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prediction of corporate pro-social behavior than widely accepted arguments in the extant literature. In the
second chapter, I study the performance consequences of disaster giving by complementing the effect of
economic reliance with insights from the literature on sensemaking. I argue that the firm’s financial
reward or loss associated with non-market decisions made under high informational and time constraints
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donation, or stakeholder needs. This occurs because firms and external stakeholders follow different
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decide about the contextual appropriateness of organizational decisions and spur action. While
stakeholders rely on pre-disaster media reputation, firms focus on financial performance. In the
concluding chapter, I study the effect of corporate disaster giving on the magnitude and speed of national
recovery from natural disasters. I draw on the dynamic capabilities literature to argue that firms
economically reliant to the affected country are better-equipped than other entities to sense areas of need
following a disaster, seize response opportunities, and reconfigure resources for efficient relief efforts.
The evidence shows that nations benefit greatly from the intervention of economically-reliant firms when
disasters strike.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Management

First Advisor
Witold Henisz

Keywords
business responses to disasters, corporate donations, non-market strategy, systematic risk

Subject Categories
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Economics | Management Sciences and
Quantitative Methods
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2179

DRIVERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF NON-MARKET DECISION-MAKING:
EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL CORPORATE DISASTER GIVING

Luis Ballesteros
A DISSERTATION
in
Management
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2017
Supervisor of Dissertation
_____________________
Witold Henisz
Deloitte & Touche Professor of Management in Honor of Russell E. Palmer, former
Managing Partner
Graduate Group Chairperson
______________________
Catherine Schrand, Celia Z. Moh Professor, Professor of Accounting
Dissertation Committee:
Mauro Guillén, Dr. Felix Zandman Professor, Professor of International Management
Exequiel Hernández, Assistant Professor of Management
Michael Useem, William and Jacalyn Egan Professor of Management
Tyler Wry, Assistant Professor of Management

Drivers and Consequences of Non-Market Decision-making under Uncertainty: Evidence from Global
Corporate Disaster Giving
COPYRIGHT
2017
Luis Ballesteros

This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
License
To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/

DEDICATION

It has been 10 years. It started as the most unexpected moment in my life. Being married
to you encapsulates what overcoming and succeeding means in my mind. For all the great
moments during our life in Philadelphia, for all the difficult ones—I continued just for
you, thanks to you. Renata, this is not a dedication of my dissertation, nor a dedication of
my doctoral degree. This is a confirmation that I dedicate my life to you.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Being the first of my family to achieve this educational degree, all the clichés apply.
Perhaps the most relevant is when I include my dissertation committee in the picture.
They took the risk to take a rebellious, naïve kid from Mexico City under their wing,
which implied blood and sweat for them. It was not only teaching me about the academic
world and aligning my work to the literature. It was psychological counseling, offering
suggestions on sleep training my daughters, recommending travel ideas and, in general,
being friends. I was extremely lucky to have Mike, Mauro, Tyler, and Zeke.
One thing I don’t remember is that one piece of paper with research ideas that Vit did not
review. I am not limiting to finished paper drafts, but also extended abstracts, the
paragraph on a potential project, the diagram and I sketched when I suddenly woke up at
3:00am. He read thoroughly every single research product I created during my doctoral
program; every single one. He crowded out his weekend time and family holidays to
dedicate attention to guide me, teach me; over and over again.
I have no doubt that if one good day I become a successful scholar, I will think of these
five professors and look back to these years at Wharton Management with immense
gratitude: the financial support, the advice, the learning; the confidence, the dedication,
the friendship. It was the cornerstone—a solid, wonderful cornerstone.

iv

ABSTRACT
DRIVERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF NON-MARKET DECISION-MAKING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL CORPORATE DISASTER
GIVING
Luis Ballesteros
Witold Henisz
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the determinants of
non-market strategy and its consequences for the firm and external stakeholders by
studying the provision of collective goods in the aftermath of natural disasters. I use an
integrative theoretical framework whose cornerstone is the strength of a firm's economic
connection with a national market, or economic reliance. I build this construct by
drawing on insights from the theory of clubs. In the first chapter, I argue that firms
consider the relative importance of a national market’s collective goods for their own
operation when they decide to engage in its provision—i.e., to behave pro-socially. Using
a model of economic reliance that considers the market standing of the firm, market
concentration, and the country’s institutional development, I empirically show that
accounting for economic reliance results in a more accurate prediction of corporate prosocial behavior than widely accepted arguments in the extant literature. In the second
chapter, I study the performance consequences of disaster giving by complementing the
effect of economic reliance with insights from the literature on sensemaking. I argue that
the firm’s financial reward or loss associated with non-market decisions made under high
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informational and time constraints are often socially constructed and not strongly
associated with the physical characteristics of the firm, its donation, or stakeholder needs.
This occurs because firms and external stakeholders follow different prominent and easy
to collect signals not associated with the focal decision (i.e., cognitive referents) to decide
about the contextual appropriateness of organizational decisions and spur action. While
stakeholders rely on pre-disaster media reputation, firms focus on financial performance.
In the concluding chapter, I study the effect of corporate disaster giving on the magnitude
and speed of national recovery from natural disasters. I draw on the dynamic capabilities
literature to argue that firms economically reliant to the affected country are betterequipped than other entities to sense areas of need following a disaster, seize response
opportunities, and reconfigure resources for efficient relief efforts. The evidence shows
that nations benefit greatly from the intervention of economically-reliant firms when
disasters strike.
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PREFACE
What determines firms’ engagement in the provision of collective goods that benefit
external stakeholders—i.e., pro-social behavior? And what are the conditions and
mechanisms of performance benefits associated with such behavior, and those of an
economic surplus for external stakeholders? The goal of this dissertation is to address
these questions that lie at the heart of corporate non-market strategy. I pursue this goal
by studying a growing non-market strategy: the company provision of monetary and inkind resources in the aftermath of natural disasters. Between 1990 and 2015, for
instance, the fraction of the 10,000 largest multinational enterprises engaging in
corporate disaster giving in any given year went from 15% to over 70% and their average
donation increased 18 times. Thus, firms have been responsible for the largest increase in
proportional participation to disaster aid and, for some disasters, their total donation has
surpassed the combined contribution by governments, multilateral agencies, and private
charity (Ballesteros, Useem, & Wry, 2017).1
In comparison, the literature on corporate disaster giving has expanded at a slow rate
and become increasingly equivocal over time. Behind this ambiguity, there is a crucial
factor that academic research has neglected: how firms’ economic reliance to market
systems —i.e., the extent to which firms sell, buy, or rent raw materials, final products,
or services, or hire human capital to/from a given market system—explains the corporate

1

For instance, firms accounted for 55.4% of international aid for the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in
Chile, 68.3% for the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in Japan and 51.7% for Typhoon Haiyan in the
Philippines—more aid than all other international sources combined (OCHA, 2016).

xi

provision of collective goods and its consequences. The essence of this relationship is
captured by a manager from Coca Cola when reflecting on Coke’s motives to donate in
the aftermath of the 2011 disaster that devastated East Japan: “We are part of a system.
If the Japanese government cannot (effect a recovery) … we need to rebuild, we need the
market to recover,” 2 he said. This argument was recurrent across my interviews with
corporations donating to Japan and Chile in the aftermath of the 2010 disaster. These
informants pointed to a strategic consideration that existing theories on non-market
strategy do not capture (Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2017).
Economic Reliance and the Corporate Provision of Collective Goods
My dissertation thus follows an integrative theoretical framework that centers on the
economic reliance of firms to market systems to study the drivers and consequences of
corporate disaster giving. This framework centers on insights from the theory of clubs
(Buchanan, 1965), which marked a theoretical departure from the pure public-goods
approach (cf., Samuelson, 1954) 3 by suggesting that universal accessibility of collective
goods—i.e., the pure public good—is rare. Instead, societies are comprised by systems,
or clubs that entities need to join to use certain physical assets and social benefits. A club
is a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from production costs and consumption
rights of collective goods (Sandler, 2013).

2

International Public Affairs, Coca-Cola Company, in interview with the author.
The theory of public goods outlines the conditions and potential threats for the establishment and
sustainability of social systems of non-excludable goods that are too costly as to be provided by a private
(non-central) agent and whose benefits require the organization of co-operative, collective sharing
arrangements.
3
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I argue that market systems—i.e., socioeconomic and political structures for
commercial exchange, such as national markets, are economic clubs that firms join
through their economic affiliation. Market systems are comprised by club goods—i.e.,
collective goods that are exclusive of the market and necessary to maintain, improve, or
reestablish its welfare. Local infrastructure is thus a public good from the perspective of
local market—i.e., in the absence of membership fees or quotas, any firm operating in
the local market can use the roads or telecommunication systems. However, such
infrastructure is a club good from the perspective of a global economic system in which
the local market is only a part.
The intuition is simple. In the context of the disruption created by disasters, relief and
recovery are club goods whose scarcity may reduce the expected profitability and
sustainability of firms that rely economically in the affected market. These firms have a
strategic need in the reestablishment of the market’s status quo through relief (e.g.,
provision of water, food, and first aid), and restoration of education, health,
transportation, communication, and housing. The biggest the share of a firm’s financial
performance explained by a disaster-stricken country, the greater the strategic value for
the firm of contributing to the country’s relief and recovery. That is, corporate pro-social
behavior that is driven by economic reliance is in line with profit maximization and,
indeed, a form of strategic consideration.
Therefore, if economic reliance to specific markets varies across firms and across
time, this second-moment should play a non-trivial role in collective action among
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multinational enterprises because it explains their willingness to supply collective goods.
This means that firms with a negative expectation to freeride have a comparatively
greater interest on the recovery of the market. In other words, corporate disaster giving,
and corporate pro-social behavior in general, can be studied by applying essential
insights from game theory (Camerer & Fehr, 2002). Identifying a prominent causal
factor of corporate donations thus centers on formalizing measures of economic reliance
that a given firm has in the affected country market.
What the construct of economic reliance brings to the literature?
If the causal effect of economic reliance on pro-social behavior is sizeable, the study
of corporate disaster giving calls for a theoretical paradigm absent in the extant literature
on non-market strategy. This literature has shown that modeling corporate pro-social
behavior as a pure public good is inappropriate because such behavior may not be
unselfish at all (cf., Dorobantu et al., 2017; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). Widely evoked
theories based on strategic considerations approaches emphasize the role of reputational
capital (Muller & Kräussl, 2011), consumer visibility (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014),
informal risk hedging (Douty, 1972), or rent-seeking behavior (Marquis & Qian, 2013).
Scholars have found that corporate giving responds to institutional pressures at the local
(Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013) and national levels (Zhang & Luo, 2013). To a lesser extent,
social-preferences approaches argue that managers pursue psychological and
sociological objectives (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002).
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Despite such theoretical separation, the literature on corporate disaster giving and the
broader scholarship on non-market strategy continue to rely largely on the Samuelsonian
assumption that private actors benefit of the collective good by virtue of their provision
(Andreoni, 1989; Dorobantu et al., 2017; Kaul & Luo, 2017; Roberts, 1984; Yildirim,
2013).4 However, this assumption is not easy to generalize.
Imagine that Coke had no operations in Japan in 2010 and no future interest to enter
such market. Scholars would argue that Coke’s donation resulted in a direct benefit, such
as a warm glow that it is appropriated by its employees (Flammer & Luo, 2015;
Yildirim, 2013) or an indirect benefit, such as buttressing the support of soda consumers
interested in the welfare of Japanese victims (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011). However, it is
unclear how Coke appropriated the collective good per se. In other words, it is unclear
how firms with no economic reliance benefit directly from the rebuilt roads and housing
in Japan, for instance.
The sources of benefits of disaster giving for an economically-reliant firm come from
the market’s exclusive collective goods—i.e., club goods—and the private goods—i.e.,
the firm may capture direct (e.g., a warm glow) and indirect utility (e.g., reputational
capital) or both. On the other hand, the benefits of firms with no economic reliance are
not a function of the club goods of the affected market. Distinguishing between high and

4

The management literature has overcome the theoretical limitations of the public-goods model
regarding the private gains associated with the provision of collective goods. On the one hand, strategicconsiderations approaches hypothesize that giving is instrumental for the achievement of indirect benefits.
On the other hand, the less developed literature on social-preferences explain that managers indeed achieve
intrinsic gains such as the satisfaction of altruistic or reciprocal motivations (Muller et al., 2014), prestige
and respect (Jia & Zhang, 2011) or the avoidance of social scorn (Zagefka & James, 2015).
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low demanders of such goods thus derives in the identification of firms with a relatively
high willigness to engage in pro-social behavior.
In summary, economically affiliated firms give with relatively high frequency and
magnitude because they have more certain and proximate benefits associated with a
market’s club goods and face lower information asymmetry and transactions costs of
giving than non-affiliated firms (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016).
Pro-social behavior is less frequent among non-affiliated multinational firms because
they are part of a broader public-goods systems where free-riding is pervasive (Alessi,
1975; Douty, 1972).
In Chapter 1, I offer evidence that the effect of economic reliance is not explained by
the traditional strategic considerations such as reputational capital with internal (Flammer
& Luo, 2015) and external stakeholders (Muller & Kräussl, 2011), a social license to
operate (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011), an agency cost (Jia & Zhang, 2011), or institutional
pressures (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Likewise, it is not captured by the socialpreferences theories of altruism (Batson & Powell, 2003) and fairness (Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Additionally, the explanatory power of economic reliance is
not equaled by physical distance (Muller & Whiteman, 2008) or embeddedness (Jamali &
Neville, 2011). Overall, this suggests that study that centers on economic reliance
uncovers a form of strategic consideration whose effect remains understudied.
Error! Reference source not found. compares the optimization problem of
corporate pro-social behavior using my approach, social-preferences’ impure altruism,
xvi

and alternative strategic considerations approaches. In addition to the role of economic
reliance, I integrate the role of cognitive affiliation. As noted, building on club goods and
using economic reliance as baseline achieves a clear characterization of the set of agents
that benefit from the market’s exclusive collective goods and, consequently, have a
relatively high willingness to donate to such a market. Error! Reference source not
found. summarizes the predictions of my model, social preferences, and strategic
considerations.

Table 1. Comparison of the optimization problem in the corporate provision of collective
goods
Model
Pure public-goods
Pure
altruism
Social
preferences
Impure
altruism
Alternative strategic
considerations
Clubs theory of
economic reliance and
pro-social behavior

Club members
(firms with economic reliance)
No cognitive
Cognitive affiliation
affiliation

Non-members
(firms with no economic reliance)
No cognitive
Cognitive affiliation
affiliation
𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺)
where X is the set of private goods, G is the set of club goods, g is the private gain (e.g., a warm glow)
𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺, 𝑔)

𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺)

𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺, 𝑔)

𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺)

𝑈𝑡0 (𝑋); 𝑈𝑡1 (𝑋, 𝑧);
where z is a form of indirect utility in time 1 (e.g., gain out of reputational capital) out of the donation
made in time 0
𝑼(𝑿, 𝑮, 𝒈)

𝑈(𝑋, 𝐺)

𝑈(𝑋, 𝑔)

𝑈(𝑋)

Table 2. A comparison of predictions with impure altruism and alternative strategic
considerations

Moderator

Main prediction:
Economic reliance affects positively
donation likelihood and magnitude
Exclusivity of the club (market
size)

Clubs theory of economic
reliance and pro-social
behavior

Social Preferences’
Impure Altruism

Alternative arguments in
strategic considerations

+

+

-

Intervention of central providers

-

-

+

Quality of governance (agency
5
problem )

-

+/-

No clear prediction in the
literature

Social standing

+

+/-

-

5

Where the principal is the market membership and the agency is the club management (i.e.,
regulatory institutions).
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The findings in Chapter 1 suggest that the average donor is a firm economically
proximate to the affected market, with a prominent level of social standing, and
operating in monopolistic markets. Furthermore, the frequency and size of corporate
giving drops with the intervention of local governmental agencies, but increases with
external intervention and national development.
Economic Reliance and the Consequences of Corporate Disaster Giving
The causal relationship between economic reliance and disaster giving should also
provide a baseline for analyzing the consequences of such behavior. As explained above,
when corporate revenue is a function of the economic welfare of the market, corporate
donors gain benefits from the collective good—i.e., recovery—and not only from the
private good—e.g., reputation. Moreover, corporate donors with economic reliance may
also obtain greater private benefits than donors with no reliance because such connection
materializes institutional forces affecting stakeholder expectations (Marquis, Davis, &
Glynn, 2013). This aligns with the prediction that companies will act in the public good
when doing so serves their own interests (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011).
However, the extant empirical literature embraces little nuance to understand the
value of this argument as it commonly limits to assess post-donation differences between
donors and non-donors (Crampton & Patten, 2008; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller &
Kräussl, 2011). When studying the implications for firm value, scholars have left behind
two important characteristics of corporate disaster giving that may affect how businesses
benefit from such behavior. First, the combination of donation timing and size is,
xviii

arguably, an important determinant of the capacity to profit from disaster giving. The
theoretical prediction in the extant literature is that the donation amount that would yield
the largest per donor value should vary across companies because of differences, such as
market share and size (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009). Nevertheless, the pattern of
significantly different firms donating the same amount with different timing occurs in
almost 65% of natural disasters with corporate donations in the period 2000-2015. Thus,
one may expect that the lack of consideration of donation timing has led to incorrect
measurements of the size and direction of the relationship between disaster giving and
financial performance.
Integrating theoretical elements from the timing strategy literature (Fosfuri, Lanzolla,
& Suarez, 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013) to the role of economic reliance thus
is a promising method to study the material consequences of disaster giving. Holding
everything else constant one face the following questions: is the first economically-reliant
corporation to donate more likely to realize rents than one that is subsequently donating
an identical amount or one than is subsequently donating a different amount?
Additionally, is the imitator better off than the firm deviating from the amount donated
by the economically-reliant first mover?
Similarly, when studying the economic consequences of corporate disaster giving for
external stakeholders, accounting for the effect of economic reliance should offer a
method to identify those firms with specific capabilities to generate economic surplus.
That is, holding everything else constant, stakeholder benefit is a function of the
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capabilities of the corporate donor to deploy its aid in a certain manner that meets their
needs and expectations. Economically-reliant firms should scan post-disaster needs at the
local level and deliver aid more efficiently than entities with no economic reliance (Kaul
& Luo, 2017).
To the extent that decisions about how to respond to market disruptions are best made
when informed by nuanced and diverse data. Economically-connected firms are likely to
benefit from local relationships developed through their operations. They use local grassroots relationships, affiliate networks, and partner organizations to assess disaster
damages and to determine where aid is most urgently needed and will have the greatest
impact (Useem, Kunreuther, & Michel-Kerjan, 2015). That is, a source of a comparative
advantage of firms to deploy aid is their economic reliance to the affected country
market.
Why is important to complement the role of economic reliance (based on clubgoods theory) with managerial and institutional arguments?
Despite the arguments above, relying solely on the strategic value of economic
reliance is likely to produce a theoretical framework with serious econometric
deficiencies due to the behavioral and institutional forces affecting the decision to engage
in disaster giving. In fact, the literature has relied heavily on the assumption of
deliberative thinking among corporate donors and their stakeholders (Luo, Zhang, &
Marquis, 2016; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Zhang & Luo, 2013).
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Managers are portrayed as users of computation and logics (Matten & Moon, 2008)
that undertake trade-offs (Flammer, 2013), recognize relevant interdependencies
(Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007) and, ultimately, assess the characteristics of corporate
pro-social behavior that maximizes its associated private returns (Aguinis & Glavas,
2012; Porter & Kramer, 2006). Likewise, external stakeholders are often considered as
actors that have copious data on the expected outcomes of different organizational
decisions (Hillman & Keim, 2001), which allow them to focus attention on the
determinants of socially efficient responses (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014) and identify their
substantiveness and sincerity (Cuypers, Koh, & Wang, 2015).
However, like other non-market decisions, corporate disaster giving occurs under
conditions of high uncertainty, causal ambiguity, and time pressure. First, the potential
material and human impacts of disasters to the firm and the market are often difficult to
estimate. Information on the social need is often unavailable or inaccurate for months
(Kousky, 2013). Firms often make donation decisions that conflict with the logics of
market operation (Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009) and follow referents not
necessarily associated with the characteristics of the emergency (Wassenhove, Tomasini,
& Stapleton, 2008). The mining firm Anglo American, for instance, used its annual social
budget in Chile as a referent for its donation in the aftermath of the 2010 disaster.6
Second, a calculation of the expected benefits associated with particular
characteristics of the donation is complex (Kunreuther, Meyer, & Zeckhauser, 2002).

6

VP of Corporate Affairs in interview with the author.
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Disaster giving is an infrequent and unstructured behavior for most firms whose
projection in the annual financial plan is rare (Ballesteros, 2015). Furthermore, the
uniqueness of disasters hampers the value of experience. Firms often have to deal with
temporal institutional arrangements and societal contexts for which they lack information
(Klinenberg, 2003). They are involved with myriad non-traditional stakeholders whose
strategic role is hard to discern (Zyck & Kent, 2014). Moreover, external stakeholders
commonly lack the cognitive resources to assess the economic value of firms’ choices
(White & Lang, 2012).
In these contexts of uncertainty and causal ambiguity, firms face a decisive tradeoff
when deciding to donate. Waiting can bring relevant data. Laggards have better
understanding of the association between corporate choices and stakeholder reactions
than early movers had. Yet, on average, about 84% of corporate pledges come within a
month of the disaster, when information of the impact to the firm and the market, and
stakeholder needs is scarce (E. Cavallo, Galiani, Noy, & Pantano, 2013). This suggests
that capturing rents has a comparatively short span and decision makers do not engage in
lengthy processes of exploration (Kaplan, 2008). Given these conditions, scholars have
underappreciated the possibility that the performance consequences of non-market
choices are often socially constructed.
To theoretically account for high informational and time constraints that result in a
collapse in the mental processes that facilitate deliberative thinking (Camerer &
Kunreuther, 1989; Weick, 1996), I complement the arguments from club-goods theory
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with the microfoundations of institutional theory (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), and
particularly the role of sensemaking (Weick, 1996). Sensemaking brings meaning to “an
undifferentiated flux of fleeting sense-impressions…” (Chia, 2000).., the micro-processes
behind the generation of institutions are simple and aimed at interpretation (Weick, 1996;
Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014).
In chaotic contexts, decision-makers engage in constructivism and rely on cognitive
referents or prominent and widely available signals whose gathering entails a low
transactional cost and are not necessarily associated with the focal good or decision
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011; Wry et al., 2014). Cognitive
referents represent measures of appropriateness valid in a specific socioeconomic context
where choices and exchanges of goods take place and help decision-makers interpret the
potential consequences, its contextual appropriateness, and spur action (Bitektine, 2011).
A prominent idea in my dissertation is that firms and external stakeholders differ in
the cognitive referents that they use to manage informational and time constraints. I test
this idea in chapter 2 and show that while firms follow their peers’ financial performance,
stakeholders focus on firms’ pre-disaster media reputation to form beliefs of their
corporate capacity to respond efficiently to the catastrophe. A positive reputation,
measured by the net pre-event media coverage sentiment score, provides a signal to
customers, governments and other stakeholders that an organization is apt to select
options whose means and ends are contextually appropriate (Galaskiewicz, 1997). Thus,
reputable first movers are likely to accrue first-mover advantages. The legitimization of
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their behavior influences consumers, for instance, to increase willingness to pay for the
firm’s goods when faced with market choices (Sirsly & Lamertz, 2007), workers to be
more productive for a given wage (Flammer & Luo, 2015) and governments or other
external stakeholders to give the firm preferential treatment (Henisz, 2014).
Comparatively, firms with bad reputations are prone to suffer larger performance
shortfalls. Because these firms recurrently lead the industry in responding to disasters
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011) and they may also be strong performers (Weigelt & Camerer,
1988), imitation often results in performance losses. At the same time, I argue that
mimicking reputable firms generates legitimization spillovers that can override followers’
bad reputation and imitating a first mover with a negative reputation results in spillover
harm (Barnett & King, 2008).
Given these institutional forces, firms err frequently in their timing and imitation
choices due to the salience of cognitive referents when making fast strategic decisions
under high uncertainty and ambiguity (Kunreuther et al., 2002; Pahnke, Katila, &
Eisenhardt, 2015). Followers find difficult to divert from the choices of high-performing
first movers (Henisz & Delios, 2001) because they consider these firms comparatively
successful in identifying stakeholder expectations (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and abiding
by institutions (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). This exacerbates the negative consequences
of the divergence in cognitive referents between firms and stakeholders because firms
with bad reputations see moving first as a chance to accumulate reputational capital
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011).
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In other words, my dissertation proposes that corporate disaster giving is a nonmarket area where pro-social behavior is often uncorrelated with underlying
characteristics of the social need. This variance is also not directly proportional to the
scale of the rent; firms gain performance benefits despite their donation being
economically suboptimal. Hence, performance advantages created in institutional
contexts like the aftermath of disasters are more a function of stakeholder perceptions of
the contextual appropriateness of the corporate response—i.e., its legitimacy in the eyes
of stakeholders—than a function of its objective social value. This proposition represents
a departure from the extant literature where the material benefits are mostly associated
with the characteristics of the organizational choices and the physical characteristics of
the donor (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & Kräussl, 2011).
Finally, a systematic evaluation of the implications of corporate disaster giving for
stakeholder welfare is absent in the empirical literature; a reflection of the focus on the
broader scholarship on non-market strategy (cf., Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Mellahi,
Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2015). The idea that societies benefit from corporate disaster
giving has generally been assumed rather than systematically evaluated. Conceptually,
the topic has been subject to significant tension. Some work, for instance, suggests that
corporate intervention focuses more on firm goals than stakeholder interests,
symbolically addressing them but not genuinely responding to them (Cuypers et al.,
2015; Marquis & Qian, 2013). At the essence of these empirical issues is the lack of
theory to predict the conditions and mechanisms under which corporate pro-social
behavior generates social value (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Kaul & Luo, 2017).
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When building a theoretical argumentation based on economic reliance for studying
the economic value of disaster giving, Professors Michael Useem, Tyler Wry and I
considered that disaster-stricken nations may obtain disaster relief and recovery from
different sources. Here we confronted the question that, while the business community
has the potential to contribute to social welfare based on their resources and influence,
this work may be best left to entities such as government—e.g., USAID—and
multilateral agencies—e.g., UNOCHA—that specialize in these activities and can be held
accountable for their pursuit (Frynas, 2005; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). We then suggest
considering the unique capabilities of firms as a social entity, and the situations where
these capabilities are likely to be deployed in ways that yield positive social outcomes.
We chose the literature on dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) as an
ideal theory that complements club-goods theory to conduct this comparative evaluation
of the social value of corporate giving. Studies in this literature examine how firms sense
threats in the external environment, seize response opportunities, and reconfigure routines
and resources to do so (Teece, 2007). Although, this approach is commonly used to
explain variance in firm-specific performance, there is evidence that dynamic capabilities
vary systemically among entities with different forms (Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Recent
work applies the dynamic capabilities framework to study the management of stakeholder
expectations via corporate diplomacy (Henisz, 2016).
We draw on this work to argue that firms have dynamic capabilities that enable them
to address social needs in the aftermath of disasters more effectively than other types of
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entities. Following Teece (2007), we decompose dynamic capabilities and suggest firms
with economic reliance in disaster-stricken nations are well suited to sense threats and
diagnose areas of critical need following a disaster, seize upon opportunities to respond,
and swiftly reconfigure routines and resources to do so effectively.
We complete this argumentation by reflecting on the strategic value of firm specific
versus general routines and resources. Applied to disasters, this idea points to a
distinction between firms that respond with general resources—such as donating money
to relief efforts—versus those that respond by reconfiguring areas of core expertise.
According to the dynamic capabilities literature, firms work to develop areas of core
expertise around co-specialized routines and resources, which they then look to deploy in
response to environmental shocks (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Teece, 2014).
Calculating a Measure of Economic Reliance
To construct a measure of economic reliance, I considered three variables—i.e.,
subsidiaries, sales, and employees—and focused on the share of company affiliates in the
country (adjusted for corporate hierarchy) as the main explanatory variable. This measure
captures the strategic role of organizational structure in the firm’s economic dependency
to geographical markets (cf., Andersson et al. 2002). The calculation entailed the
following steps:
To account for the diverse types of affiliates, such as joint ventures and fully-owned
subsidiaries, I used the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations database to code for the type
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of affiliate and its relative importance for the corporation.7 I calculated the ratio of the
number of affiliates of a given company level in the disaster country to the total number
of affiliates of the same company level at the international level. For instance, a company
that has three of its 10 affiliates level “5” in one country has a ratio of 3/10 for level “5”
in that specific country. Finally, I obtained the sum of weighted ratios of all the available
company levels. I calculate economic reliance based on the status of firm affiliates on the
official day of the occurrence of the disaster.8
With this procedure, I produce a conservative estimation of economic reliance. First,
firms that have the interest of entering the market in the near future have, arguably, a
higher motivation to aid the system than firms with no such prospective consideration.
Likewise, firms that plan to exit the market system in the immediate future after the
occurrence of the disaster should have few incentives to give. Second, economic reliance
does not include export and import and sporadic activity not represented in the Corporate
Affiliations database. That is, the number of corporate donors with some sort of

This scale starts with “0,” for headquarters, and it goes as many levels as the organizational tree has
(e.g., a “9” indicates eight levels between the specific affiliate and the headquarters). To consider the
descending relative importance of affiliates as the distance from the top organizational structure increases, I
assigned each affiliate with its reciprocal inverted value. For instance, for a firm with nine levels in the
organizational tree, the headquarters received the number “9;” and affiliates at the bottom of the
organizational tree, a “1.”
8
For example, to calculate the economic reliance of 1.95811 that the corporation Amgen had to
Turkey during the Izmit earthquake, I obtained the number of subsidiaries of a given hierarchical level in
Turkey on the 1st of May of 2003.The firm had 8 affiliates of level 5, 6 of level 3, and 3 of level 2. Then I
calculated the share of subsidiaries by adding the ratios of the number of affiliates by level in Turkey to the
total number of Amgen affiliates by level at the international level. Amgen had in total 49 subsidiaries of
level 5, 38 of level 3, and 15 of level 2. Hence, [(8/49) + (6/38)+(3/15)]. Given that Amgen has seven
organizational levels on 5/1/2003 (i.e., 0 to 6), the assigned index values for Turkish affiliates are “2” for
level 5, “4” for level 3, and “5” for level 2. I multiplied these values to the correspondent ratio. Thus,
[((8/49) x 2)+ )+((6/38) x 4)+((3/15) x 5)].
7
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economic reliance is likely higher than the one reflected in the analyses, which is likely to
result in the underestimation of its effect.
An integrative theoretical framework for the study of corporate disaster giving
Therefore, my dissertation combines the main predictions of the theory of clubs
identify with sensemaking and dynamic capabilities. Through the integration of these
theories, I propose a methodology to predict which firms will donate frequently and in
large amounts (i.e., those that are economically reliant to a national market), when firms
will be better off by donating first, imitating or deviating from the donation amount of the
first donor (i.e., when economically-reliant firms focus on the cognitive referents used by
stakeholders—media reputation—instead of the cognitive referent used by firms—
financial performance), and when corporate donors have a comparative advantage to
generate economic surplus (i.e., when they have local operations and use their core
competences to deliver aid).
This integrative framework results in more precise predictions regarding the pattern
of corporate giving with respect to characteristics of the event, the country in which it
occurs, the timing relative to peer donations, and its competitive and economic
implications than extant theories employed in the extant literature. This literature offers
conflicting accounts about the characteristics of corporate donors and the conditions and
mechanisms under which these donors realize performance benefits and generate
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economic value for external stakeholders.9 Most of these studies are cross-sectional
evaluations (covering a single or a few events) of publicly-listed U.S. corporations—a
reflection of the empirical literature in non-market strategy (Dorobantu et al., 2017). This
trend represents a valid concern for the achievement of statistical regularities given the
longitudinal fragmentation of the phenomenon at the international level and the diversity
in the country of origin of corporate donors (White & Lang, 2012).
Using my theoretical approach, for instance, I show that monopolistic firms engage in
pro-social behavior more frequently and in a greater magnitude than firms operating in
fragmented industries. This finding challenges empirical work in the institutional and
strategic philanthropy literatures suggesting that the benefits of corporate pro-social
behavior are comparatively large in competitive industries where the quest and returns to
differentiation are relative big (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009).
Complementing the effect of economic reliance with institutional factors that affect
how firms and external stakeholders perceive behavior (Powell & Colyvas, 2008), I show
that firms often follow wrong cognitive referents and make inefficient decisions
regarding their engagement in disaster giving. I found that 43% of first corporate
9

Some authors, for instance, show that firms with a local presence in disaster-stricken countries are
frequent donors (Muller & Whiteman, 2008), while others have found that the giving from locallyheadquartered firms is comparatively low in the wake of high-impact disasters (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
Similarly, the literature on the consequences of corporate disaster giving provides ambiguous insights of
the strategic value of such behavior. Some authors have found that some corporate donors do not realize
sizeable returns. Particularly, firms with a reputation for social irresponsibility—proxied by the concerns
data from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini database, which are frequent donors, obtain insignificant
short-run insurance value of their stock prices. They still suffer price drops associated with the disaster
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011). Conversely, other studies find support of a positive association between disaster
giving and financial performance measured by cumulative abnormal market returns (Madsen & Rodgers,
2014).
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responders in my sample obtained revenue lower than expected from pre-disaster trends.
Furthermore, almost 51% of the time, firms engaging in this behavior obtained negative
performance consequences that were significantly larger than the size of their donations.
By bringing insights from institutional theory, I show empirically that firms need to
consider pre-disaster media reputation when choosing when to lead or who to follow. I
show that, under high informational and time constraints, the argument that moving fast
with a large and substantive action accrues greater material benefits than a late, small,
and symbolic choice often does not hold (Anderson, 2010; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006;
Posen, Lee, & Yi, 2013). I provide evidence that the divergence in cognitive referents
between firms and stakeholders is enduring even when the degrees of uncertainty and
ambiguity subside.
Finally, my dissertation shows that, contrary to what the statistics on corporate
philanthropy suggest (Becerra, Cavallo, & Noy, 2014; Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner,
2014; Kellett & Caravani, 2013; White & Lang, 2012), firms with an economic reliance
in the affected country detect more efficiently a country’s economic vulnerability to large
calamities than public and multilateral donors. We confirm that economic reliance offers
firms an advantageous position to help drive timely delivery of disaster aid, thereby
lessening the adverse impact of natural disasters on social welfare.
My dissertation thus offers evidence for the societal benefits of the corporate
provision of collective goods and identify factors that generate and enhance positive
outcomes. This addresses a weak spot in the non-market strategy literature and
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complements firm-level studies by suggesting that, at least in the context of disaster aid,
strategic pro-social behavior may indeed be a win-win proposition (McWilliams &
Siegel, 2011).
In conclusion, the integrative theoretical framework of my dissertation reconciles the
evidence of the corporate provision of collective goods with the theory on disaster giving.
When complementing club-goods theory with institutional and managerial approaches,
my dissertation offers insights on how core strategy theories can inform the study of nonmarket behavior conducted under high informational and time constraints. Chapter 1
identifies conditions and mechanisms under which private actors can overcome the
collective action problems outlined by theories on public choice (Morgan & Tumlinson,
2012). Firms with comparatively high stakes in the country market are particularly prone
to cooperate in its sustainability because foregoing market profit entails a high
opportunity cost. Orders of economic reliance are likely to distribute stakeholders
according to their strategic value for the firm (Freeman, 2010), and affect how firms
relate to them (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999), and the frequency and magnitude
by which firms invest resources to meet their expectations (Henisz, 2014).
Given that the findings suggest that proximity to the disaster damage affects the
drivers and consequences of corporate giving, my work is relevant for the study of the
non-market strategy of multinational enterprises. The exposure of these firms to disaster
risk is historically at the peak due to the internationalization of capital and global
interdependencies (Boehm, 2014; A. Cavallo, Cavallo, & Rigobon, 2013). Similarly, the
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economic hardship associated with natural disasters is expected to continue to grow
globally because of expanding human settlement in disaster-prone areas (Cutter, Emrich,
Webb, & Morath, 2009; Dong & Tomlin, 2012; Kunreuther & Useem, 2009; von Peter,
von Dahlen, & Saxena, 2012). Traditional sources of humanitarian aid and standard
insurance practices have not proven sufficient to disaster losses, particularly in large
markets (Kellett & Caravani, 2013; Noy, 2012; Weitzman, 2011). The value of corporate
disaster giving for socioeconomic development is thus likely to increase over time. In this
context, the cardinal practical question will be how such form of pro-social behavior can
be stimulated and disciplined organically, and this dissertation may inform such
endeavor.
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CHAPTER 1
“We are part of a system. If the Japanese government cannot… we need to rebuild, we need the market to
recover.”
Manager, Coca Cola, in the aftermath of the 2011 tsunami and earthquake in East Japan

INTRODUCTION
The study of what drives firms to incur a cost and provide goods that benefit
communities external to the organization—pro-social behavior—has primarily focused
on the argument that business decision makers achieve a direct or indirect gain by giving
(Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2011; Marquis et al., 2007; Muller & Whiteman, 2008; Porter
& Kramer, 2002; Whiteman, Muller, & Voort, 2005). Yet work embedded in social
preferences—a desire to win social and psychological objectives such as prestige and
respect (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Marquis et al., 2007; Olson, 1971), and strategic
considerations—instrumental achievements that help the organization “do well by doing
good” (Godfrey, 2005; McWilliams & Siegel, 2011)—provides little attention to the fact
that such pro-social behavior often results in collective goods that firms themselves
require for their market operation. That is, firms vary in their need for geographically
located goods, such as transportation and communication systems, the availability of
qualified labor force, or the maintenance of consumer purchasing capacity; these goods
are critical for firm performance and sustainability (Gimeno, 1999). This chapter
investigates the role of this variance in the organizational decision to supply collective
goods.

1

Building on the theory of club goods initiated by Buchanan (1965), I argue that
organizations benefit from certain collective goods through their economic reliance on
markets; that is, the extent to which they sell, buy, or rent raw materials, final products or
services, or hire human capital to/from geographical communities. Because market gains
are a function of club goods (i.e., collective goods that are exclusive of a market system
and necessary to sustain, improve, or reestablish its welfare, such as social and economic
infrastructure), ceteris paribus, a firm’s willingness to behave pro-socially in a given
market is directly proportional to that market’s relative economic importance for that
firm. Thus, economically affiliated firms give with relatively high frequency and
magnitude because they have more certain and proximate benefits associated with a
market’s club goods and face lower transactions costs of philanthropy than non-affiliated
firms. Pro-social behavior is less frequent among non-affiliated firms because they are
part of a broader public-goods systems where free-riding is pervasive (Alessi, 1975;
Douty, 1972).
The case of corporate disaster giving—organizations’ provision of pecuniary and/or
in-kind giving to disaster relief and recovery—provides an example of the potential
empirical consequences of neglecting economic reliance in the study of pro-social
behavior. For instance, consider the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that devastated East
Japan in 2011. Following the indirect-benefit paradigm, strategic philanthropy may help
identify key firm-specific characteristics that led firms to give. First, some scholars would
predict that firms with low social standing gave in the hope of accumulating reputational
capital (Du et al., 2011; Freeman, 2010; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006; Godfrey, 2005;
2

Roberts & Dowling, 2000; Sacconi, Blair, Freeman, & Vercelli, 2010). Alternatively, a
recent history of financial volatility might have motivated some managers to donate
because they aimed to smooth market performance by consumers’ goodwill from the
firm’s charitable record (Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Given the
high magnitude of the shock, a third prediction would be that managers from corporations
headquartered in Japan engaged in scarce giving (Muller & Whiteman, 2008; Tilcsik &
Marquis, 2013). This result would be attributed to two factors: financial concerns
constrained pro-social behavior, and the network of local philanthropy was damaged to
such a degree that external aid would crowd out the local response (Ballesteros & Useem,
2016).
On the other hand, scholars drawing from institutional theory suggest that
environmental factors also play a role in philanthropic incentives (Marquis et al., 2007;
Zhang & Luo, 2013).These theorists would predict that corporate giving would be greater
in fragmented than in concentrated markets serving Japan given that the quest and
potential returns to differentiation are bigger in such settings (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006;
Godfrey et al., 2009). Likewise, work on CSR predicts pro-social behavior to be
inversely associated with economic development (Twigg, 2001). Hence, the Tōhoku
disaster might have prompted a lesser amount of donation than shocks in less developed
economies, such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Finally, foreign governments’ pledging
might have fueled private giving due to firms’ interest in using political capital as a riskmanagement mechanism against stakeholder opportunistic behavior (Baker, Gibbons, &
Murphy, 2002; Godfrey et al., 2009; Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2013).
3

The empirical assessment of these predictions is difficult because decision-making is
likely endogenous to the suggested factors. The risk of documenting a spurious
relationship is particularly high since the discussed organization-specific variables (e.g.,
financial performance) and pro-social behavior are likely moving in the same direction as
idiosyncratic unobserved factors (e.g., managerial capabilities and risk aversion).
Alternatively, the direction of the causal relationship may not be clear. To address these
issues, in addition to exploit the exogeneity established by the occurrence of sudden
natural disasters,10 I tried to mitigate the potential self-selection issue of geographic
location and propensity to donate by coarsened-exact matching the data. In evaluating the
predictions, I replicated the empirical measures for a range of theoretical arguments
found in the extant literature and analyzed giving of corporations representing 40
headquarters countries to the relief fund of 3,115 natural disasters that affected 175
countries between 2003 and 2013, inclusive. The analyses suggest that the average
corporate donor was a firm economically proximate to the affected market, with a high
level of social standing, and operating in monopolistic markets. Furthermore, the
frequency and magnitude of corporate giving dropped with the intervention of local
governmental agencies, but increased with external intervention and national
development. These findings are in line with the predictions of the theoretical argument
that accounting for firms’ varying dependence on markets provides a more efficient
identification method than approaches that ignore such relationship.
10
These phenomena are, at least, exogenous to a variety of societal processes correlated with the
private provision of collective goods. However, one can argue that the magnitude of disasters and, until
some extent, their frequency may be associated with historical processes of creation and modification of
human settlements.
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By testing the robustness of my argument to factors drawn from institutional theory, I
demonstrate that economic reliance has stronger explanatory power than embeddedness
(Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Uzzi, 1996) or physical presence (Whiteman et al., 2005)
alone. Finally, this study adds to the strategy literature by analyzing corporate decision
making across national contexts, and applying the concept of business
internationalization to the understanding of firm-market dynamics. More importantly, this
chapter presents an attempt to harmonize attention to firm’s market and non-market
activity in a discussion of the potential role of corporate pro-social behavior in market
sustainability. My study also represents a parallel to the main predictions of the literature
on industry self-regulation (Baron, 2010; Barrett, 2010; Ostrom, 2003; Prakash &
Potoski, 2007).11 As I develop later in this chapter, this literature situates the motives of
the provision of collective goods (i.e., public goods) in a collectivity circumscribed by the
industry (Baron, 2009). My study focuses on the notion of a business community defined
by geographical markets, a collectivity of industries. From this perspective, my study
extends the literature on industry self-regulation to explain variance in the studied
behavior across nations (i.e., groups of industries) using a profit motive.
A THEORY OF ECONOMIC RELIANCE AND THE CORPORATE
PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS

11

For exceptional work that delineates such parallel between clubs theory and theory and industry selfregulation, I recommend the studies by Aseem Prakash on corporate engagement in environmental
regulation; notably, Prakash and Potoski (2007) and Potoski and Prakash (2005).
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Universal accessibility of collective goods (i.e., the pure public good) is rare.
Societies are comprised by systems, or clubs, that entities need to join in order to use
certain physical assets and social benefits (Buchanan, 1965). Consider a geographically
circumscribed market (i.e., a socioeconomic and political structure for commercial
exchange) a club. Only firms that are economically reliant to such local market have a
direct need of the market’s specific social and economic infrastructure and other marketexclusive collective goods (i.e., club goods) to provide products and services. In other
words, local infrastructure, for instance, may be a public good from the perspective of the
local market—in the absence of membership fees or quotas, any entity operating in the
local market can use the roads or the telecommunication systems. However, such
infrastructure is a club good from the perspective of a global economic system in which
the local market is only a part.
Therefore, firms’ dependency on a given market’s collective goods is a function of its
economic reliance to the market. The degree of local investment alters economic reliance.
From no operation, firms may sporadically rent, buy, sell, or hire raw materials, final
products, services, or human capital. Also, firms may be regular exporters, importers, or
leasers via foreign subsidiaries; or manufacturers or producers via owned transformation
facilities (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).
Empirical contexts in which overall market output falls due to the exogenous
destruction of collective goods, such as natural disasters, can help to empirically
discriminate between theoretical arguments based on club goods theory and more widely
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invoked alternatives. A firm economically affiliated with a geographical community
affected by a disaster is more likely to suffer a direct economic impact than a firm with
no such affiliation. In absence of full provision from a central entity such as a national
government, managers acting in the firm’s interest finance the reconstruction of roads,
bridges, or airports because the profitability and/or sustainability of their business depend
on the restitution of their value chain. That is, firms, along with governance institutions
and civil society groups, share the costs and benefits of club goods (Harrison &
Hirshleifer, 1989; Roberts, 1984).
Firms distribute their resources between composite demands of private goods and
collective goods and face a budget constraint. It is assumed that private organizations can
produce collective goods from private goods through a simple linear technology and
normality in private and collective goods.12 Consumption equality is not necessary.
Under a model of club goods, if the firm is a member of the market (i.e., it has an
economic reliance with a focal market system), its utility is comprised by the market’s
exclusive collective goods (i.e., club goods) and the firm assets (i.e., private goods). With
its giving, the firm may increase its utility through a direct (e.g., a warm glow) or indirect
gain (e.g., reputational capital) or both. On the other hand, if firm is a non-member, its
utility is not a function of club goods.
Thus, business organizations with relatively high stakes in the market are particularly
prone to cooperate in its sustainability because foregoing market profit entails a high

12

An indirect provision, through tax contributions, is feasible and studied below.
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opportunity cost. In other words, firms’ demand of club goods is positively associated
with their economic reliance in a focal market system. Because high and low demanders
of club goods are distinguishable, firms with a relatively high proneness to engage in prosocial behavior can be identified. In sum, the main prediction, which serves as baseline
for this study, is characterized by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The greater the firm’s economic reliance on a given market, the
greater the likelihood and magnitude of the firm’s engagement in the provision of
collective goods for such a market
The effectiveness of a theory that centers on economic reliance to overcome the
identification issues of alternative approaches depends on several factors that moderate
the main relationship in H1. These moderators are described below.
Exclusivity of the club or market size
A necessary condition of the sustainability of market systems is the achievement of
an optimal affiliation size because the utility that a focal organization receives from club
goods depends upon the number of other members with whom the organization shares
benefits.13 That is, with respect to club goods, markets are sharing economies, and
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By designating a private good, 𝑋𝑟 and partially deriving (1) with respect to j and r, we obtain the

marginal rate of substitution between the collective good and private good for the ith agent,
the club-size variable, we obtain
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exchange for the private good.
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members’ utility functions are interdependent. Reflecting on the example of a sports club,
restricting the use of the club pool to one agent is not economically viable given
maintenance costs, but allowing too many members to use the pool at the same time is
also an inefficient solution (Buchanan, 1965).
Affiliation or membership, the number of private entities that consume the collective
good, is endogenous but independent of the decision of who provides and maintains
collective goods (Sandler & Tschirhart, 1997). That is, the firm’s strategy and resources
to compete in a market determine economic reliance. Thus, the cost of providing
collective goods is independent of the costs of entering the business club (i.e., market
entry), which are partly determined by market barriers, institutions, and other
idiosyncrasies of the market and its stakeholders. Ordinarily, accessing club goods does
not entail per se transaction costs or direct fees; market competition naturally allocates
consumption rights. That is, my theoretical approach differs from club models with
positive exclusion mechanisms such as a fine or a coarse exclusion.
Formally, in the absence of central provision, changes in the number of members that
share a collective good affect the individual cost of the good to any focal agent. Cost
inequality is possible; some club affiliates may bear a disproportionate share of the
burden. Pareto optimality is observed by equalizing the marginal cost and utility and such
condition represents the rate at which a firm is willing to give up utility in exchange for
additional firms in the business club. When the marginal loss in utility equals the
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marginal reduction in cost, the business club achieves a stable equilibrium.14 Factors
endogenous to market competition (e.g., investment in R&D and marketing) and
environmental factors such as institutional arrangements (e.g., trading regulations) may
affect the achievement of an optimal market size.
Holding everything else constant, the smaller the number of entities holding a share
of the market in the system is, the greater the benefit per-firm. When the system is
relatively large, each affiliate is less likely to capture collective benefits (Putnam, 1998).
Conversely, the larger the size of the system, in number of entities, the lower the
individual cost of collective-goods supply due to economies of scale. Therefore,
affiliation size is never a trivial decision for the willingness to give to collective goods.
Regarding the expansion of market systems, incumbents balance marginal decreases in
market gain and collective-goods consumption and cost-sharing gains of maintaining the
system. Ceteris paribus, the opportunities of unpunished free-riding are positively
associated with market size. The likelihood that any given firm will engage in collectivegoods provision in any given time is inversely proportional to the number of entities in
the market. Hence, I suggest that:
Hypothesis 2.a (H2a): The greater the exclusivity of the system, the stronger the
relationship between economic reliance and the provision of collective goods

Intervention of central providers
14

Given this, it is clear that some collective systems may not meet the condition for optimal
membership when partial sharing arrangements are not feasible (i.e., private-goods systems) and when any
group of finite size is smaller than optimal (i.e., pure public-goods systems) (Buchanan, 1965).
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The provision of collective goods in market systems adopts a variety of forms: firm
provision, public provision, or a public-private partnership. Because of the ubiquity of
free-riding, central entities, such as governments, have traditionally played a critical role
in the provision of collective goods that are too costly for a single private entity and
whose benefits require the organization of co-operative sharing arrangements. Even when
a Pareto optimum may be fostered through the intervention of central entities, such
intervention may disturb the perceived value of optimality for club members and, thus,
firms’ incentives to engage in pro-social behavior.15
Specifically, with full central provision, firms may substitute the foregone utility of
giving (e.g., the warm glow or reputational capital) with higher consumption of private
goods. Conversely, in settings where central entities do not obtain and mobilize resources
in a magnitude such that the cost of collective goods is financed, the outpouring of
private participation becomes frequent and critical for the maintenance, improvement, or
restoration of social welfare (Ballesteros, 2013; White & Lang, 2012). This crowding-out
effect is integrated in the model in the following way:
Hypothesis 2.b (H2b): The greater the relative magnitude of intervention of central
entities, the weaker the relationship between economic reliance and corporate provision
of collective goods
Quality of governance of the club
15
However, free-riding is commonly overestimated when pro-social behavior is modeled as a purepublic good because firms’ giving may not be orthogonal to self-interest (Andreoni 1993, 2006, Harrison
and Hirshleifer 1989, Yildirim 2013). Hence, private provision not necessarily converges to zero in large
economies, as predicted by public-goods theory (Samuelson, 1954).
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As discussed above, although self-management by private entities is feasible (Ostrom,
2003), market systems commonly have a government agency. In this context, business
organizations play the role of the principal. In the presence of agency costs, which are
paid in lieu of direct giving to collective goods (e.g., a tax levy), the greater agent’s effort
is, the lower the cost of collective-goods provision. However, the agency aims at
maximizing her utility, 𝑈 = 𝑡 − 𝑐(𝑒), where 𝑡 is a transfer from the membership (e.g.,
officer pay). The principal-agent problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) may arise because
the agency’s allocation of public resources does not lead to an optimal provision of
collective goods that maximizes private effort and investment in capital. For instance,
government agencies may underinvest in communication systems that would reduce
coordination costs. Market members can observe the cost of collective goods, but not the
manager’s effort. Because this information asymmetry raises the cost of provision, the
marginal benefit of cost sharing increases, which may generate an expansionary bias that
results in market sizes bigger than the optimal (Sandler & Tschirhart, 1997).
Therefore, the materialization of private incentives into pro-social behavior may be a
function of institutional quality and governance effectiveness (Ballesteros & Useem,
2015; Cohen & Werker, 2008; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Marquis & Qian, 2013; Zhang &
Luo, 2013). Systemic issues such as lack of accountability may deter private provision of
collective goods because business decision makers fear resources will not be well spent
by the agency. In other words:
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Hypothesis 2.c (H2c): The higher the quality of governance of a market system, the
stronger the relationship between economic reliance and corporate provision of
collective goods

Social standing
Market affiliation entails a normative influence for the firm’s pro-social behavior.
Affiliated firms operate amid mechanisms of accountability and expectation to contribute
to social welfare. Therefore, pro-social behavior arises not only with the expectation of
obtaining a direct or indirect utility, but also to avoid societal sanctions. We can think of
these sanctions as an individual cost of free-riding. The cost of free-riding for the
affiliated firm is a function of its donation to collective goods 𝑔𝑗 , and the firm’s relative
visibility or standing in a correspondent referent group (e.g., country). Social standing
connotes identifiability and goodwill from the perspective of the public (Douty, 1972).
Given the standing of firm i, the public expect the organization to contribute at least
𝑖
𝑔1𝑖 +𝑔2𝑖 +, … , +𝑔𝑛+𝑚
at some point in time. The organization may receive a societal

sanction if its total contribution, 𝑔𝑖 , is below social expectation, that is, if 𝑔𝑖 < ∑𝑛+𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑔.
Such sanction will be stronger if the public believes that the firm’s giving is necessary for
the improvement, sustainability, or recovery of the system’s status quo, which arguably is
positively related with the firm’s standing. Therefore, I expect that:

Hypothesis 2.d (H2d): The higher a firm’s social standing in the market system, the
stronger the relationship between economic reliance and corporate provision of
collective goods
13

To summarize, a comparison of the optimization problem using my approach vis-àvis social-preferences’ impure altruism and alternative strategic-considerations
approaches is shown in Error! Reference source not found. in the Preface. In addition
to the role of economic reliance, a firm-community cognitive affiliation is integrated in
the analysis. As noted, building on club goods theory and using economic reliance as
baseline achieves a clear characterization of the set of agents that benefit from the
market’s exclusive collective goods and, consequently, have a relatively high proneness
to donate to such a market. Likewise, Table 2 contrasts the predictions of my approach
vis-à-vis social preferences and strategic considerations.

CREATING A DATASET OF DISASTER GIVING
Regarding the empirical setting, I have coordinated a collaborative project with
researchers in Wharton and UPenn’s Department of Computer and Information Science
to build, arguably, the largest database on disaster aid at the international level. The
output of four years of data collection and coding using a combination of manual and
automatic procedures, the dataset covers every monetary and in-kind donation from
firms, governments, multinational agencies, and non-governmental organizations
reported in news media to the relief and recovery fund of all natural disasters that
affected the world from 1990 to 2015.16 The coded data of corporate aid comprises
93,247 donations from 38,980 firms from 83-headquarters countries to 4,637 natural
disasters that hit 176 countries in the period 2003-2015.
16

I covered newspapers, trade press, magazines, newswires, press releases, TV and radio transcripts,
digital video and audio clips, corporate websites and reports, institutional websites and reports, and
government websites and reports, among other sources.
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We conducted Boolean searches of combinations of the name of the affected country
(e.g., United States), the type of the disaster (e.g., Hurricane), and in some cases the name
of the disaster (e.g., Katrina). These searches resulted in over 2,310,000 reports from
which we searched for mentions of cash and in-kind donations (i.e., free products,
services or labor) from business organizations. To make these reports computationally
tractable, we applied differential language analysis to code information on the donor
organization, the characteristics of the donation (i.e., in-kind, monetary or both, amount,
currency, and timing), the target entity (i.e., government agency, NGO, or victim group),
the target area or sector (e.g., rebuilding of schools), the initiator within the firm (i.e.,
employees or top management), and the organizational vehicle (e.g., subsidiary, group of
employees, department or unit).
For in-kind contributions, we monetized the total value of the goods using the
monetary value reported by the donor, when available; if not, we used the value of
similar donations reported by other donors. Where neither of these two sources was
available, we calculated the value of the donation using current prices in the affected
nation. We also converted values into U.S. dollars when necessary using the exchange
rate on the donation date.
We coded giving from economically-reliant corporations and the degree to which
disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. We used an automated coding
process to search within each report for details about the type, financial value, date, and
source of each donation. A group of researchers coded donations that were coming from
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corporations with local affiliates as reflected in the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations
database. We developed a measure of related giving that reflects the degree to which
disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. To calculate this, we began by
using a firm’s four-digit SIC code to identify its key business activities. We coded the
dollar number of in-kind donations that aligned with these activities as related [i.e.,
products, services, or activities that are relevant for the firm’s market operation (e.g.,
Bayer giving medicines in response to Typhoon Haiyan)].

Then, we randomly selected a sample of 5% of coded donations. A group of
researchers not involved in the earlier procedures checked for measurement error. We
repeated this process with a separate group. This resulted in fewer than 5% of the selected
sample that marked as inaccurate. About 60% of these errors were associated with
monetizing the in-kind value of donations, with less than 8% of the donations were
incorrectly marked as related giving. The rest of sample of discrepancies were due to
missing data on the nature of donor’s business. Figure 1 illustrates an example of our
coding.
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Figure 1. Coding donations from economically-reliant corporations and aid associated with
the donor’s core operation
We first ask, does the donor firm has an affiliate in the affected country?: (0,1)
$10.0 M

$4.5 M

1

0

We code this amount as giving from a locally active firm
Then we ask, is Anglo American’s donation related with an activity instrumental for
its market operation or where the firm can use its market resources and routines?
Market-nonmarket Relatedness:
% of in-kind donation related to the donor firm’s core business
Cash=
$1.25 M
$ 1.2 M
Food & medicines

In-kind=
$8.75 M

$ 7.55 M
Constructing school buildings with
mining-related resources
and skills

Then, we coded that
75% of Anglo’s
donation was related
giving
from locally active
firm

Finally, I hired independent researchers to conduct two different procedures to verify
the quality of the dataset using third-party sources such as company sustainability reports.
We randomly selected five percent of the events (156) for the period 2003-2013 and
researchers searched reports using Google, Lexis Nexis, and Factiva. From this
procedure, 5.1% percent of the selected events (8) had data inaccuracies, e.g., donation
amount, date of donation. We had access to exclusive information of donation for the
2010 tsunami and earthquake in Chile via the Chilean government. By comparing our
database with the list of donors given by the Chilean government, we found that our
dataset comprised 68% of the official source. Our tracking did not include donating
frequency of small- and medium-sized Chilean, non-multinational enterprises. In terms of
magnitude, our dataset accounted for 92 percent of the total corporate aid for the event.
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When available, we corroborated the accuracy of the data using external sources: a)
the Financial Tracking System (FTS) of the United Nations Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is a global database that records self-reported
international humanitarian aid for different humanitarian crises.17 The FTS has
information on corporate donation for about 3 percent of the tracked events; and
government and NGO donation for about 10 percent of the tracked events. In all cases,
for corporate giving, the built dataset was larger than the FTS dataset. b) Disaster
corporate aid trackers of the Corporate Citizenship Center (CCC) at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Foundation.18 This source provided information on corporate donation for
0.61% of the tracked events. In all cases, our database was larger than the CCC dataset.
For my dissertation, I merged this proprietary database with several other eventspecific (e.g., Swiss Re's SIGMA database on disaster insurance), country-specific (e.g.,
The World Bank's World Development Indicators), and firm-specific (e.g., Lexis Nexis'
Corporate Affiliations and Capital IQ) databases. Additionally, I built a dataset that
reports media reputation of the firm one year before and after the official date of the
disaster. The measure uses computer linguistic software, as implemented by Factiva,
which quantifies the tone (i.e., sentiment) of each media report.
The database offers a more efficient empirical tool for observing the effect of
organizational, industry, country, time, and event variance, and mitigating unobserved
17
For information about the method of collection of FTS data and their verification, visit the following
site: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=AboutFTS-Data.
18
These data are available at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/corporate-citizenshipcenter/disaster-corporate-aid-trackers.
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heterogeneity than existing studies on corporate giving, which traditionally focus on
single or a few events, one geographical context (e.g., the U.S.), and a type of
organization (large, publicly listed firms).
Scholars in specific sub-fields in the management literature may find benefits from
the use of these data. For instance, international business scholars can increase their
understanding of the role of internationalization and country-specific risk and uncertainty
on pro-social behavior. Taken together, the frequency of exposure to systemic shocks that
affect local communities is higher for multinational enterprises than for single-country
organizations. Accordingly, disasters are relatively likely to affect the strategic trajectory
of MNEs.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
For studying the causal relationship between economic reliance and the frequency
and magnitude of corporate disaster giving, I restrict the study to natural disasters
because their frequency is arguably exogenous to the studied behavior. Furthermore, I
focused on sudden disasters (e.g., earthquakes); shocks whose outbreak is clearly
identified and is not significantly distant in time (i.e., more than 30 days) from the trigger
(e.g., shaking and displacement of ground). Hence, I did not consider evolutionary
disasters (e.g., famines or heat waves) that are long-lived events without a single, easily
identifiable source or whose trigger is remote in time from the disaster peak (e.g.,
extended period of below average precipitation). The reason is that such disasters imply a
complexity of ex-ante and ex-post socioeconomic and political factors that may be
19

correlated with the likelihood of receiving disaster aid (Birkland, 1997; Klinenberg,
2003; Platt, 2012). For a similar rationale, I did not include manmade shocks.
The main dataset of the firm-specific predictors is the more than 1.9 million firms
worldwide of the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations database (CAD). 19 The analyzed
sample comprises the largest 550 multinational organizations by firm value at the
international level (Capital IQ). These firms represent 40 countries based on their
ultimate-parent’s headquarters location.
There are 3,523 sudden natural disasters in the EM-DAT database in the period
2003—2013. I dropped 119 disasters with imprecise dates and 191 that did not meet the
30-day rule. The final list was comprised by 3,115 events that affected 173 countries.20
On an average sample year, there were around 307 events associated with an economic
loss of at least US$102 billion,21 affecting over 166 million people22 and killing almost
102,000 others.

This is an international directory of corporate structure of public and private companies. The CAD’s
criteria for content inclusion is annual revenue of $1 million or greater for privately held parent companies.
For U.S. Public firms: all major publicly traded companies with U.S. located headquarters traded on one of
the three major U.S. exchanges: NYSE, NASDAQ and NYSEAMEX. Also included are significant
companies traded on smaller U.S. exchanges. Also included are outside service firms attached to the parent
companies. Included are the parent companies and their subsidiaries, no matter where the subsidiaries are
located. International companies listed generally have revenues of US$10 million or greater, in excess of
300 employee totals or substantial assets/net worth.
20
Additionally, given that the applied econometric specifications include country-fixed effects, for
some models I did not include 12 countries hit by only one disaster and considered events that received
corporate disaster giving at least once.
21
The economic impact of a disaster usually consists of direct (e.g. damage to infrastructure, crops,
housing) and indirect (e.g. loss of revenues, unemployment, market destabilization) consequences on the
local economy. In EM-DAT estimated damage are) given in US$ (‘000). For each disaster, the registered
figure corresponds to the damage value at the moment of the event, i.e. the figures are shown true to the
year of the event (EM-DAT, 2014).
19
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Dependent variable
For each disaster, I recorded a binary variable that takes value “1” if the firm donated
or made a pledge and a continuous variable for the total dollar amount of the donation.
Hence, I estimated two dependent variables: Y={0,1}, donating; and Y={0,…,n}, USD
donated. Given the one-year tracking window, the data reflect donations that mostly
target disaster relief (i.e., giving that addresses immediate life-threating concerns), and
recovery (i.e., giving that focuses on reconstruction, restitution, and resettlement and
rehabilitation). The average donation of sample firms in the analyzed 10-year period was
close to $1.7 million.
Main predictor: economic reliance
I used the measure defined in the Preface. I used a polynomial expansion of
subsidiaries, sales, and employees as an alternative measure of economic reliance. There
are two considerations regarding the sole use of sales and employees as proxies of
economic reliance, which have 23 and 27 percent of missingness in the CAD database,
respectively. One can argue that the restriction of the analyses to these variables reduces
construct validity dramatically. Sales only accounts for the demand side of the market
and it does not capture the relevance of the market as a supplier of inputs for the firm. For
instance, a disaster in a developing country can potentially reduce the economic standing

22
People that have been injured (i.e., individuals suffering from physical injuries, trauma or an illness
requiring medical treatment), affected (i.e., individuals requiring basic survival needs such as food, water,
shelter, sanitation, an immediate medical assistance during a period of emergency) and left homeless (i.e.,
individuals needing immediate assistance in the form of shelter) after a disaster are included in this
category (EM-DAT, 2014).
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of a corporation buying materials from or manufacturing in such country. If the affected
country is not an important end user of the firm’s goods, the period sales would likely not
be affected. Finally, some industries are under or overrepresented by sales subsidiaries.
Similar considerations apply for the share of employees as some industries and are more
intensive in their use of human capital than others. Additionally, variance in the number
of employees by country does not necessarily capture the dependency of the firm on the
market’s collective goods (Sandler, 2013).
Nevertheless, to use the additional information that income and human resources
provide in robustness tests of economic reliance, I estimated a Chebyshev polynomial
expansion in subsidiaries, market share, and proportion of employees as a functional form
of economic reliance. The central tenant behind this approach is that a high-order
polynomial can be used to approximate most functional forms (Kolsarici & Vakratsas,
2015). For this calculation, I am not imputing missing values. Modeling missingness is
not expected to increase efficiency in a significant fashion given the loss in statistical
power (note that non-sales subsidiaries are not to be considered).
Sales. I calculated market share using the annual dollar amount of national sales was
calculated by adding the reported income by all the subsidiaries in a country. This
amount was divided by total dollar amount of sales for the corporation in the same period
of observation.
Employees. I divided the sum of employees by subsidiary that the firm has at the
country level by the total number of employees at the international level.
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The economic reliance, k, of firm i to country m at time t has the following form:
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑘𝑚
= 𝑓(𝜎𝑚
, 𝜔𝑚
, 𝜀𝑚
)t

(1)

where
𝑖
𝜎𝑚
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
= ∑(
) 𝑥 ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
0
∑𝑛0(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 )
𝑖
𝜔𝑚
=
(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)
𝑛

𝑖
𝜀𝑚
=

∑𝑛0(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)
(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)

I considered expansions up to the 20th degree, opting for third-order polynomial based
on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).23
To assess the construct validity of this measure, I hired researchers to conduct an
independent qualitative assessment of the accuracy of the independent variable to
measure economic affiliation. A total number of 50 firms, 2.5 percent of the sample, were
randomly selected. Diverse sources were analyzed to identify information of the
economic importance of geographical areas during the period 2003—2013. The sources
were annual corporate reports, Factiva Dow Jones, and Thomson Reuters.
Moderators
To measure exclusivity of the club, I built on the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)
(Rhoades, 1993) and constructed a measure of market concentration. Exclusivity is the
sum of squares of the market share of the largest five firms in the focal country. This
variable provides a normalized value of the market concentration of the business club
23

See Donoghue et al. (2012) and Kolsarici and Vakratsas (2015) for a discussion.
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[0,1].24 Relatively large values of the variable suggest the existence of monopolistic
market systems; conversely, relatively low values are an indication of competitive,
fragmented clubs. The data source is the CAD.
Agency intervention is the estimated proportion of total cost of the disaster that was
financed by the national government proxied by the ratio of the estimated economic cost
of the disaster to the general government total expenditure. Similarly, external
intervention is the ratio of the estimated economic cost to the net official development
assistance and official aid received. These data were obtained from the World Economic
Outlook the World Development Indicators.25 For robustness purposes, I used two binary
variables for each construct. Respectively, whether the national government requested
external resources and whether there was an official aid appeal or a response plan
reported by the Financial Tracking System of the United Nations Office for Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (e.g., a volcanic eruption in Peru in 2006). Arguably,
aid appeals foster donations from outside the club system (i.e., from public-goods
donors).
To proxy quality of governance, or agency performance, I used scale indicators based
on the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).26 For selecting the
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As an alternative measure, I calculated the HHI by industry (four-digit SIC code). Large values of
the variable (e.g., .324 for Arrangement of Passenger Transportation in Brazil in 2009) suggest the
existence of monopolistic industries; conversely, relatively low values (e.g., 0.014 for Apparel, Piece
Goods, and Notions in Sweden in 2009) are an indication of competitive, fragmented clubs. One argument
against the use of this variable is that concept of a club is broader than a single industry. Moreover, the
hardship caused by the disaster extends to different industries. A given company, hence, consider not only
the firms in its own industry, but also in other industries when engaging in disaster giving.
25
(International Monetary Fund, 2014) and (The World Bank, 2014).
26
According to the World Bank, the WGI is a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of
governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial
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dimensions that better explain variance in collective-goods provision without creating
redundancy, I tested for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIF) and
selected government effectiveness and regulatory quality.27 For the sake of maintaining
the information that each indicator captures, I run interactions with individual betas. For
example, in 2010, Haiti had low government effectiveness (3) and regulatory quality (17)
in comparison with Belgium (93 and 86, respectively). Finally, standing is proxied by
rank of the corporation by firm value (Capital IQ), lagged by a year related to the disaster
date.28
Control variables
One of the estimation vectors has disaster, organization, country, month, year, and
firm-by-country fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant factors and pathdependent CSR-related investment in the market. To account for potential yearly trends
in the availability of disaster risk and aid (e.g., urbanization has increased exposure to
certain types of disasters), I included year dummy variables. Additionally, I used month
dummies because disasters like hurricanes show seasonal patterns in their frequency and
magnitude.

and developing countries. The six broad dimensions of governance that comprise the WGI are rule of law,
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, and control of corruption. For further information, please refer to (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi,
2011).
27
Government effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al.,
2011). Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The estimates range
from 0 (weak) to 100 (strong).
28
Alternatively, I used the count of regional and national newspapers articles that mention the name of
the firm over a year before the disaster date in the affected country. The source was Factiva.
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At the firm level, I controlled for industry (four-digit SIC code), and one-year lags of
firm longevity (logged number of years), logged values of employees, revenue, market
capitalization, and return on assets (percentage) because research has suggested these
variables correlate with philanthropic behavior (Marquis et al., 2007; Muller & Kräussl,
2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Additionally, I controlled for customer orientation
because firms with an end-user focus (i.e., business-to-individual industries) may have a
different propensity to engage in the provision of collective goods than firms with an
industry focus (i.e., business-to-business industries). Using this rationale, I conducted
sub-sample tests dividing the data per the industry orientation.
At the country level, total land area (km2) and total population may not only skew
disaster risk, but also the size of market systems and the likelihood of donation. Hence,
using data from the World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2014), I controlled
for the logs of these variables. Regarding event-specific controls, I used dummies for
disaster type as some specific types may fuel public response and aid more effectively
than others (Birkland, 1997). The impact of the disaster was also controlled using the
relative magnitude of killed, number of affected, and associated economic damage (i.e.,
killed/total population, affected/total population, and economic damage/GDP PPP,
respectively).29 Finally, to account for donor fatigue, 30 the geographical distribution of
shocks, and the learning effects of disasters, I included controls for the number of
29

I obtained these data the EM-DAT, The World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (2014). Note
that endogeneity may be an issue when regressing measures of disaster hardship. Arguably, hardship is
endogenous to the characteristics of the philanthropic response. The following subsections explain the
methods to account for this risk.
30
Club members may face the situation of allocating scarce resources to multiple collective goods in
the same fiscal exercise; early disasters may crowd out the response to subsequent shocks.
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disasters by country and worldwide in a period of one year before the focal disaster
date—both logged. Additionally, I accounted for the possibility that other major social,
political, or economic events may have crowded out organizations’ attention and
financial capacity to provide collective goods (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Franks,
2013). Newsworthy events is the average of “the median number of minutes a news
broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day” over the forty days after the
disaster.31 Table 3 summarizes the different constructs and variables and Table 4 and 5
show descriptive statistics and correlations.

31

See Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this indicator and a test of its effectiveness.
The variable is calculated by Professor David Strömberg and is available at http://people.su.se/~dstro/.
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Table 3. List of constructs and variables
Construct
Donating
USD
donated
Economic
reliance
Exclusivity
Central
intervention
Quality of
governance

Standing
Firmspecific
Countryspecific
controls:
Eventspecific
controls:

Economic
reliance
Central
intervention

Social
standing
Physical
Presence
Degree of
Poverty
Employeedriven
Donation

Variable
Dependent variable
Company Donated? (1=Yes)
Donated Amount in USD
Explanatory variable
Share of affiliates in the disaster country adjusted by the relative value of the affiliate
Moderators
Dispersion of market share across firms within an affected country (sum of squares of the ratio of the
of annual local sales of the largest five firms to the total sum of sales in a given country)
External
Ratio of estimated damage to net official development assistance and official aid
received
Agency
Ratio of estimated damage to gross national expenditure (current US$)
Government
Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
Effectiveness degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such
policies
Regulatory
Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
Quality
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development
Rank of the corporation by firm value (Capital IQ), lagged by a year related to the disaster date
Controls
Primary industry, primary sector, total assets, consumer orientation, market capitalization, total
revenue, R&D intensity, ROA %
total population, land area in squared kilometers, GDP, willingness to receive aid (aid appeal local
government)
Disaster type, ratio of deaths=number of people killed/total population, proportion of affected
population=(number of people displaced or injured)/total population, relative economic
damage=associated economic damage/GPD PPP
News pressure: the median number of minutes a news broadcast devotes to the top three news
segments in a day” over the forty days after the disaster
Donor fatigue: annual number of disasters by country and annual number of disasters at the
international level
Robustness
Polynomial expansion in subsidiaries, market share, and proportion of total employees
Agency: 1=there was an official appeal for international aid reported by the United Nations.
Internal= 1 when the local government explicitly commits to cover an at least 50 percent of the
associated direct damage (i.e., amount of disaster cost covered by the government divided by total
estimated cost)
Count of regional and national newspapers articles that mention the name of the firm over a year
before the disaster date in the affected country. It does not account for the sentiment of the discourse
Binary variable indicating if the firm has an affiliate in the affected country
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population)
1= the employees initiated the donation (and not the top management)
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics
VARIABLES
Donating(Yes=1,No=0)
USD Donated
Economic Reliance
Exclusivity
Agency Intervention
External Intervention
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Social Standing

Total Employees
Total Assets ($USDmm)
Total Revenue ($USDmm)
Market Capitalization ($USDmm)
Return on Assets (%)
R&D Expenses ($USDmm)
Net PP&E ($USDmm)
SG&A Expenses ($USDmm)
Total Enterprise Value ($USDmm)
Consumer Orientation
GDP ($USDmm)
Land Area (SqKm)
Population (Millions)
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Mass Movement Dry
Mass Movement Wet
Volcano

Mean
Dependent variables
0.00
1,697,227.00
Explanatory variable
0.01
Moderators
0.08
1.72
1.54
53.31
51.65
45.85
Controls
Firm
74,743.85
3,502,923.00
1,980,828.92
34,156.95
5.02
27,130.46
898,893.00
260,636.50
1,671,652.00
0.46
Country
2,751,000.00
2,605,036.15
244.40
Event
0.33
0.49
0.10
0.00
0.06
0.16
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SD

Min

Max

0.03
11,900,000.00

0.00
1000.00

1.00
350,000,000.00

0.09

0.00

1.00

0.15
11.91
6.87
27.27
28.02
278.99

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

1.00
178.25
115.36
99.51
100.00
6,000.00

120,956.29
16,600,000.00
10,276,140.44
48,053.16
4.49
433,537.26
5,439,931.00
1,649,753.00
9,995,316.00
0.50

0.00
0.00
11.00
16.50
(7.82)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(673,620.00)
0.00

2,200,000.00
231,000,000.00
228,700,000.00
511,887.00
38.21
14,319,402.00
124,000,000.00
38,900,000.00
231,000,000.00
1.00

4,559,000.00
3,733,879.02
418.00

296.00
200.00
0.03

16,770,000.00
16,381,390.00
1,357.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.47
0.50
0.30
0.05
0.24
0.13

Table 4. Descriptive statistics
VARIABLES
People Affected
People Killed
Estimated Damage
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
Annual Number of disasters (World)
Newsworthy events

Mean
364,080.72
392.61
1,163.80
7.58
237.78
8.90
Robustness
0.02
26.94
0.01
0.01
0.03

Physical Presence
Degree of Poverty
Employee-driven Donation
Local Aid Appeal
External Aid (United Nations Appeal

SD
2,459,571.30
6,902.89
8,171.50
8.07
16.71
2.57

Min
1.00
1.00
0.01
0.00
213.00
2.83

Max
67,900,000.00
222,570.00
210,000.00
35.00
260.00
29.25

0.14
15.45
0.08
0.12
0.18

0.00
2.30
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
75.30
1.00
1.00
1.00

Table 5. Correlations
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

1

0.00

0.03

0.00

1.00

1,697,227.00

11,900,000.00

1000.00

1.00
350,000,000.00

0.10

1.00

0.01

0.09

0.00

1.00

0.08

0.01

1.00

Economic Reliance (Employees)

0.03

0.15

0.00

1.00

0.07

0.01

0.72

1.00

5

Economic Reliance (Sales)

0.03

0.16

0.00

1.00

0.07

0.01

0.69

0.97

1.00

6

Economic Reliance (Polynomial)

0.03

0.15

0.00

1.00

0.07

0.01

0.69

0.99

0.98

7

Exclusivity

0.00
0.00

1.00
178.25

0.05

0.00

0.30

0.48

0.08

1.00

Agency Intervention

0.15
11.91

0.01

8

0.08
1.72

-0.01

0.00

-0.02

-0.04

-0.03

-0.04

-0.06

9

External Intervention

1.54

6.87

0.00

115.36

0.00

0.00

-0.01

-0.02

-0.02

-0.02

-0.02

1

Donating (Yes=1, No=0)

2

USD Donated

3

Economic Reliance (Subsidiary)

4

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1.00
1.00
0.07

1.00

10

Government Effectiveness

53.31

27.27

0.00

99.51

0.03

0.00

0.15

0.24

0.23

0.25

-0.05

-0.19

-0.02

1.00

11

Regulatory Quality

51.65

28.02

0.00

100.00

0.03

0.00

0.15

0.24

0.23

0.25

-0.08

-0.18

-0.02

0.93

1.00

12

Social Standing

45.85

278.99

1.00

6,000.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00
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1.00

Methods
I regressed the US dollar amount of giving using the following OLS specification:
𝑈𝑆𝐷 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼1(𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑟𝑎) + 𝛼2𝑎 (𝑒𝑎 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛼2𝑏 (𝑒𝑎 ∗
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛼2𝑐 (𝑒𝑎 ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛼2𝑑 (𝑒𝑎 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)+𝛼′(𝜃𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖
(2)

where the vector 𝜃𝑖 has firm-, country-, and event-specific variables, and, in some
specifications, fixed-effects for these three levels of analysis.
Regarding the likelihood of donating, I interpret the process that firms follow when
deciding to participate in collective-goods provision as an attempt to maximize utility.
The business decision maker makes a marginal benefit-marginal cost calculation based
on the utilities achieved by donating to a given event, by not donating (i.e., using the
resources for something else), and by using the resources for another event. That is, firm
i chooses to contribute to event j, j≠k, given that 𝑃𝑖𝑗= 𝑃𝑟(𝑉𝑖𝑗 > 𝑉𝑖𝑘 ), where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the
probability that the utility that it obtains for event j (𝑉𝑖𝑗 ) is higher than the utility for
event k (𝑉𝑖𝑘 ). Hence, the specification should account for the characteristics of the
affected community and the collective good. Formally:
𝑋𝑖 = 𝛽1(𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2.𝑑 (𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)
𝑍𝑗 = 𝛽2.𝑎 (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽2.𝑏 (𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2.𝑐 (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)

The probability that firm i engages in provision of collective goods for event j is:

𝐽
(𝑃𝑖𝑗) = ∫ ∏𝑇𝑡=1 ∏𝑗=1

exp(𝑋𝑖 𝛽𝑗𝑡 +𝑍𝑖𝑗 𝛽𝑗𝑡 )
∑𝐽𝑘=1 exp(𝑋𝑖 𝛽𝑗𝑡 +𝑍𝑖𝑗 𝛽𝑗𝑡 )
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𝑓(𝛽|Ɵ)𝑑𝛽

(3)

Notice that this model combines a multinomial logit (subscripted by firm-specific
characteristics) and a conditional logit (examining the characteristics of the choice—i.e.,
the target country-disaster pair). I used random-effects with bootstrapped errors and
firm-by-country fixed-effects.32 See next sub-sections for further robustness checks,
including an additional strategy to address endogeneity concerns via matching, and the
Appendix for a description of the process to address missingness.
Results
I found a positive association between the frequency and magnitude of engagement in
disaster response with economic reliance, providing support for the baseline hypothesis.
Ceteris paribus, an increase of one standard deviation in the degree of economic
affiliation raises the contribution of the average firm by about 17 percent (Table 6, Model
1). In probabilistic terms, sample firms are 27.5 times more likely to donate for every
standard-deviation unit of increase in their economic reliance [0,1] to a given market. The
main finding is robust to the inclusion of the different season-, event-, country-, and firmspecific, time-variant and -invariant controls, including the moderating variables, and
hold after CEM is implemented. Additionally, the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing
method resulted in smaller standard errors than the mixed-conditional logit and linear
models, which one may interpret as a conservative estimation of the original model.
Moreover, it is important to reiterate that the explanatory variable does not consider
sporadic commercial activity not captured by an affiliated in the affected country.

32

The p-value for the Hausman test (Hausman, Stock, & Yogo, 2005) was 0.1037 (Wooldridge, 2010).
Consequently, I centered on models with random effects and used fixed-effects for robustness checks.

32

Table 6. The effect of economic reliance on corporate disaster giving
VARIABLES
Economic Reliance
Exclusivity x ER
Agency Intervention x ER
External Intervention x ER
Government Effectiveness x ER
Regulatory Quality x ER
Social Standing x ER
Exclusivity (Market Concentration)
Agency Intervention
External Intervention
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Social Standing
CONTROLS
Number of Employees
Total Revenue
Market Capitalization
Return on Assets
R&D
Consumer Orientation
GDP
Area (Size)
Population
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Mass Movement Dry
Mass Movement Wet
Deaths
People Affected
Economic Cost
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
Annual Number of disasters (World)
Newsworthy events
Constant
Observations
Number of events

Model 1 (RE)
USD Donation (LN)

Model 2 (MC Logit)
Donation Frequency

Model 3 (FE)
USD Donation (LN)

0.167
(0.003)
0.116
(0.005)
-0.571
(0.017)
3.983
(0.028)
-0.009
(0.001)
0.008
(0.001)
0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.010
(0.002)
0.060
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

3.141
(0.737)
1.133
(0.135)
-0.067
(0.102)
-0.048
(0.149)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.099
(0.015)
0.073
(0.012)
0.319
(0.498)
4.419
(0.369)
-0.200
(0.117)
0.041
(0.015)
-0.016
(0.013)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.129
(0.013)
0.000
(0.000)
0.090
(0.044)
2.761
(0.148)
-0.019
(0.004)
0.016
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
(0.276)
-0.035
(0.006)
0.047
(0.005)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.006
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.008
(0.003)
0.001
(0.002)
0.029
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.044
(0.040)
0.000
(0.000)
123.098
(134.505)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.000)
-0.098
(0.008)
1,713,250
3,115

0.076
(0.020)
-0.017
(0.041)
-0.061
(0.041)
0.043
(0.006)
0.016
(0.039)
0.375
(0.055)
0.392
(0.134)
-0.383
(0.110)
0.133
(0.156)
0.119
(1.121)
0.015
(0.021)
1.215
(0.133)
0.006
(0.000)
0.008
(0.000)
-9.153
(42.272)
-0.180
(0.380)
5.871
(0.414)
-0.043
(0.025)
0.011
(0.008)
0.073
(0.050)
-24.650
(3.345)
1,713,250
3,115

-0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
0.007
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.004
(0.003)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.001)
-0.006
(0.011)
0.004
(0.011)
0.055
(0.011)
-0.017
(0.036)
0.006
(0.012)
0.230
(0.209)
-0.001
(0.001)
1,276.850
(811.887)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.002
(0.001)
0.046
(0.039)
1,713,250
3,115
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Model 1 (RE)
Country FE
Year FE
Month FE
Firm FE

Model 2 (MC Logit)

Model 3 (FE)
YES
YES
YES
YES

Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses. Fixed-effects model with month-, year-, country-, and firm-by-country effects

The results suggest that the level of market competition has an inverse effect in the
willingness of business decision makers to opt into the provision of collective goods
(Models 1 to 3). That is, being a member of exclusive markets, as measured by the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, is associated with a relatively high donation frequency and
magnitude. An affiliated firm operating in a relatively concentrated market is 2.6 times
more likely to engage in disaster giving than a similar firm operating in a market one
standard deviation more fragmented. Likewise, its donation amount is expected to be
11.6 percent bigger, which is in line with H2a. This finding not only contests the
prediction of standard economic theory,33 but it is also inconsistent with empirical work
in the management literature. Management scholars have suggested that the benefits of
investing in corporate pro-social behavior are relatively large in competitive industries
when such behavior acts as a signal of product quality (Fernández‐Kranz & Santaló,
2010; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013).
With respect to H2b, the results suggest that the effect of central intervention on
corporate giving depends on whether funding comes from inside or outside the market
system. Models 1 to 3 show that affiliated firms reduce frequency and magnitude of
provision of collective goods in proportion with increases in local government’s
financing. An increase of one standard deviation in the degree of local government
33

See Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) for a discussion.
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intervention is associated with a reduction of four percent in the average affiliated firm’s
donation amount (model 1) and a drop in the donation frequency (model 2). A potential
explanation is that firms see local government intervention as an expected function of the
club agency—an argument that is tested in the following model. The observation of
incomplete crowding-out opposes the prediction of neutrality of some social-preferences
models (cf., Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). Additionally, the observed negative effect of local
intervention contradicts strategic considerations models that predict foreign firms’
motivation to mimic the host country government’s response to obtain the favor of local
policymakers (cf., Marquis & Qian, 2013; Zhang & Luo, 2013). On the other hand,
foreign aid increases the donation magnitude of affiliated sample firms by about 3.7
percent (model 1), which challenges public-economics theories that external intervention
crowds out local response (Cavallo & Daude, 2011).
Regarding H2c, I found that different dimensions of the perception of national
political and institutional development may have a divergent impact on the corporate
provision of collective goods. On the one hand, improvements in local regulatory quality
are associated with surges in affiliated firms’ donation size and frequency. Given that
regulatory quality measures the public’s perception of the local government’s
performance to regulate and promote the private sector’s development, it is expected that
firms are willing to contribute to the agency when this perception is relatively high. In
such cases, firms are able to satisfy the impact question of their giving. On the other
hand, a one-standard deviation improvement in government effectiveness leads to
reductions of 0.90 percent in the size of the donation (model 1) and 17 percent in the
35

probability of affiliated firms’ giving (model 2). Given the information that government
effectiveness is aimed to capture, one interpretation is that firms that consider the agency
a viable mechanism to manage public goods also see it as having a high capacity to
manage shocks. Therefore, they prefer to allocate corporate resources in markets with
greater levels of vulnerability where the risk of shortage of collective goods is higher.
In agreement with H2d, the results suggest that social standing motivates the prosocial behavior of economically affiliated firms. Affiliated firms are more likely to
donate with every one-standard deviation increase in social standing. Additionally, an
increase in the level of standing is associated with a greater donation (0.10 percent) vis-àvis a firm whose standing remained the same. This means that sample market systems
rely on firms with high standing to cope with the scarcity of collective goods in the
context of sudden systemic shocks.
Robustness
Further identification strategy with matching
One concern in my study is that the decision to enter a market is endogenous to the
likelihood of engaging in philanthropic disaster response. That is, given the geographical
(and, thus, political, and socioeconomic) heterogeneity in the context of disaster risk,
firms with a similar propensity to give self-select into specific market systems. The
econometric problem here is that donating and economic reliance are both moving in the
same direction as an unobserved factor (e.g., adversity to systemic risk), which prevents
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an observation of the causal effect of economic reliance on the frequency and magnitude
of giving.
To mitigate the occurrence of this issue, I applied coarsened exact matching (CEM) 34
(Iacus, King, & Porro, 2008, 2011) to balance the baseline propensity to engage in prosocial behavior between the treatment (i.e., firms with at least one affiliate in the affected
country) and the control groups (i.e., firms with no presence in the market). To conduct
the match, I draw on the literature in philanthropy and, specifically, corporate disaster
giving.35 CEM was carried out with no replacement using the following variables:
primary industry, number of employees, market capitalization, market capitalization,
headquarters country of ultimate parent, total revenue, and return on assets.36 Pre- and
post-descriptive statistics were compared in the treatment and control groups for
assessing quality. Additionally, I calculated measures of imbalance as suggested by Iacus
et al., ( 2008). The main results hold in the matched sample, which I include in the
Appendix in addition to the matching summary.
Additionally, a plausible argument is that the effect of economic reliance on the
provision of collective goods is heterogeneous across events. For some shocks, economic
reliance may have relatively little effect because of the magnitude of news coverage
(Stromberg, 2007). For instance, events such as Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. and the
2010 earthquake in Haiti were certain to receive philanthropic giving irrespective of the
34
See (King, Nielsen, Coberley, Pope, & Wells, 2011) for a comparative assessment of the
effectiveness of matching methods.
35
(cf., Crampton and Patten 2008, Marquis et al. 2007, Muller et al. 2014, Patten 2008, Tilcsik and
Marquis 2013, Whiteman et al. 2005)
36
I targeted a treatment-to-control ratio of 1:10, but tested up to 1:2 for robustness.
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economic connection of the organization. Therefore, it is likely that the studied
association is stronger for events whose probability of being in the news is relatively low.
Thus, I followed Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) and conducted robustness analyses
limiting the sample to disasters with a probability of being in the news of 50 percent and
lower. I also run analyses including countries that never received donations from firms,
which does not affect the estimates.
Testing alternative explanations from social preferences and strategic considerations
In this sub-section, I discuss several potential problems of identification and test the
robustness of my approach to the inclusion of social-preferences and strategicconsiderations factors. On the one hand, social-preferences’ impure-altruism and
neoinstitutionalism models advance three predictions regarding firms’ engagement in the
provision of collective goods. First, because members of the firm are embedded in
societal arrangements that foster their cognitive membership to communities (Berry,
Guillén, & Zhou, 2010; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis et al., 2007; Powell, 1991), a
“normative pressure on the company” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Patten, 2008) exerts a
particular influence in the pro-social behavior of the geographically proximate
organization. This argument provides a simpler explanation to the main relationship of
this study. Ceteris paribus, there exists a direct association between physical presence, or
local embeddedness, and pro-social behavior.37 Hence, economic reliance would be a

According to Uzzi (1996) “organization networks operate on a logic of exchange which differs from
the logic of markets. I refer to this exchange logic as "embeddedness" because ongoing social ties shape
actors' expectations and opportunities in ways that differ from the economic logic of market behavior.”
37
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second order measure that could be obviated because the effect of an economic firmmarket linkage is captured by differentiating firms based on geographic presence. I tested
this argument with the binary variable physical presence that takes value “1” when the
firm has any type of affiliate in the focal country. Such relationship resulted inverse as
shown in Table 8, suggesting that the mechanism driving this form of corporate prosocial behavior is more complex than geographic location or embeddedness alone and
that the measure of economic reliance better captures such complexity.
A second prediction suggests that inequity aversion drives pro-social behavior and,
thus, affiliated firms will mostly give to economically underdeveloped markets (Fehr,
Naef, & Schmidt, 2006; Jaramillo, Kempf, & Moizeau, 2003). To test this argument, I
regressed an interaction of economic reliance and degree of poverty proxied by the
poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (as a percentage of population).38 As
shown in Table 9 in the Appendix, I found that sample firms donate in a lower magnitude
to poorer countries than to higher-income countries. A third prediction suggests that
employees of affiliated firms seek to satisfy their reciprocal preferences and this fuels the
response from top managers (Camerer & Fehr, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Simpson
& Willer, 2008). Using data from my dataset, I analyzed the interaction between the
binary variable employee-driven donation and economic reliance. Table 10 shows that a
negative coefficient suggests that employees’ social preferences crowd out the firm’s
magnitude of pro-social behavior.

38

See Anand and Sen (1994 and 2000) for a discussion on this measurement.
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On the other hand, the strategic-philanthropy literature offers another set of
alternative predictions. First, the null hypothesis to H2a captures an argument built on the
resource-based theory of the firm. If there is a market demand for corporate pro-social
behavior that is discoverable for market competitors, some firms may engage in the
provision of collective goods in the hope of achieving or sustaining a competitive
advantage. Firms strive to capture socially responsible consumers by connecting the
demand of their private goods to the provision of a collective good ( McWilliams and
Siegel 2010, Bagnoli and Watts 2003). Monopolistic markets may entail lower incentives
for firms to invest in reputational capital because the internalization of reputation
spillovers is relatively low (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). However, the analyses consistently
reject such argument and suggest that monopolistic firms are the type of organization that
frequently engages in this form of pro-social behavior and tend to give the largest
amounts.
A third prediction suggests that business organizations tend to construct their socially
beneficial behavior in accordance with signals coming from central agencies such as the
national government. Managers acting strategically invest in government transferences
(e.g., operating privileges) to improve their market standing [i.e., rent-seeking and special
interest groups may develop (Olson, 1971)] and the approval of the local community [i.e.,
a social license to operate (Boutilier & Thomson, 2011; Howard-Grenville, 2008;
Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011)]. Therefore, firms increase donating in response to the
intervention of government agencies. The null hypothesis to
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Hypothesis 2.b (H2b): captures this argument, which was systematically rejected for

the case of local government intervention. The results suggest that local government’s
disaster financing crowds out affiliated firms’ giving.
Lastly, strategic-philanthropy theories suggest that low-standing organizations are
relatively likely to engage in the provision of collective goods because the marginal
utility of reputational capital is higher for this type of firm than for high-standing firms
(Crampton & Patten, 2008; Godfrey et al., 2009; Porter & Kramer, 2002). The several
analyses, including the coarsened-exact matched models, provide evidence of the
opposite argument.
DISCUSSION
This study investigates the mechanisms and conditions under which firms’ economic
reliance to markets affects willingness to provide collective goods. Using arguably the
largest dataset on disaster giving to date, I identified the existence of a causal process
moderated by four main factors in line with the predictions of the theory of clubs
(Berglas, 1976; Buchanan, 1965; Sandler, 2013). The setting of business responses to
global natural disasters allowed me to test and confirm the main relationship and the role
of market exclusivity, firm standing, central intervention, and quality of governance
across several organization-, industry-, home and host country-, and time-specific factors.
In sum, my study evidences that integrating variation in firms-market economic reliance
leads to a more accurate prediction of corporate engagement in collective-goods
provision than theoretical arguments than do not account for such relationship.
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Contributions to the non-market strategy literature
Whereas much prior work in the CSR literature has focused on the internal and
external determinants of pro-social behavior, my study uncovers a form of strategic
consideration whose effect remains understudied (cf., Aguinis and Glavas, 2012;
McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 2006; Mellahi et al., 2015). The effect of economic
reliance is not explained by the traditional strategic considerations such as reputational
capital with internal (Flammer & Luo, 2015) and external stakeholders (Muller &
Kräussl, 2011), a social license to operate (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011), an agency cost
(Jia & Zhang, 2011), or institutional pressures (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). Likewise, it is
not captured by social-preference theories such as altruism (Batson & Powell, 2003),
reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006), fairness (Kahneman et al., 1986), or a warm glow
(Andreoni, 1990). Additionally, the explanatory power of economic reliance is not
equaled by physical distance (Muller & Whiteman, 2008) or embeddedness (Jamali &
Neville, 2011).
The results suggest that a theory based on economic reliance provides a clear
identification of the set of business decision-makers that are prone to behave pro-socially.
The observation of pro-social behavior among firms with no clear economic reliance is,
in fact, a test of the criterion of falsifiability (Popper, 1963). The frequency and
magnitude of such behavior is better characterized by broader public-goods systems. That
is, a corporation with no economic reliance may donate to a country affected by a
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disaster, but the likelihood of not observing a donation (i.e., free riding) is relatively
large.
Additionally, my study advances the literature on global CSR. Both the theoretical
and empirical literatures in CSR in an international context remain underdeveloped
(Kitzmueller & Shimshack, 2012). Traditionally, pro-social behavior has been studied at
the country level and, although there have been influential studies on corporate disaster
giving using a multi-country setting, these limit to one event affecting several countries
(Whiteman et al., 2005) or a few single-country events (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014).
Furthermore, the literature has neglected the study of firms with an emerging country of
origin, particularly when they give abroad. My dataset enables overcoming challenges of
data quality and mitigates the risks of measurement error and omitted-variable bias that
have been a concern regarding the findings of observational studies in developing
countries (Mellahi et al., 2015).
Contributions to other literatures
My study also makes relevant contributions to the institutional, stakeholder literatures
and industry self-regulation literatures. First, using this empirical setting to evaluate the
role of sociopolitical dynamics is particularly valuable for the development of
institutional and organizational theory. My findings suggest that the role of institutional
quality on the willingness to give of economically reliant companies is more complex
than it has been traditionally suggested in the extant literature. On the one hand, firms
consider the general capacity of the government to implement policies and regulations
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that assure the effective use of private giving and facilitate the maximization of its
positive impact. This conclusion conforms with past work showing that institutional
underdevelopment creates challenges for the establishment of CSR (Marquis & Qian,
2013; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Conversely, a negative perception
of the capacity of the local government raises the disaster giving of an average sample
firm. Hence, taken together, my study offers a more nuanced understanding of the role of
institutional forces in disciplining firms into a certain pro-social behavior than previous
studies.
Second, a contribution to stakeholder theory centers on the emphasis of my
theoretical approach on the time and spatial distribution of firm-market linkages. My
study informs about the mechanisms and conditions under which geographically located
customers, competitors, and governments become salient stakeholders for the
organization. The relative standing of the firm and the degree of market competition are
two elements necessary to understand when and how power dependence, need for
legitimacy, and urgency vary across firm-stakeholder relationships (Mitchell, Agle, &
Wood, 1997).
Scholars have shown how stakeholder attention explains competitive advantages out
of corporate disaster giving (Crampton & Patten, 2008; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). A
promissory avenue of research is the investigation of the role of social standing in the
ability of the firm to attract stakeholder attention and, more importantly, approval to its
pro-social choices. For instance, does a firm with relatively high standing in a given
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market need to invest significantly more in pro-social behavior than a lower-standing
firm in order to capture rents?
Additionally, the finding regarding the role of market competition poses an
interesting paradox and challenges paradigms in public economics (Bénabou & Tirole,
2006; Cowling & Mueller, 1978). My study suggests that monopolies act as stop-loss
mechanisms in the presence of disruptive shocks that overwhelm the financial capacity of
national governments. Given the worldwide interest on antitrust regulation (Woodruff,
2006), an interesting research extension may target a more detailed estimate of the net
social value of monopolies, taking into consideration both market and non-market
dimensions of business strategy.
Third, my findings provide scholars in the industry self-regulation a context to
increase their understanding of the role of internationalization and country-specific
factors on the industry-related factors that affect collective action. For instance, taken
together, the frequency of exposure to systemic shocks that affect local industries is
higher for multinational enterprises (MNEs) than for single-country firms. Accordingly,
disasters are relatively likely to affect how industry dynamics impact the strategic
trajectory of MNEs. In this sense, the study of global systemic shocks provides a good
setting for the evaluation of cross-national heterogeneity in the predictions of industry
self-regulation regarding pro-social behavior. Moreover, the effect of systemic shocks on
the capacity of industry-based collectivities to overcome collective action problems
remains understudied (Baron, 2001; Ostrom, 2003; Prakash & Potoski, 2007). In this
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sense, scholars conducting single-country studies have made progress in the
conceptualization of (geographically circumscribed) business communities (Tilcsik &
Marquis, 2013). My study suggests a method to replicate such endeavor in a multicountry setting.
Additional limitations and boundary conditions of my study are associated with its
focus on large, publicly traded firms. Although this type of organization accounted for
nearly 90 percent of the recorded corporate donations the observed period (and, thus,
selection bias is mitigated), smaller and/or private firms may follow unique mechanisms
and conditions when behaving pro-socially. Future work based on case studies may better
complete our understanding of private provision of collective goods by unpacking such
factors. This effort also would provide a finer grained understanding of the relationship
between economic reliance and the geographic distribution of club systems particularly in
countries with large territories.
Managerial and policy implications
The practical implications of my study are related with the economic significance of
the findings. The average contribution from sample firms to the relief and recovery fund
of any given studied disaster is almost $1.6 million; more than the median annual
contribution of $1.5 to higher education by the largest 271 companies worldwide in 2014
(CECP, 2015). In any given year, the accumulated giving to disasters worldwide may
account for more than the annual CSR budget of the corporation. The occurrence of a
highly-devastated disaster in a country where the corporation has significant stake may
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lead the firm to allocate to disaster aid more than the budget for all social areas for years
to come. This finding corroborates the recurrent argument raised by the managers
interviewed in preparation for this study. For example, Anglo American’s donation for
the Chilean disaster in 2010 was greater than $10 million surpassing the mining
company’s $8-million annual CSR budget in Chile, a market to which the company was
highly reliant (0.49).39 Similarly, the $50 million that Cisco pledged in the aftermath of
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake was worth more than three years of Cisco’s corporate social
activity in China.40
The social value of corporate disaster giving is likely to continue to rise. The
inflation-adjusted costs of disasters have increased in the last four decades and the real
value of the traditional public sources for financing such costs have dropped in the same
period (United Nations, 2016). In the last 20 years, no other sector has increased its
proportional participation in disaster response more than firms (Ballesteros & Useem,
2015). Hence, information on the firm- and market-specific factors that foster corporate
disaster giving may help managers in multilateral and national agencies to predict the
influx of corporate giving to a disaster area and better plan requirements of public
resources and issue aid appeals. This information would help better address an important
public-policy issue by stimulating a structured and organized formal inclusion of
corporate giving in disaster relief and recovery around the world.

39

Felipe Purcell, Vice President of Corporate Affairs in Chile, in interview with the author on
10/19/2003.
40
(Cisco, 2010).
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APPENDIX
Matching procedure
I used no-replacement coarsened exact matched procedure in which I targeted a
treatment-to-control ratio of 1:10, but tested up to 1:2 for robustness. To assess and
mitigate the effect of spatial autocorrelation that may hamper econometrically efficient
standard errors, I used the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing method (Dekker, Krackhardt,
& Snijders, 2007) implemented as a linear probability model with fixed-effects for the
treatment and control groups (Rogan & Sorenson, 2013). The sum of absolute differences
1

across the multivariate histogram that has the following form: 𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐) 2

𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘

𝑛|𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 −

𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 | . Where 𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the relative frequency of the categorical variables for the firms in
the treatment group and 𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the correspondent number for the firms in the control
group.41 A magnitude of 𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐)=0 means perfect balance while a magnitude of 1
represents perfect separation.

41

The procedure to obtain the relative frequencies of the categorical variables is based on Iacus et al.,
(2008).
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Table 7. The effect of economic reliance on corporate disaster giving (Coarsened-exact matching)
VARIABLES
Economic Reliance
Exclusivity x ER
Agency Intervention x ER
External Intervention x ER
Government Effectiveness x ER
Regulatory Quality x ER
Social Standing x ER
Exclusivity (Industry Concentration)
Agency Intervention
External Intervention
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Social Standing

Model 4 (RE)
DV Amount (LN)
0.244
(0.054)
0.126
(0.005)
-0.039
(0.002)
0.037
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.000)
0.007
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

Model 5 (MC Logit)
DV: Donation Frequency
19.493
(1.609)
0.557
(0.137)
-0.531
(0.052)
-0.072
(0.068)
-0.079
(0.014)
0.067
(0.011)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.132)
-0.388
(0.318)
-0.200
(0.117)
0.039
(0.017)
-0.017
(0.015)
0.001
(0.000)

Model 6 (FE)
DV: Amount (LN)
78.723
(22.327)
-2.529
(1.572)
-1.509
(0.396)
-1.572
(0.716)
-0.502
(0.137)
0.516
(0.128)
0.000
(0.000)
0.231
(0.276)
1.045
(0.383)
-0.028
(0.117)
-0.010
(0.017)
-0.004
(0.015)
0.000
(0.000)

0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.000)
0.005
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.003
(0.000)
0.011
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.035
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.001
(0.003)
0.036
(0.056)
-0.000
(0.000)
3,044.217
(1,125.475)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.000)
(0.009)
1,524,614
2,846

0.078
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.041)
-0.066
(0.041)
0.043
(0.006)
0.419
(0.056)
1.025
(0.386)
-0.407
(0.121)
-0.013
(0.170)
3.609
(1.173)
3.373
(1.154)
6.095
(1.172)

-0.036
(0.038)
0.049
(0.097)
-0.039
(0.103)
0.024
(0.017)
0.209
(0.139)
-0.573
(0.445)
-0.294
(0.133)
0.119
(0.198)

-32.824
(42.089)
-0.223
(0.580)
297,763.560
(792,109.162)
-0.049
(0.028)
0.022
(0.009)
0.096
(0.051)
(4.062)
1,495,193
2,791

202.022
(737.407)
20.337
(6.168)
-9993698.328
(3907004.581)
-0.016
(0.041)
-0.018
(0.011)
-0.116
(0.062)
(4.189)
113,641
209
YES
YES
YES
YES

CONTROLS

Number of Employees
Total Revenue
Market Capitalization
Return on Assets
Consumer Orientation
GDP
Area (Size)
Population
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Mass Movement Dry
Mass Movement Wet
Deaths
People Affected
Economic Cost
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
Annual Number of disasters (World)
Newsworthy events

Observations
Number of events
Country FE
Year FE
Month Fes
Firm FE
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Table 8. Physical Presence and the Magnitude of Donation
Model 7 (RE)
Dependent variable: USD Donation Amount (LN)

VARIABLES
Physical Presence

-0.263
(0.033)
-0.016
(0.006)
0.002
(0.001)
0.008
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)

Exclusivity x Presence
External Int x Presence
Agency Int x Presence
Gov Effectiveness x Presence
Reg Quality x Presence
Standing x Presence
Exclusivity (Industry Concentration)
Agency Intervention
External Intervention
Social Standing
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
CONTROLS
Number of Employees

0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
0.005
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
0.026
(0.020)
-0.000
(0.000)
2,586.047
(236.313)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.004
(0.000)
-0.062
(0.009)

Total Revenue
Market Capitalization
Return on Assets
Consumer Orientation
GDP
Area (Size)
Population
Disaster Type
People Killed
People Affected
Economic Cost
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
Annual Number of disasters (World)
Newsworthy events
Constant

Observations
Number of events

1,524,614
2,846
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Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses.

Table 9. Moderating Effect of Poverty
Model 9 (RE)
Dependent variable: USD Donation Amount (LN)

VARIABLES
Economic Reliance

0.135
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.000)
0.004
(0.001)
0.002
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.078
(0.020)
-0.000
(0.000)
2,408.327
(180.395)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.004
(0.000)
-0.076
(0.009)

Poverty x Economic Reliance
Degree of Poverty
Number of Employees
Total Revenue
Market Capitalization
Return on Assets
Consumer Orientation
GDP
Area (Size)
Population
Disaster Type
People Killed
People Affected/Population
Economic Cost/GDP
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
Annual Number of disasters (World)
Newsworthy events
Constant

Observations
Number of events

1,524,614
2,846

Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses with month and year dummies
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Table 10. Moderating Effect of Employee-Initiated Giving
VARIABLES

Model 10 (MC Logit)
Dependent variable: Donation
Frequency

Economic reliance

5.356
(0.420)
-5.619
(1.556)
7.299
(1.064)
0.012
(0.037)
0.689
(0.358)
-0.002
(0.011)
0.175
(0.170)
0.348
(0.144)
0.338
(0.158)
-0.506
(0.171)
1.198
(0.283)
0.055
(0.227)
-0.367
(0.070)
0.061
(0.073)
0.413
(0.058)
0.618
0.426
(1.182)
1.432
(1.148)
0.934
-19.249
(2.994)
1,524,614.00
2,846

Economic reliance x Employee Giving
Employee Giving
Return on Assets %
Consumer Orientation
Industry
Number of Employees
Market Capitalization
Population
Area (Size)
Annual Number of disasters (World)
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
Affected Population
Economic Damage (USD Million)
Deaths
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Constant
Observations
Number of Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Firm-by-country fixed-effects. GDP-controlled
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CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION
The strategy literature has reached theoretical consensus that the decision to move
first, imitate or deviate from the first mover’s choices is often associated with
performance advantages (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). Yet, the
empirical work on the performance consequences of imitating or deviating is
comparatively scarce (Posen et al., 2013). Furthermore, the theoretical literature on
timing strategy has become progressively equivocal and some of its key predictions are
often not supported in practice (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013).
Consider the cases of the high performer Samsung leading the business response to
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the much less profitable Nokia and Panasonic donating
an identical amount as Samsung in the next couple of days. The responses spurred public
backlash in the following weeks, including consumer boycotts decrying them as “a drop
in the bucket”. Subsequently, Samsung’s choice was associated with losses not explained
by its market operation, which defies the prediction that firms that perform well tend to
accrue first-mover rents (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). Moreover, it was not
imitating the high-performing first mover which resulted in follower benefits (Gaba &
Terlaak, 2013), but deviating from it. Such a decision paid off for firms like Sony, a late
mover that accrued performance advantages despite giving an amount 50% smaller than
Samsung’s (Xinhua News Agency, 2008). In contrast, in the aftermath of the 2010
earthquake and tsunami in Chile, imitating the first mover Anglo American arguably paid
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off for the higher-performing BHP Billiton. The Anglo American and its imitators
realized performance benefits, while firms than deviated from Anglo American’s choice,
such as Rio Tinto, faced performance losses.
These examples suggest that the main predictions of the timing strategy literature may
not apply in the case of non-market settings such as corporate disaster giving. A setting
where informational and time constraints are pervasive (Kunreuther et al., 2002).
Additionally, the literature on non-market strategy has shown that the performance
consequences of pro-social behavior may depend on external stakeholder perceptions of
contextual appropriateness of corporate behavior. That is, the degree firms’ choices
satisfy their expectations and follow norms, rules, and customs (Madsen & Rodgers,
2014; Marquis & Battilana, 2009; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2016).
The fact that the literature on timing strategy has understudied the role of
stakeholders (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013) is relevant because
the measures that firms use to perceive the contextual appropriateness of business action
may differ from the those used by stakeholders. For instance, Samsung’s high
performance might have influenced Panasonic to imitate this first mover, as previous
research suggests (Anderson, 2010; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Posen et al., 2013).
Instead, customers in China might have focused on the accusations of unethical labor
practices that Samsung was facing and other indications of its preexisting reputation
when evaluating its donation.
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I explore this intuition with a framework that enriches the effect of economic reliance
on corporate disaster giving, explored in Chapter 1, with insights from institutional
theory. My theoretical stance is that the performance consequences of moving first or
following are frequently socially constructed under conditions of high environmental
uncertainty, causal ambiguity, and time pressure. I ground my theoretical argumentation
in the microfoundations of institutionalization (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) and particularly
on the role of sensemaking: the process decision-makers use to generate an appropriate
mental model of behavior that facilitate information processing and action (Weick, 1996).
Under conditions of high informational and time constraints, situational awareness relies
on cognitive referents—i.e., prominent and easy to collect firm-specific features that are
not necessarily associated with the focal good or decision (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011).
Cognitive referents signal a firm’s likelihood to select goods whose means and ends are
contextually appropriate to replace objective measures of past performance on a focal
decision (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Wry et al., 2014).
I identify media reputation as a cognitive referent that external stakeholders
recurrently use to form beliefs about a firm’s capacity and willingness to meet their
expectations. Thus, reputable first movers are prone to gain first-mover advantages. The
legitimization of their choices influences, for instance, consumers to increase willingness
to pay for the firm’s goods (Sirsly & Lamertz, 2007) or investors to facilitate access to
financing (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). Conversely, stakeholders perceive the
choices of firms with preexisting bad reputations as symbolic or socially prejudicial
(Cuypers et al., 2015). These firms are thus prone to suffer performance shortfalls.
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The influence of a first mover’s reputation then spills over to impact followers.
Imitating reputable firms generates legitimization for the follower that can override a bad
reputation. For instance, despite facing allegations of damaging environmental practices a
year before the 2010 disaster in Chile (KPMG, 2009), BHP Billiton gained rents by
arguably imitating Anglo American that had been publicly recognized for its work with
small farms. Similarly, imitating a first mover with a negative reputation is likely to result
in spillover harm (Barnett & King, 2008). This explains why Panasonic obtained
associated losses despite their good reputation as illustrated by its receipt of a
sustainability award in 2007.
Firms err frequently in their timing and imitation choices due to the salience of
cognitive referents when making fast strategic decisions under high uncertainty and
ambiguity (Kunreuther et al., 2002; Pahnke et al., 2015). Followers thus find difficult to
divert from the choices of high-performing first movers (Henisz & Delios, 2001). They
believe that high performers are comparatively successful in identifying stakeholder
expectations (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and abiding by institutions (Rindova &
Fombrun, 1999). This institutional pressure thus exacerbates the negative consequences
of the divergence in cognitive referents between firms and stakeholders because firms
with bad reputations see moving first as a chance to accumulate reputational capital
(Muller & Kräussl, 2011). Hence, imitation bandwagons often lead to systemic
performance losses.
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The setting of corporate disaster giving offers several benefits for the study of timing
advantages. First, it is subject to fewer of the endogeneity concerns that constrain the
development of the literature on timing advantages. For example, the exogenous nature of
the disaster mitigates the risk of reverse causality between the organizational choice and
firm performance. Second, it allows me to overcome some of the measurement problems
that are common in the empirical literature on imitation (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006;
Posen et al., 2013). The financial value and the timing of the donation are unambiguous
and measurable under objective criteria in my setting. Third, high informational
constraints and time pressure are pervasive for firms and stakeholders (Camerer &
Kunreuther, 1989; Lampel et al., 2009). Almost 84% of corporate donations are pledged
within one month of the disaster date, when information about the impact to the firm and
the market, stakeholder needs, and the material consequences of donations is scarce. As
expected, imitation is a recurrent phenomenon worldwide with the companies donating
the same amount as the first mover in 64% of the events with corporate responses.
Finally, the vastly increasing role that business intervention is playing in disaster
response represents a novel phenomenon for societies worldwide, limiting the ability of
stakeholders to objectively predict the efficiency of corporate giving (Ballesteros et al.,
2017).
The main identification strategy relies on the implementation of a quasi-experimental
technique: the synthetic control method (SCM) (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller,
2015). SCM is similar to matching techniques but, instead of unit-by-unit matching, it
uses an algorithm to generate a weighted combination of multiple control entities: a
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synthetic control. SCM is efficient for empirical settings where the focus is on aggregate
entities (e.g., organizations) and the pool of potential controls (e.g., first donors) is small.
Furthermore, SCM accounts for unobserved time-variant heterogeneity in panel data that
traditional quasi-experimental designs, such as differences-in-differences, cannot (Abadie
et al., 2015).
My findings suggest that the divergence in cognitive referents between firms and
stakeholders is enduring even when the degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity subside.
The effects of financial performance and reputation on business and stakeholder decisionmaking, respectively, are robust across firms, industries, countries, events, and time. The
fact that using concepts from prior research alone cannot solve the puzzle of why timing
choices based on financial standing have varying material consequences suggests that
theoretically distinguishing between the referents used by firms and stakeholders
contributes to the literature on timing strategy. By merging the idea of economic reliance
based on club-goods theory from Chapter 1 with insight from institutional theory, my
study offers a method to better predict first-mover rents. Additionally, it adds to the scant
scholarship on the efficiency of imitation.
My findings also contribute to the literature on the performance consequences of
corporate pro-social behavior. The results show that disaster giving is a non-market area
where firm choices are not strongly correlated with the social need, yet this variance is
not directly proportional to the scale of the rents received: firms may accrue rents despite
their donation being socially suboptimal. This proposes that the rents generated in
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institutional contexts, like the aftermath of disasters, are more a function of the perceived
contextual appropriateness of the corporate response than a function of its objective
social value.
THEORY
Timing advantages
The timing of choosing or implementing a high-stakes decision is an important factor
in the relationship between strategy and firm performance, and scholars in the strategy
(Mitchell, 1991), organizational theory (Hannan & Freeman, 1993), marketing (Kerin,
Varadarajan, & Peterson, 1992), and innovation literatures (Foster, 1988) have long
reached that consensus.42 However, the performance consequences of moving first or
leading vis-à-vis delaying a response or following remains the source of a theoretical
debate, and its verification an open empirical question (Fosfuri et al., 2013; Lieberman &
Montgomery, 2013). Moreover, the scope of the work has largely been focused upon
market entry and, particularly, new-market entry, a highly consequential but rare business
decision (Klingebiel & Joseph, 2015).
Despite such active debate and limitations, the literature has achieved strong
agreement on the conceptual frameworks around the association between timing and
competitive advantages, and there are two ubiquitous and largely accepted arguments

42
The study of timing advantages has spanned a wide range of topics such as market barriers in
industrial-organization economics (von Weizsacker, 1980), product innovation in business strategy
(Agarwal & Gort, 2001), consumer-preference formation in marketing (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1988), and
legitimacy in institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
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(Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). First, decision-making under uncertainty and time
constraints entails a trade-off between learning and seizing a market opportunity.
Delaying or deferring a response mitigates the risk of erring by allowing time to obtain
relevant information on stakeholder expectations and the institutional environment
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). At the same time, competitive advantages have, by nature, a
narrow window of opportunity (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015). The second
argument is that resolving the tradeoff between learning and acting to choose the optimal
timing is associated with the possession of strategic resources whose unequal distribution
across firms explains the creation, allocation, and sustainability of market rents (Helfat &
Peteraf, 2015).

Gaining timing advantages by responding to disasters
Engaging in disaster relief and recovery by donating cash, products or services, or
taking active roles in post-disaster logistics is not a new societal function for firms, as
reports date back to the late 1800s (Alessi, 1975). In recent years, however, corporate
disaster giving has reached a new scale in the non-market repertoire worldwide. For
instance, the proportion of the 3,000 largest firms at the international level that engage in
disaster giving went from 34% in 1990 to over 91% in 2015. Most of this growth has
occurred in the last 10 years, when the real average disaster donation grew 10 times to
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reach $1.6 million.43 For some disasters in the past six years, corporate giving surpassed
the combined donations from foreign governments, multilateral agencies, NGOs, and
individual charity (Ballesteros et al., 2017). In any given year, the accumulated donation
to disaster relief and recovery may be larger than the annual social budget of the
corporation and firms often reduce other expenditure to allocate resources to these
unpredictable phenomena (Ballesteros, 2015; Useem et al., 2015).
Studies usefully have shown in the context of their samples that corporate donors aim
to accumulate reputational capital (Muller & Kräussl, 2011), restore strategic club goods
(Ballesteros, 2015), and respond to institutional forces (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Zhang
& Luo, 2013). 44 By doing so, donors often accrue rents (Crampton & Patten, 2008;
Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). The analyses in this nascent literature, however, lack
consideration of the role that the timing of the corporate engagement may have in this
process.
For most accounts, this process occurs in stable institutional contexts with clear
referents for what constitutes appropriateness in corporate behavior (Thornton, Ocasio, &
Lounsbury, 2012). Particularly, the institutional literature proposes that firms encounter
and follow enduring geographically located pressures (Marquis & Battilana, 2009). Firms
are fungible entities of the geographical market, and the timing of making high-stakes
decisions is an extension of customs, norms, and laws (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Zhang &
43
As a reference, the median annual contribution to secondary education of companies worldwide
went from $1.8 to $1.5 million during the same period (CECP, 2015).
44
In addition to the referred reports, the author conducted interviews with managers of corporations
donating to the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Chile and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan.
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Luo, 2013). Decision-makers are either “cultural dopes” that align to institutional logics
or “change agents” that disrupt the status quo with institutional entrepreneurship (Tracey,
Philips, & Jarvis, 2010; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011). Thus, a normative pressure
should drive the timing of giving (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; Marquis et al., 2013).
Under this approach, timing benefits arise when a firm’s decision to give first or defer
their response better meets the model of contextual appropriateness than do the choices of
competitors.
However, studies in economics (Andreoni, 2006), social psychology (Simonsohn &
Ariely, 2008), and institutional theory (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Marquis & Lee, 2013)
suggest that under extreme environmental uncertainty, ambiguity, and time constraints,
the institutional assimilation of new phenomena is more complex than the extant
literature has portrayed. The availability of institutional tools to navigate informational
and time constraints has been “taken-for-granted” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) and the
argument that revealed stakeholder expectations govern corporate action is difficult to
support in chaotic contexts such as the aftermath of disasters.
Environmental uncertainty
Responding to disasters poses a “formidable challenge” not only to naïve decisionmakers, but also to users of logic and probability (Kunreuther et al., 2002). Firms are
increasingly exposed to suffer the negative effects of disasters due to economic
interdependencies and the internationalization of the business activity (Oh & Oetzel,
2011). These material and human impacts to the firm and the market are often difficult to
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estimate. Hence, managers may make decisions that conflict with the logics of market
operation (Lampel et al., 2009). The chief risk officer of a U.S. firm, a donor to the 2011
disaster in East Japan, recalls one part of this struggle:
“… “We have two large plants in Japan…The east coast plant was damaged, and it took
our capacity offline for months. And that had a significant impact on our earnings and
ability to supply parts so we lost significant market share during that period. It has taken
us 18 to 24 months to regain the share that we lost.”45
In addition, unlike other non-market areas, information on the social need is often
unavailable or inaccurate for months. Firms are rarely provided with a description of the
damage, what aid is needed, by whom, and where (Fritz, 2004). Therefore, when firms
make donation decisions they sometimes use referents not necessarily associated with the
emergency. For example, Anglo American considered its annual social budget in Chile as
a referent for its donation and, in this way, the firm could respond quickly becoming the
first corporate donor.46
Causal ambiguity
Although a consensus in the specialized literature is that disaster giving is associated
with market rents (e.g., Crampton & Patten, 2008; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller &
Kräussl, 2011), a normative assessment of the characteristics of the donation that
maximizes the expected benefits is a complex task for the average decision-maker
(Kunreuther et al., 2002). Corporate disaster giving is an infrequent and unstructured
activity for most firms (Ballesteros, 2015). Unlike other areas, a projection in the annual

45
46

(Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan, & Useem, n.d.).
VP of Corporate Affairs in interview with the author.
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financial plan is uncharacteristic and a cost-benefit assessment of different donation
choices is rare.
Furthermore, the uniqueness of disasters in terms of their frequency and effects
constrains the value of experience. Firms often have to deal with temporal institutional
arrangements and societal contexts for which they lack information (Klinenberg, 2003).
They are involved with myriad non-traditional stakeholders whose strategic role is
difficult to discern. Moreover, these stakeholders commonly lack the resources to assess
the social value of the corporate response (Useem et al., 2015). Is $10 million too much
or too little from the social standpoint?
Time pressure
Firms face a decisive tradeoff when they engage in disaster giving. Waiting can bring
relevant data to mitigate causal ambiguity. Laggards will have a richer understanding of
the association between corporate responses and stakeholder reactions than early movers
had. Yet, traditionally, all corporate aid comes within the first two post-disaster months.
This suggests that the opportunity of making a move to capture rents has a shorter
timespan than other strategic areas. The longer the organization waits to respond, the
lower the likelihood of realizing performance benefits. In such conditions of urgency,
decision makers cannot engage in lengthy processes of exploration (Kaplan, 2008).
In response to the concerns regarding the ability of the extant literature to capture the
role that extreme informational constraints and time pressure plays in the antecedents and
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consequences of organizational decision-making, recent scholarship has brought attention
to the microfoundations of institutionalization (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Its proponents
contend the need for a more nuanced characterization of the role of decision-makers in
institutional evolution, not only passively behaving, but also choosing; not only aligning,
but also creating to institutional referents (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).
This scholarship suggests the existence of environmental contexts where decisionmakers confront a unique experience with no reference to probability estimates (Lampel
et al., 2009). Normative mechanisms like legislation are often nonexistent and replaced
by learning, benchmarking, and voluntarism (Lepoutre, Dentchev, & Heene, 2007). A
pertinent question of the microfoundations of institutionalization is how expectations
regarding contextual appropriateness emerge in the first place. In addition to the
theoretical gap, applying this inquiry to the studied setting has important practical
implications. The global salience of disasters give corporate responders high visibility
that exacerbates the material consequences of their choices (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007;
Franks, 2013): given the fast-paced decision making, how peer firms and stakeholders
solve uncertainty and ambiguity to identify responses that meet stakeholder expectations?
Economic Reliance and Rents
Disasters are most likely to link with a strategic value for the firm when they diminish
or disrupt market welfare and, consequently, their firms’ performance (Hoffman &
Ocasio, 2001; Lampel et al., 2009). The larger the share of a company’s income from a
given market, the larger the importance of an event disrupting the market’s status quo
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(Ballesteros, 2015). Consequently, the economic consequences of responding to a given
disaster should be directly proportional on their firms’ economic reliance on disasterexposed market (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007).
This focus of business managers on a market’s recovery is in line with a theoretical
expectation that pro-social behavior becomes strategic when it not only helps society but
also the company itself, reducing the real cost of corporate giving (cf., Godfrey, 2005;
Porter & Kramer, 2002; Saiia et al., 2003; Wokutch et al., 2013). In other words,
although corporate disaster giving may be driven by social preferences, such as altruism
and reciprocity (Muller, Pfarrer, & Little, 2014), business managers strategically are
likely to focus their pro-social behavior in disaster-affected nations where the direct and
indirect business implications for the firms are greatest (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2009;
Sandler, 2013). The self-interested premise that a firm’s performance may be weakened if
the market is not soon restored may thus have the unintended effect of driving a firm to
invest private resources where the gap in international aid is largest.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The likelihood of obtaining performance benefits from corporate
disaster giving is directly proportional with the firm’s economic reliance with the
affected market.
At the same time, some business decision makers are prone to lead or follow because
they the perceived cost-benefit of this strategy is associated with their reliance to the
affected market. I argue that the motives of acting are particularly salient for
organizations with a significant economic affiliation to the market system. Market-related
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sunk costs drive the firm to participate in economic processes that are relevant for firm
performance (Ordanini, Rubera, & DeFillippi, 2008). Recent studies show, for instance,
that the share of an organization’s income dependent on a given market is a predictor of
its willingness to contribute to that market’s recovery in the aftermath of systemic shocks
(e.g., Ballesteros, 2015; Muller & Whiteman, 2008). Furthermore, an economic
affiliation provides an institutional pressure that legitimates making a material
commitment regarding a high-stake decision (i.e., leading) a more socially accepted
alternative than deferring the response (Zhang & Luo, 2013).
A spokesperson for the pharmaceutical company GSK captured this argument when
explaining why the firm had donated a large amount in the aftermath of an earthquake in
China in 2008, “We have a lot of business in vaccines and consumer health care goods in
China. Our donation reflects…our commitment to the Chinese people,” she said.47
Consequently, firms with little economic affiliation in the market are, on average,
more likely to defer decisions whose pay-offs are highly ambiguous (Ballesteros, 2015).
The potential costs of the decision outweigh the uncertain material rewards. Following
this argument, I suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a (H1. a). The degree of economic reliance to the affected country is
inversely proportional to the timing of the donation
Sensemaking under Uncertainty and Ambiguity

47

(Associated Press, 2008).
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The chaotic context generated by disasters is associated with a collapse in the mental
processes that facilitate deliberative thinking (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Weick,
1996). In the face of high informational and time constraints, the micro-processes behind
the generation of institutions are simple and aimed at interpretation (Weick, 1996; Wry et
al., 2014). Firms and stakeholders undertake processes aimed at constructivism and focus
on prominent and widely available signals whose gathering entails a low transactional
cost (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). These cognitive referents are the basis of measures of
appropriateness that are valid in a specific socioeconomic context where decisions and
exchanges of goods take place and help decision-makers interpret the potential
consequences of behavior (Bitektine, 2011).
Sensemaking has implications on the microlevel outcomes behind stakeholders
punishing or rewarding firms for their choices (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). Cognitive
referents enable firms and stakeholders to stratify, rank, and classify potential suppliers
per their perceived capacity to satisfy stakeholder expectations while aligning to
institutions. Sensemaking is triggered when decision-makers “bracket” firms and their
choices according to specific idiosyncrasies (Wry et al., 2014).
In settings where the scale of private participation has no contextual precedent and
experiential learning is rare, decision-makers find cognitive referents in the
characteristics of early behavior. Specifically, first movers are often the actors that
institutionalize standards for private intervention. Stakeholders and firms draw on the
characteristics of first responses to construct beliefs of what the corporate provision may
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or should be. This process does not involve a comparative analysis of efficiency. Rather,
responses of certain type of early movers are enacted through their strategic salience in an
environment of informational scarcity and urgency (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).
If firms and stakeholders adopted the same cognitive referents, their beliefs on what is
a contextually appropriate response would be aligned and errors made by firms would be
infrequent (i.e., stakeholders would reward more frequently than punish firms’ choices;
Chase & Simon, 1973). I argue that the divergence in cognitive referents, as discussed
below, is precisely what determines that the performance consequences of the decision
timing often do not follow the predictions of the extant literature.
Using financial standing to make sense of organizational imitation
The literature has long assumed that imitation is a prominent phenomenon under
context of environmental uncertainty and causal ambiguity (Cyert & March, 1963; Gaba
& Terlaak, 2013; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Rivkin, 2000). Through strategic imitation
followers learn clues to resolve the ambiguity of unexplored options (Guillén, 2002;
Henisz & Delios, 2001), understand institutions and stakeholder dynamics (HowardGrenville, 2008; Nikolaeva, 2014) and achieve legitimization in market systems
(Deephouse, 1996). Organizations, for example, imitate market entry and expansion
choices (Belderbos, Olffen, & Zou, 2011; Guillén, 2002; Haveman, 1993; Hsieh &
Vermeulen, 2014), labor practices, production standards, or technology (Kogut & Zander,
1992; Ritchie & Melnyk, 2012; Yeung, Lo, & Cheng, 2011), or philanthropic patterns
(Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis et al., 2007; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
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Because the firm’s objective function centers on the generation of profits (Sundaram
& Inkpen, 2004), managers focus on the financial standing of the first mover to form
beliefs of its capacities in interpreting institutional and stakeholder dynamics (Posen et
al., 2013). For them, financial standing connotes credibility (Pahnke et al., 2015) and
goodwill (Douty, 1972) in the market. Managers thus perceive high performers as firms
that are likely to understand what constitutes appropriate behavior within the norms,
customs, and laws of the market system (Thornton et al., 2012). Therefore, financial
standing becomes the main informational mechanism to mitigate ambiguity and forecast
stakeholder reactions to specific characteristics of firm choices (Servaes & Tamayo,
2013).
Follower firms thus use financial standing as a cognitive referent to choose whether
to imitate or deviate from the first mover’s donation. Because few firms solve the
learning-opportunity tradeoff by waiting too long, mimicry is a recurrent strategy in the
market of disaster public goods. Particularly, firms will imitate high-performing first
movers because managers believe that these organizations give them high chances to
sanction their choices (Deephouse, 1996). In this sense, deviating from a first move
perceived as aligned with relevant stakeholder preferences and institutions is a risky
choice in the eyes of the manager of the follower firm (Kopel, 2009). Hence, imitation
will be frequent among firms of the same institutional group (e.g., industry) that share
strategies, stakeholders, and institutions (Deephouse, 1999).
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In consequence, high-performing first movers create long lasting isomorphic
bandwagons and their donation size is a strong predictor of the average corporate giving
for a specific disaster. First movers with low performance exert a weaker and less
sustainable scale of influence (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009). They generate fleeting
imitation and cognitive referents that deviating firms adjust more drastically.
Because several firms set their giving as a function of the choices of early donors,
which have comparatively very little objective data on the size of the hardship, the
aggregate business response is often uncorrelated with the underlying characteristics of
the social need. That is, I expect that the share of corporate giving for a specific disaster
will be either too large or too little in relation to variables such as the number of victims.
Putting these arguments together, I predict the following:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The first responses in the industry when first movers are high
performers explain the average amount of corporate aid more than objective measures of
the social need
Using media reputation to make sense of stakeholders punishing or rewarding
organizational choices
Consumers, governments, and other stakeholders directly or indirectly affected by the
disaster deal with the uncertainty of firms efficiently helping restore social welfare
(Ballesteros et al., 2017). Media reputation, i.e., a general and short-term perception of an
organization’s attitudes and aptitudes based on stakeholder inferences from its recent
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behavior in different market and non-market domains, functions as this signaling
mechanism (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Kuhnen & Niessen-Ruenzi, 2011; Wry,
Deephouse, & McNamara, 2006). This perception is created by the several microencounters that the firm has had with members of society in the recent past (Bitektine,
2011). Replacing the most permanent and focused influence of a history of supplying
disaster goods, media reputation finds its main source in mass outlets (Deephouse &
Carter, 2005).
As such, different disciplines have documented the power of media to influence the
social construction of socioeconomic processes (Deephouse, 2000). In a market system,
the pre-event media coverage sentiment score influences stakeholder beliefs of the firm’s
intentions and capacities to increase or hamper social welfare with its aid. Media
communications mitigate information asymmetry among local stakeholders that have no
objective data on the performance of the corporation in the focal action (Weigelt &
Camerer, 1988).
A positive reputation translates to the time of the focal choice and situates the firm as
a reliable actor whose provision is socially desirable. The firm thus achieves moral
legitimacy and stakeholders perceive its behavior to be contextually appropriate. For
instance, they believe that the firm’s choices will likely meet social needs and will be in
line with relevant norms, customs, and rules (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). In contrast,
stakeholders perceive that the intervention of firms with negative preexisting reputation
will be less socially beneficial. The underlying motives of low-reputation donors are
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likely to be perceived as less altruistic or sincere and more instrumental and symbolic
(Cuypers et al., 2015).
The main consequence of this constructivism is the propensity of reputable first
donors to realize competitive benefits. A firm whose choices achieve legitimization by
way of its preexisting reputation has a comparatively high likelihood of gaining different
forms of stakeholder support. For instance, the local government may favor the firm
when distributing operational rights (Wilburn & Wilburn, 2011), investors may facilitate
access to financial resources (Cheng et al., 2014), and customers may increase their
willingness to pay or their demand for the firm’s market goods (Servaes & Tamayo,
2013). Additionally, internal stakeholders such as workers may perceive an intrinsic pay
through an emotional connection with the organization and increase productivity
(Flammer & Luo, 2015), and other external stakeholders may provide goodwill that
functions as informal insurance for future calamities (Minor & Morgan, 2011). A positive
reputation thus becomes a strategic resource for value creation (Barnett, 2007;
Deephouse, 2000).
In sum, I argue that the main determinants of performance benefits associated with
timing choices are not the de facto capacities of the firm to choose the optimal
characteristics of its choices or the firm-specific financial or physical resources, but the
perceived efficiency of the corporate response. Formally, I hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). On average, first movers with a positive preexisting reputation
will realize performance advantages more often than first movers with a negative
preexisting reputation

The Construction of Follower Rents
Whether strategic isomorphism confers performance benefits to the corporate donor
depends mainly on the target of imitation. Ideally, a follower will mimic a first donor
with a positive reputation, but the institutional pressures previously described will lead
several followers to err. Because first donors with bad reputations often move first in the
hopes of improving the public image of the organization some firms will imitate its
donation (Muller & Kräussl, 2011).
Mimicking first donors with negative pre-disaster reputation may carry a financial
cost because firms adopt responses that stakeholders perceive as contextually
inappropriate. Once the manager has set her imitation target, adjusting her behavior to
deviate significantly from the first mover’s donation is a complex task. Such donation
amount is a legitimized choice and if the imitator searches additional information, it
centers such effort on the data that suit the first move (Asch, 1955; Simonsohn & Ariely,
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2008). Therefore, organizations mimic attributes that the market evaluates as contextually
inappropriate.48
On the other hand, imitating leaders that stakeholders perceive positively often results
in performance benefits. Imitators capture positive reputational spillovers and legitimize
their behavior as suppliers of disaster aid (Deephouse, 1996; Howard-Grenville, 2008;
Nikolaeva, 2014; Salomon & Wu, 2012). Particularly, firms with large informational
gaps benefit from savings in the costs of learning (Lee, Smith, Grimm, & Schomburg,
2000; Nikolaeva, 2014; Pingle, 1995; Posen et al., 2013). They economize in collecting
and transforming data into relevant information (Levitt & March, 1988).
Rational mimickers thus free ride on early movers’ endeavors that absorb the risks
and costs of social experimentation. By capturing legitimization spillovers, external
stakeholders consider the follower’s choices as contextually appropriate. Hence,
performance benefits arise due to material savings in the costs of decision-making, and a
fit with the institutional environment (Deephouse & Carter, 2005).
It follows from these arguments that if stakeholders judge first donations as
contextually suboptimal, due to the perceived inefficiency of the first donor, followers
have more opportunities to capture rents by donating a significantly different amount than
by engaging in imitation. In other words:

48

In other settings, follower organizations may err in entry by expanding to crowded markets with
declining life cycles; or they may adopt soon-to-be obsolete technology only because it has surpassed a
tipping point of users in a reference group (Haveman, 1993).
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Hypothesis 4 (H4). Imitating a first mover’s choice is more likely to gain rents than
deviating when the first mover has a positive preexisting reputation
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Deviating from the first mover’s choice is more likely to gain
rents than imitating when the first mover has a negative preexisting reputation
Variance in Uncertainty and Ambiguity and the Use of Cognitive Referents
The heterogeneity in the relative importance of cognitive referents vis-à-vis
deliberative or controlled thinking is fundamental in a theory of the social construction of
timing advantages. The cognitive capabilities to make choices or evaluate the social value
of these choices should vary across firms (e.g., some have more experience in the specific
market and understand the institutional context better than others do) and across societies
(i.e., some have been more exposed to private supply than others have) (Henisz & Delios,
2001; Zollo, 2009).
Additionally, some choices entail more time for decision-making or their higher
frequency enables iterated choices under relatively similar stakeholder and institutional
dynamics. Firms in disaster-prone areas, for instance, where the occurrence of these
phenomena is seasonal (e.g., tornados in the U.S. Midwest) have more data to mitigate
causal ambiguity (Henisz & Delios, 2004). Conversely, seismic activity is highly
uncertain even in countries frequently hit by earthquakes such as Japan and China (Baker
& Bloom, 2013). Moreover, they are associated with a wide range of socioeconomic
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impacts, which hampers predictability of the social need and the organizational ability to
respond (Anbarci, Escaleras, & Register, 2005).
Therefore, all else being equal, the higher the frequency of the corporate decision and
the existing history providing such good are, the larger the opportunities for learning
(Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009; Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Rerup, 2009).
Learning mitigates the distorting effect of beliefs in ambiguous contexts (Kahneman,
2011) and facilitates the mental association between timing and stakeholder expectations
(Starbuck, 2009; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Additionally, firms accumulate context-specific
knowledge that help meet internal and external pressures (Beck & Plowman, 2009; Helfat
& Peteraf, 2015; Henisz & Delios, 2002).
On the other hand, experiential learning enables stakeholders to make informed
assessments of the social consequences of corporate aid. Government stakeholders, for
instance, may be more able to identify cases where the participation of the business
community or specific firms is more desirable than the intervention of other entities
(Ballesteros et al., 2017). Thus, learning helps transforming environmental uncertainty
and causal ambiguity into risk. I summarize these arguments in the following moderating
prediction:
Hypothesis 6 (H6). The effect of cognitive referents in the generation of follower rents
is directly proportional to the degree of uncertainty and ambiguity

77

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data
I tested the value of my theoretical argumentation with a dataset that covers the
population of major natural disasters worldwide from 2003 to 2015, as reported in the
International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) from the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters. Although EM-DAT records all 5,237 major disasters,49 I
focused on sudden disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, which have a clear
triggering event, immediate disruption, and peak impacts within 30 days. I did not
consider slowly emerging disasters, such as famines, because impacts unfold over a long
period and it is difficult to identify the total magnitude and timing of aid. I also excluded
manmade disasters, such as 9/11, as these often involve sociopolitical factors affecting
aid and its consequences (Birkland, 1997; Klinenberg, 2003; Platt, 2012). Finally, I
dropped events with missing data on or imprecise dates. The final list comprises 4,637
disasters that affected 177 countries.
For corporate disaster giving, I used the propriety dataset described in the Preface.
The Annex contains a detailed description of the procedures to monetize in-kind giving,
convert to U.S. dollars, and assess measurement error and data quality using third-party
sources. After merging this dataset with the several datasets described below on firmspecific data from Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliates, Capital IQ, and tracking media
49

According to EM-DAT, these are events associated with 10 or more people killed, 100 or more
people affected, a declaration of a state of emergency, or a call for international assistance,
http://www.emdat.be/.
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reputation using Factiva, and country-specific data from the World Bank and the United
Nations Development Program, the study covers 5,845 multinational firms from 74
headquarters-countries and 19,958 donations.
Method
My argumentation focuses on how the perception of the contextual appropriateness of
corporate disaster giving, driven by media reputation and corporate financial standing,
affects donations decisions and performance benefits. Testing these associations is a
complex task because reputation, financial standing, and donation choices are likely
endogenous to firm performance. Isolating causality requires an approach that compares
performance variables among firms that donated with different timing and magnitude,
and have different levels of media reputation and financial standing, but are otherwise
similar with regard to underlying attributes. The assumption of heterogeneity in these
characteristics but homogeneity in everything else is difficult to satisfy and poses an
estimation challenge for conventional panel-data techniques. The risk of documenting a
spurious relationship is particularly high since financial performance and pro-social
behavior are likely moving in the same direction as unobserved factors such as
managerial capabilities and risk aversion.
Tools such as fixed-effects and control variables partially address these issues, but
they impose the assumption that ex ante disaster trends extrapolate to ex post conditions,
which is often not the case (Ballesteros et al., 2017). Large sample matching techniques
like coarsened-exact matching are inefficient in contexts where the potential control pool
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is limited (e.g., first movers with good/bad reputation and high/low financial
performance) and efficient single comparisons often do not exist (Abadie et al., 2010,
2015).
Given the impossibility of a clean experiment that randomly allocates firms into
groups with different donation- and firm-specific characteristics, I used the second-best
econometric tool for causal inference: a quasi-experimental design. Traditional quasiexperimental designs, such as differences-in-differences, allow for the inclusion of
unobserved confounding influences. This heterogeneity must be time-invariant, though,
so that the temporal method can address it. Instead, I chose the synthetic control method
(SCM), which mitigates the issues described above and allows the effects of unobserved
heterogeneity to vary overtime (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015).
Synthetic control method. As with other matching techniques, SCM matches a focal
(treated) entity with a control that is statistically similar for a set of relevant predictors,
but different with regard to a focal independent variable (the treatment). Comparison
units are selected to reproduce the counterfactual for the focal entity, and thus isolate how
treatment affects the outcome of interest. SCM is unique, though, in that controls are a
combination of multiple potential comparators, rather than single entities.
The approach works by using an algorithm that, first, evaluates the capacity of every
firm not affected by an intervention to emulate pre-treatment characteristics of the treated
entity. From this, weights are assigned to multiple control firms, which are then
combined to form a synthetic comparator that closely resembles the treated firm, except
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for the presence of the intervention (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2015 for detailed
discussions). The approach is also capable of matching entities over a long pre-treatment
time-period. As Abadie et al. (2015: 498) note, this effectively controls for unobserved
variance, as “only units that are alike in observed and unobserved [factors]…should
produce similar trajectories on the outcome variable over extended periods of time.” In
my study, this means that SCM matches each treated firm with a combination of carefully
selected firms in the control group: a synthetically created organization. For instance, no
one firm approximates Anglo American in the years leading up to the 2010 earthquake
and tsunami. However, features of Rio Tinto, Antofagasta, Tek, Bifox, and Codelco are
combined in different proportions to form a synthetic Anglo American that closely
matches features that predict performance.
The efficiency of SCM centers on the capacity of the algorithm to minimize, for each
pre-treatment period, the distance between treated firms and each of the synthetic
counterfactuals on a case-by-case basis. As a result, SCM does not compute significance
levels as in traditional panel-data techniques, and effect sizes are interpreted directly as
the difference between the values for treated versus control entities on the outcome of
interest (Abadie et al., 2015). The statistical likelihood that observed outcomes are the
result of treatment versus chance is calculated using placebo tests. The approach works
by telling the SCM algorithm that entities in the control group have received treatment
(even though they have not). These ‘placebo’ entities are then matched with synthetic
counterparts, and outcomes of interest are assessed. Repeating this analysis for all nontreated entities creates a distribution of outcomes that are essentially observed by chance.
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This distribution of false treatment effects is then used to compare with the actual
treatment effects and generate p-values (see Abadie et al., 2015). The Appendix has a
mathematical description of SCM and how statistical inference is conducted.
Variables
Outcome variable. Calculating performance effects associated with the response to
country-localized disasters requires a measure that is sensitive to changes in performance
at the national level. Therefore, I use annual revenue at the subsidiary level. Revenue is
the income that a corporate subsidiary has from its market activities, usually the sale of
products or services to external or internal customers. Previous studies have relied on
similar measures to analyze performance of multinational companies (Rangan & Sengul,
2009).
The outcome variable is the probability of off-trend revenue, which is the likelihood
that a donor firm has of accruing income that it is not explained by the historic trajectory
of the determinants of market income at the subsidiary level. To estimate this measure, I
use exact inferential techniques as suggested by Abadie et al., (2010), using the predictor
variables described below. For each treated firm, I construct a synthetic control based on
five years of pre-disaster data at the subsidiary level using the predictors also described
below. Then I use revenue one year after the disaster. Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations
and Capital IQ are the data sources. Negative values of the probability of off-trend
revenue means that the firm is, on average, likely to obtain losses associated with its
donation.
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Local revenue facilitates the evaluation of the main relationship of interest in a way
that other variables of financial performance commonly used in the extant literature
cannot (Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). For
instance, cumulative measures using stock prices in international markets may be affected
by factors that are beyond the subsidiary’s control (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Furthermore,
the impact of giving on consumer behavior may be observed faster via revenue than other
economic consequences of strategic philanthropy, such as increases in employee
productivity (Lev et al., 2010).
Predictor variables. In my setting, I analyze what would have happened to the
generation of off-trend revenue associated with the timing of one specific donation in the
absence of a given level of media reputation and/or financial standing. I followed a
rigorous data-driven procedure to construct efficient comparison groups that have
statistically similar characteristics to the treatment units. Particularly important are the
characteristics strongly associated with financial performance as reflected in a
voluminous literature on firm resources and capabilities (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker,
1993; Barney, 1991; Du et al., 2011; Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013) and those
associated with pro-social behavior (e.g., Marquis et al. 2007, Muller and Kräussl 2011,
Servaes and Tamayo 2013). Using I use 1) performance proxied by annual revenue,
market capitalization, and return on assets; 2) industry is the four-digit SIC code; 3) size
proxied by number of employees and total assets; and 4) innovation proxied by the dollar
amount of research and development. The sources of these data are Capital IQ and
Corporate Affiliates.
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Additionally, I include in the matching logarithm country variables (GDP, life
expectancy, inflation rate, trade openness, and government effectiveness) and eventspecific variables (human hardship and media visibility), following previous work
investigating the effect of institutional development (Volberda, van der Weerdt, Verwaal,
Stienstra, & Verdu, 2012) and the development implications of disasters (Kousky, 2013).
My approach, hence, isolates the effect of the potential sources of public opinion from
several context-based factors that may also contribute to the generation and evolution of
performance advantages.
Treatment variables. For hypothesis 1, given that the distribution for economic
reliance is symmetric, the mean and standard deviation are efficient indicators of location
in the distribution. I thus divided the dataset into three equally sized groups using the
33.3 and 66.6 percentiles as cutoff points: firms with low economic reliance; firms with
medium levels of economic reliance; and firms with high levels of economic reliance.
For hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 the treatment variable is net pre-event media coverage
sentiment score. Considering limitations, biases, and measurement error, the argument
that media captures corporate reputation has been established in several lines of research
(Deephouse, 1996). The tone or sentiment of media is the surrogate of unambiguous and
objective measures of a firm’s attention to (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) and engagement in
(Henisz et al., 2013) social issues, its predisposition to risky market behavior (Sitkin &
Weingart, 1995), its conformity to social norms (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester,
2012) and regulation (Marquis & Qian, 2013), among other features. Media reports are an
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imperfect substitute of primary data collected through surveys, but the second best
available proxy of public opinion (Kuhnen & Niessen-Ruenzi, 2011).
I calculate media reputation by analyzing media reports on the business organization
one year before and after the official date of the disaster. The measure uses computer
linguistic software, as implemented by Factiva, which quantifies the tone (i.e., sentiment)
of each report. I followed work that calculates and ranks organizations based on their
media-sourced reputation (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Carroll & Hannan, 1989;
Deephouse, 1996) and used the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (JCE).50 The JCE is
calculated as follows:
𝑒 2 − 𝑒𝑐
𝑖𝑓 𝑒 > 𝑐
𝑡2
𝑒𝑐 − 𝑐 2
𝐽𝐹𝐶 =
𝑖𝑓 𝑐 > 𝑒
𝑡2
{
0
otherwise

Where, e=annual number of positive media reports on the firm; c =annual number of
negative media reports on the firm; and t=e+c
In hypothesis 1 I test the argument that peer firms use financial standing as their main
cognitive referent of appropriateness and a driving factor of their proneness to imitate. In
this case, I use the rank of the corporation by firm value, lagged by a year related to the
disaster date. Several studies have shown in the context of their samples that firm value is
an efficient proxy of performance and the measure is widely accepted in the strategy

50

For an analysis of the reliability of this measure to capture the comparative media reputation of a
firm see Bansal & Clelland (2004).
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literature and particularly in studies evaluating the performance effects of CSR (Cuypers
et al., 2015; Flammer, 2015; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). See Hansen and Wernerfelt
(Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989) for a thorough discussion.
To capture the timing of the choice, I use the log of the number of minutes between
the official disaster time, as reported in EM-DAT, and the announcement of the
organizational decision to donate based on the earliest media report. In cases of finding
the same timing between two or more reports (2.75 percent of cases), I considered
seconds as the deciding measure. Additionally, for robustness purposes, I construct
categorical variables to denote order groups: D1=1, if the firm is the first mover; D2=1,
an imitator; D3=1, a deviator. The exclusion case is abstention.
Regarding the amount of donation and timing, I coded four options: 0) abstention,
there is no reported donation, p, for organization i, pi=0; 1); first mover, organization i is
the first reported donor from institutional group A, ti< tj, when i, j, ∈A; 2); imitation, there
is at least one other organization, h, that reported the same cash or in-kind USD amount
of donation prior to organization i in institutional group A, th< ti, when h and i ∈ A; 3);
deviation, organization i reported a donation amount significantly different than those of
previous organizations, 1…h, in institutional group A; that is, ti< th when i and h ∈ A.51 I
use two types of classification continuously referred in the literature as sources of
51

The organizational behavior is studied as an intended decision. Business decision makers choose the
timing of donation, and, if following, they choose to replicate other organizations’ responses (i.e., donate
the same amount, with the same form—in-kind or cash, and to the same target area), to donate differently,
or to abstain (i.e., not to donate). Followers face no ambiguity: imitation is not tacit or complex (Lieberman
& Asaba, 2006). Followers know the methods used by leader organizations to pledge a donation.
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institutional pressures for managerial decision-making under uncertainty: the industry
(i.e., four-digit Standard Industrial Classification) (Ethiraj & Zhu, 2008), and the country
of headquarters (i.e., country where the organization was founded) (Marquis & Battilana,
2009).
RESULTS
Consistent with earlier studies, the exploratory analyses show that the measure of
firm performance (i.e., revenue) correlates positively with a firm’s disaster giving,
providing preliminary evidence that consumers value such behavior favorably.
Economic Reliance and Rents (Hypothesis 1)
Table 11 shows results for hypothesis 1 predicting that firms with high economic
reliance in the affected market are comparatively likely to obtain performance benefits
out of corporate disaster giving. I find that while firms with mean economic reliance
(0.49) are, on average, unlikely to obtain off-trend revenue associated with their donation,
firms with high economic reliance are 16.6 percentage points more likely to realize
performance benefits than firms with low economic reliance. However, when taken
together, corporate donors are more likely to suffer performance losses than benefits.
To assess the capacity of economic reliance to predict donation timing, I run an OLS
specification with fixed-effects where the dependent variable is the expected donation
timing (greater values represent later donations) and the explanatory variable is the
degree of economic reliance (greater values represent higher reliance on the affected
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country). To assess and mitigate the effect of spatial autocorrelation that hampering
econometrically efficient standard errors, I used the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing
method (Dekker et al., 2007) implemented as a linear probability model with fixedeffects (Rogan & Sorenson, 2013).
Table 11. The effect of economic reliance on the probability of obtaining off-trend revenue
Model 2 Low

Economic Reliance
Model 3 Medium

Model 4 High

Total Revenue (USDmm ln)

9.74

9.76

9.97

Market Capitalization (USDmm ln)

9.55

9.64

9.69

Return on Assets %

5.96

4.17

4.05

Firm-Specific Variables

Primary Industry (ln)

8.51

8.39

8.30

Number of Employees (ln)

10.56

10.67

11.07

Total Assets (USDmm ln)

14.91

15.13

15.15

R&D Expenses (USDmm ln)

9.80

10.12

10.52

Human Hardship (ln)

12.63

11.97

8.92

Economic Cost (USDmm ln)

6.36

7.47

9.37

Media Coverage (ln)

9.67

10.35

11.34

Number of Disasters (Nation, ln)

2.17

2.10

2.04

Number of Disasters (Global, ln)

5.49

5.52

5.53

Newsworthy Events

8.69

7.96

7.15

Openness to Aid

0.89

0.75

0.62

(9.42)

0.07

7.17

Context-Specific Variables

Outcome Variable
Probability of off-trend revenue

The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated
firm on a case by case basis. Control is firms that did not donate to disasters.

Economic Reliance as a Predictor of Donation Timing (Hypothesis 1a)
Table 12 report the results of the panel fixed-effects estimation that suggest that firms
with relatively high economic reliance to the disaster-stricken country tend to donate
earlier than firms with relatively low economic reliance.
First Moves and Social Influence (Hypothesis 2)
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Table 12 shows results for hypothesis 2, which predicts that the average amount of
corporate aid for a given disaster will be more a function of the donation amount of first
movers with high financial standing than measures of the social need. Using an OLS
model with CEM data, I find that an increase of one standard deviation in financial
standing is associated with an increase of almost three times in the average donation
(Model 4). On the other hand, the coefficients of total number of deaths and affected
population are statistically insignificant.

Table 12. The effect of economic reliance on donation timing
VARIABLES
Corporate disaster giving (Yes/No)

Timing of the donation
-19.493***
(1.609)

CONTROLS
Number of Employees

0.078***
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.041)
-0.066
(0.041)
0.043***
(0.006)
0.016
(0.039)
0.419***
(0.056)
1.025***
(0.386)
-0.407***
(0.121)
-0.013
(0.170)
3.609***
(1.173)
6.095***
(1.172)
1.215
(0.133)
0.006
(0.000)
0.008
(0.000)
-32.824

Total Revenue
Market Capitalization
Return on Assets
R&D
Consumer Orientation
GDP
Area (Size)
Population
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Mass Movement Dry
Mass Movement Wet
Deaths

89

VARIABLES

Timing of the donation
(42.089)
-0.223
(0.580)
297,763.560
(792,109.162)
-0.049*
(0.028)
0.022**
(0.009)
0.096*
(0.051)
-31.404***
(4.062)
14,142,850.00
4,637
YES
YES
YES
YES

People Affected
Economic Cost
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
Annual Number of disasters (World)
Newsworthy events
Constant
Observations
Number of Events
Country FE
Year FE
Month FE
Firm FE

Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1).

Media Reputation and First Mover Rents (Hypothesis 3)
This hypothesis suggests that a pre-disaster positive reputation is a necessary
condition for the generation of first-mover rents. In line with this argument, first movers
realize performance benefits only when they receive a positive net pre-event media
coverage sentiment score. In probabilistic terms, knowledgeable and experienced leaders
are about four times more likely to realize FMAs than statistically similar leaders that,
however, lack one or both cognitive resources as seen in Table 14.
Follower Rents
Imitation (Hypothesis 4). The findings are consistent with the interpretation that early
movers generate mental anchors among peer organizations and consumers. Table
15Error! Reference source not found. indicates that imitation is a beneficial strategy
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when organizations mimic first movers with positive media reputations, which supports
H4. In fact, for organizations that have negative reputations, following pays off better
than leading. Conversely, when the leader has, on average, a negative media reputation,
imitation is a costly choice.
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Table 13. The Effect of the First-Mover’s Financial Standing on the Average Corporate Donation
VARIABLES

Financial Standing (First Mover)
Number of Deaths
Affected Population

Model 3
Dependent variable: Average
Corporate Donation (RE)
6.121***
(3.151)
-0.164
(0.530)
0.789
(3.355)

Model 4
Dependent variable: Average
Corporate Donation (FE)
2.706**
(3.022)
-0.142
(0.701)
2.972
(3.810)

0.069
(0.043)
0.705
(0.437)
0.026**
(0.013)
0.096
(0.207)
0.272
(0.176)
-0.089
(0.276)
-1.133***
(0.341)
0.743
(0.522)
0.216
(0.495)
-0.350***
(0.107)
0.238**
(0.114)
0.233*
(0.127)
0.153
(0.208)
4.582**
(1.884)
3.133
(1.969)
4.066**
(1.955)
-21.848***
(4.017)

0.017
(0.098)

CONTROLS
Return on Assets %
Consumer Orientation
Industry
Employees
Market Capitalization
Population
Land Area
Number of Disasters (Global)
Number of Disasters (Country)
Affected Population
GDP Million
Economic Damage (USD)
International Aid
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Constant

-1.742
(1.114)
-0.191
(0.428)
-0.003
(0.296)

1.834***
(0.495)
-1.166***
(0.395)
-0.328***
(0.125)
0.088
(0.109)
0.316**
(0.131)
-0.097
(0.200)
4.348**
(1.969)
2.762
(1.969)
4.391**
(1.884)

Country FE
YES
Year FE
YES
Month FE
YES
Firm FE
YES
Clustered-by-event standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Fixed-effects
model has robust standard errors, month-, year-, country-, and firm-effects.
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Table 14. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Leading)
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-trend Revenue
First-Mover with
First-Mover with
VARIABLES
Positive Reputation

Negative Reputation

3.73
4.53
5.02
4.50
4.87
6.54
4.43

3.75
4.33
5.11
4.50
4.93
6.49
4.56

6.92
57.32
9.15
57.33
53.98
14.35
380.58

6.97
57.49
9.14
57.48
54.01
14.33
422.13

Predictor Variables
Revenue (logged)
Market capitalization (logged)
Return on assets
Industry
Number of employees (logged)
Total assets (logged)
R&D expenses (logged)
Context-Based Variables
GDP (logged)
Life expectancy
Inflation rate
Trade openness
Government effectiveness
Salience
Human hardship
Outcome Variable

Probability of off-trend revenue
42.49
(0.32)
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential
control firms and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Actual is leading firms with
positive pre-disaster media reputation. Control is leading firms with negative net pre-event
media coverage sentiment score.

Table 15. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Imitation)
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue
Treatment
Control
VARIABLES
Predictor Variables
Revenue (logged)
Market capitalization (logged)
Return on assets
Industry
Number of employees (logged)
Total assets (logged)
R&D expenses (logged)
Media reputation
Context-Based Variables
GDP (logged)
Life expectancy
Inflation rate
Trade openness
Government effectiveness
Salience
Human hardship
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3.83
4.97
5.89
4.32
4.21
6.42
4.62
.02

3.21
4.62
5.88
4.32
4.49
6.93
4.51
.02

6.93
57.37
9.16
57.38
54.03
14.36
380.91

6.98
57.54
9.15
57.53
54.06
14.34
422.50

Treatment

VARIABLES

Control

Outcome Variable

Probability of off-trend revenue
38.56
(15.89)
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential
control firms and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Actual is following firms that
imitate first movers with positive media reputation (i.e., net pre-event media coverage
sentiment score.). Control is imitators of first movers with bad media reputation.

Deviation (Hypothesis 5). I do not find support for the argument that divergence from
naïve leaders is an efficient choice. Table 16 shows a statistically insignificant difference
between firms that deviate from leaders with bad reputation and firms that deviate from
reputable leaders. However, one should consider that deviants make an additional choice
in comparison with mimickers, which affects the evaluation of the efficiency of
deviation. When a follower organization deviates, the next key decision is whether its
giving will be smaller or greater than the first donation in the industry (i.e., the first
move). As per the discussion in the theory section, the likelihood that the deviator accrues
rents depends on consumers’ perceived contextual appropriateness of its choice. In turn,
this perception may depend on the follower’s financial standing relative to the first
mover’s standing (Alessi, 1975).
Therefore, a deviant organization will be more likely to seize off-trend positive
revenue when the difference between its giving and the first move is proportional with
the difference in standing between the first mover and the follower. Holding everything
else constant, if the follower organization has lower standing than does the first mover, it
will be more likely to gain rents when the size of its donation is smaller than the first
move. Conversely, when the follower has greater standing than does the first mover, its
donation must be bigger than the first move.
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Table 16. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Deviation)
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue
Treatment
Control
VARIABLES
Predictor Variables
Revenue (logged)
Market capitalization (logged)
Return on assets
Industry
Number of employees (logged)
Total assets (logged)
R&D expenses (logged)
Media reputation
Context-Based Variables
GDP (logged)
Life expectancy
Inflation rate
Trade openness
Government effectiveness
Salience
Human hardship

3.87
5.03
5.96
4.37
4.26
6.49
4.67
.01

3.25
4.67
5.96
4.37
4.54
7.01
4.56
.00

7.01
58.03
9.26
58.04
54.65
14.52
380.91

7.06
58.20
9.25
58.19
54.68
14.50
422.50

7.90

7.36

Outcome Variable

Probability of off-trend revenue

The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between
potential control firms and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Actual is following
firms that deviate from first movers with bad reputation (i.e., net pre-event media
coverage sentiment score). Control is deviance of first movers with positive reputation.

To test this argument, I use firm value (Capital IQ) as a proxy of financial standing.
Table 16 shows the results of a coarsened-exact matched, mixed-conditional logit, which
suggest that a follower with higher financial standing than the first mover must make a
greater donation than the latter to have a probability of off-trend revenue. This offers
further evidence that early movers’ choices define a cognitive referent that stakeholders
use to make a comparative evaluation of subsequent responses from peer organizations.
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Learning, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity (Hypothesis 6)
This last hypothesis suggests that experiential learning mitigates uncertainty and
ambiguity and thus the strategic value of cognitive referents. To measure the degree of
causal ambiguity that a firm faces when donating to a specific disaster, I proxied
experience donating to disasters with the cumulative number of donations to natural
disasters that the corporation has done before the focal disaster. Additionally, I used the
cumulative number of industry-years of operation in the disaster country based on the
first subsidiary operating in such country as a proxy of knowledge of the market. As the
distribution for these variables is normal, I used the mean (2.9 of experience donating and
7.8 of market knowledge) and +/- one standard deviation to divide the data into three
groups.
Table 17. Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Deviants)
VARIABLES

Probability of Off-Trend Revenue

Excess of Donation over First Move x Financial Standing

78.723***
(22.327)
1.045***
(0.383)
0.000***
(0.000)

Excess of Donation over First Move
Financial Standing
CONTROLS
Number of Employees

-0.036
(0.038)
0.049
(0.097)
-0.039
(0.103)
0.024
(0.017)
0.209
(0.139)
-0.573
(0.445)
-0.294**
(0.133)
0.119
(0.198)
202.022
(737.407)
-9993698.328**
(3907004.581)
-0.016
(0.041)

Total Revenue
Market Capitalization
Return on Assets
Consumer Orientation
GDP
Area (Size)
Population
Deaths
Economic Cost
Annual Number of disasters (Country)
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VARIABLES

Probability of Off-Trend Revenue

Annual Number of disasters (World)

-0.018*
(0.011)
-0.116*
(0.062)
-3.119
(4.189)
YES
YES
YES
YES

Newsworthy events
Constant
Country FE
Year FE
Month FE
Firm FE

Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

I found that the expected benefit of imitating a reputable first mover and deviating
from firm with bad reputation falls as the follower acquires market knowledge and issue
experience. However, Table 18 shows that the variation for a standard-deviation unit
increase is not significantly different52 from average levels suggesting that the social
constructivism of disaster giving often outstrips deductive reasoning even for
knowledgeable and experienced firms.
Table 18. Learning and Causal Ambiguity
Treatment
Levels
Difference in
the
probability of
off-trend
revenue
between
treatment
and control

-

Standard Deviation

Mean

+ Standard Deviation

Market
Knowledge
Imitati Deviat
ng
ing

Experience
Donating
Imitati Deviat
ng
ing

Market
Knowledge
Imitati Deviat
ng
ing

Experience
Donating
Imitati Deviat
ng
ing

Market
Knowledge
Imitati Deviat
ng
ing

Experience
Donating
Imitati Deviat
ng
ing

42.16

33.19

39.96

30.16

31.29

29.81

19.97

17.11

17.86

16.89

15.25

17.37

The table shows the degree of causal ambiguity that a sample firm is likely to face when engaging in
giving to a focal disaster. Market knowledge is the cumulative number of industry-years of operation in
the disaster country based on the first subsidiary operating in such country and experience in disaster
giving is the cumulative number of donations to natural disasters that the corporation has done before the
focal disaster. Treated are firms that imitate reputable first movers or deviate from first movers with bad
reputation. The cutoff levels of market knowledge and experience are defined around the mean of 7.8 and
standard deviation of 2.9.

To measure environmental uncertainty, I used the World Risk Index from the
Environment and Human Security53 that indicates the country vulnerability to different

52

The Appendix has a description of statistical inference and the calculation of significance levels
using the synthetic control method.
53
https://ehs.unu.edu/.

97

types of disasters. The distribution of this variable that goes from 0.01% to 36.45% of
disaster vulnerability is highly skewed because a few countries are highly prone to large
disasters, which means that the mean value and standard deviation do not provide
adequate cutoff points for categorizing the data. Instead, I use the 50th (6.6% of disaster
vulnerability), 90th (12.7%), and 99th (27.7%) percentiles as levels. Table 19 illustrates
that the positive spillovers of imitating reputable organizations radically increases in the
level of environmental uncertainty whereas the change in the value of deviating from first
movers with bad reputation is marginal.
Table 19. Learning and Environmental Uncertainty
50th Percentile

Levels
Difference in the
probability of offtrend revenue
between treated
firms and synthetic
controls (%)

90th Percentile

99th Percentile

Imitating

Deviating

Imitating

Deviating

Imitating

Deviating

24.95

2.53

48.35

2.56

156.19

3.10

The table shows variance in environmental uncertainty proxied by country vulnerability, which ranges from
0.01% to 36.45%. Treated are firms that imitate reputable first movers or deviate from first movers with
bad reputation. The cutoff percentile levels are 6.6%, 12.7%, and 27.7% of country vulnerability to
disasters.

Robustness and Supplementary Analyses
In this subsection, I focus on five tests to assess the robustness and provide boundary
conditions of the results. The Appendix has additional tests and supplementary analyses.
Institutional development and the effect of cognitive referents
It may be possible that the social constructivism influencing corporate disaster giving
and its consequences is only relevant in contexts of relatively underdeveloped
institutions. Countries with high institutional development may have in place the policy
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instruments (e.g., tax benefits) enabling the strategic value of disaster aid, which could
affect the frequency of imitation of high-performance firms and the use of reputation as
cognitive referent.
Although the SCM algorithm matched on several institutional variables, I took an
additional step to evaluate the potential influence of local institutions. I stratified the
application of the algorithm by government effectiveness—a measure from the World
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators that reflects perceptions about the quality of
public services, the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies—using the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles as cutoff values.
As shown in Table 20, I did not find significant differences in the effect of cognitive
referents on the off-trend revenue associated with disaster giving.

Table 20. Institutional Development and Rents
50th Percentile

Treatment Levels
Difference in the
probability of offtrend revenue
between treated
firms and
synthetic controls
(%)

90th Percentile

99th Percentile

Imitating

Deviating

Imitating

Deviating

Imitating

Deviating

34.69

6.53

33.97

7.11

41.82

5.87

The table shows variance in institutional development proxied by the estimate of government effectiveness
calculated by the World Bank that ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. Treated are firms that imitate reputable first
movers or deviate from first movers with bad reputation. The cutoff percentiles levels are -.08, 1.46, and
1.92.

Is pre-disaster media reputation a sufficient driver of rents?
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The extant literature offers an alternative prediction regarding the role of reputation as
a strategic resource that sufficiently predicts the generation of rents (Weigelt & Camerer,
1988). The pre-disaster firm-specific actions associated with accumulating reputation per
se may drive off-trend revenue. Reputable firms thus gain rents regardless of their
philanthropic engagement. For instance, government stakeholders may ally with or
support high reputation firms and these cooperative behaviors determine post-event
revenue growth (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011). To test this argument, I restricted the SCM
algorithm to firms with positive media reputation (JFC>0) and used the binary variable
donating taking value “1” when the firm gave to the disaster as treatment. In this case, the
algorithm also matches on the categorical variable of timing.
I found that reputable firms are 31% more likely to gain rents by engaging in disaster
giving than reputable non-donors (Table 21). This supports the central argument of the
study that reputation functions as public tool for perceiving the contextual value of
corporate action.
Table 21. Predictor of Probability of Off-trend Revenue (Donor versus non-donor)
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue
Reputable donors
Reputable non-donors
VARIABLES
Predictor Variables
Revenue (logged)
Number of employees (logged)
Total assets (logged)
Market capitalization (logged)
R&D expenses (logged)
Primary industry
Return on assets
Reputation
Timing (categorical)
Context-Based Variables
GDP (logged)
Life expectancy

100

3.51
3.98
5.23
4.11
3.97
2.87
3.15
.84
2.98

3.39
3.94
5.39
4.13
3.45
2.65
3.83
.88
2.94

6.11
63.12

6.34
61.14

VARIABLES
Inflation rate
Trade openness
Government effectiveness
Salience
Human hardship

Reputable donors
5.14
61.98
61.10
15.34
134.67

Reputable non-donors
6.12
58.13
62.35
15.99
123.63

31.73

0.02

Outcome Variable

Probability of off-trend revenue

The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated
firm on a case by case basis. Actual are donor firms with positive media reputation (i.e., net pre-event
media coverage sentiment score.). Control are non-donor firms with positive media reputation.

Is the substantiveness of giving what matters?
Recent research suggests that substantive philanthropy is more likely to result in
performance benefits than symbolic giving (Cuypers et al., 2015; Madsen & Rodgers,
2014; Marquis & Qian, 2013). For instance, stakeholders perceive in-kind giving as more
sincere, altruistic, and generous. To test this argument, in Table 22 I split the sample
between in-kind and cash donors and integrate the categorical variable of timing of the
donation, reputation, and financial standing in the SCM logarithm. I found no
significance in the difference between the two groups.
Table 22. Predictor of Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Substantive versus Symbolic Giving)
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue
VARIABLES

In-Kind Donors

Cash Donors

2.31
2.85
3.99
3.11
2.11
2.23
2.84
.00
2.36

2.32
2.87
3.84
3.85
2.45
2.23
2.94
.00
2.32

3.29
58.45
7.11

3.11
54.58
8.09

Predictor Variables
Revenue (logged)
Number of employees (logged)
Total assets (logged)
Market capitalization (logged)
R&D expenses (logged)
Primary industry
Return on assets
Reputation
Timing (categorical)
Context-Based Variables
GDP (logged)
Life expectancy
Inflation rate
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VARIABLES
Trade openness
Government effectiveness
Salience
Human hardship

In-Kind Donors
58.76
54.20
12.34
249.09

Cash Donors
61.87
59.52
13.56
284.56

0.09

0.18

Outcome Variable

Probability of off-trend revenue

The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated
firm on a case by case basis. Treated are donors of in-kind giving, control are cash donors.

Is the size of the donation what matters?
Studies have found that giving relatively large amounts is more likely to be associated
with higher rewards than giving relatively low (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). For instance,
stakeholders give more attention to large donors because they believe that these firms
will give more attention to their claims in the future. To test this alternative explanation,
Table 23 compares firms that gave that at least one standard deviation more than the
mean with firms that gave less or one standard deviation less than the mean. As in the
previous test, the SCM algorithm matches firms the categorical variable of timing of the
donation, reputation, and financial standing in the SCM logarithm. The probability of
gaining off-trend revenue was not significantly different.
Table 23. Predictor of Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Big versus Small Donations)
Dependent variable: Probability of Off-Trend Revenue
Big Donations (+SD)
Small Donations (-1SD)
VARIABLES
Predictor Variables
Revenue (logged)
Number of employees (logged)
Total assets (logged)
Market capitalization (logged)
R&D expenses (logged)
Primary industry
Return on assets
Reputation
Timing (categorical)

2.34
2.84
3.78
3.02
2.45
2.14
2.78
.01
1.98
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2.38
2.88
3.87
3.15
2.78
2.31
2.83
.00
2.84

VARIABLES

Big Donations (+SD)

Small Donations (-1SD)

3.27
58.33
7.26
57.89
54.23
11.98
275.33

3.74
58.45
8.34
58.24
55.28
12.03
285.20

0.98

0.03

Context-Based Variables
GDP (logged)
Life expectancy
Inflation rate
Trade openness
Government effectiveness
Salience
Human hardship
Outcome Variable

Probability of off-trend revenue

The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated
firm on a case by case basis. Treated are donor firms of large amounts (+1 standard deviation), control are
donors of small amounts (-1 standard deviation).

Does the appropriation of rents vary across industries?
Until this point, I have considered the primary industry as a predictor variable to
construct the trajectories of revenue. Counterfactual firms thus match the pre-disaster
characteristics of treatment firms from the same industry. It may be possible, however,
that the performance consequences of corporate disaster giving varies across industries.
This is because strategic stakeholder fields vary by industry (Freeman, 2010) and the
potential mechanisms behind the financial consequences of disaster giving are, arguably,
associated with specific types of stakeholders, as illustrated in Figure 2. For instance,
industry demands predominantly formed by individual consumers (i.e., business to
consumers) may be more sensitive to changes in the pro-social behavior of the supply
than demands formed by businesses (i.e., business to business industries). This is
because the effect of pro-social behavior in willingness to pay may be faster than in
other stakeholder goods, such as social licenses to operate (Howard-Grenville, 2008). In
turn, revenue may be comparatively elastic to willingness to pay.
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Additionally, studies suggest that consumers in industries such as personal services
and consumer goods tend to have different degrees of awareness of the supply’s prosocial behavior than consumers in industries such as business services and capital goods
(Du et al., 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
Figure 2. The mechanisms behind the performance consequences of corporate disaster
giving
may increase their willingness to pay (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013)

Consumers

may facilitate
access to
financing
Investors
(Cheng,
Ioannou, &
Serafeim, 2014)

Corporate Donors

Suppliers

(workers)
may increase
productivity
(Flammer &
Luo, 2015)

Government

may favor the firm distributing operational rights (Wilburn &
Wilburn, 2011)

Given these arguments, I expect the average effect of corporate disaster giving on
financial performance to be comparatively strong among firms that operate in industries
whose demand are predominantly individual consumers than other businesses. To test
this hypothesis, I split the sample between firms operating industries with a customer
focus and firms operating industries with an business focus using a classification by Lev
et al (2010). The categories, which use the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification
code, have been used before in studies on the effect of disasters on non-market behavior
(Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
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After running placebo tests to calculate the synthetic p-test following the procedure
described in the Annex, I do not find sizeable differences in the likelihood of obtaining
off-trend revenue associated with corporate disaster giving between firms operating in
industries with a customer focus and firms operating in industries with a business focus
(Table 24). Despite being apparently counterintuitive, the findings are consistent with
previous research (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
Table 24. Predictor of Probability of Off-Trend Revenue (Industries with Consumer Focus)
Dependent variable: Probability of Post-Event Off-Trend Revenue
Costumer Focus
Business Focus
VARIABLES
Predictor Variables
Revenue (LN)
Number of employees (LN)
Total assets (LN)
Market capitalization (LN)
R&D expenses (LN)
Return on assets
Reputation
Timing (categorical)
Context-Based Variables
GDP (LN)
Life expectancy
Inflation rate
Trade openness
Government effectiveness
Salience
Human hardship (LN)

14.34
10.89
14.89
9.89
7.68
1.85
.01
2.01

16.69
11.14
15.85
10.84
12.58
1.84
.00
2.01

13.27
68.14
6.71
61.28
78.11
12.15
13.74

13.48
68.23
6.12
63.71
74.36
12.17
13.74

Outcome Variable

Probability of off-trend revenue
0.02
0.01
The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a reference—the
synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms and the treated
firm on a case by case basis. Treated are donor firms in industries with a customer focus, control are
firms in industries with a business focus.

DISCUSSION
My theoretical argumentation and empirical analysis point to the enduring effects of
institutional factors in the likelihood that a firm gains performance benefits by moving
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first, imitating, or deviating from the first mover’s choices. In the analyzed dataset of
5,845 firms and 4,637 natural disasters affecting the world from 2003 to 2015, due to
processes of sensemaking based on cognitive referents, strategic choices and their
consequences are often socially constructed and diffused. To research these conclusion,
the analyses apply constructs and measures whose internal validity has been carefully
tested either here or in other studies; data and a quasi-experimental method that mitigate
endogeneity concerns that have affected empirical research; and, in the aggregate, a
research design that facilitates replication.
The findings suggest that constructivist processes whereby decision-makers find
measures of contextual appropriateness drive corporate behavior and its consequences in
settings similar to responses to disasters where environmental uncertainty, causal
ambiguity, and time pressure are pervasive and comparatively high (Baker & Bloom,
2013). I have suggested a structural mechanism behind the social construction of
performance advantages. When the business intervention in a specific market setting is a
relatively novel phenomenon, decision-makers cope with uncertainty and ambiguity by
focusing on prominent, easy-to-collect signals. Cognitive referents replace formal
institutions and objective mechanisms based on probability estimates.
I have offered evidence that a divergence in the cognitive referents that firms and
stakeholders use characterizes the antecedents and, more relevant for the goal of this
chapter, the consequences of corporate behavior. On the one hand, firms focus on
financial standing to make their decisions of when and who to imitate. High-performing
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first movers generate imitation bandwagons because followers believe that these
organizations know how to navigate the stakeholder and institutional complexities of the
market. Early donations from these firms are thus strong predictors of the average
corporate response, even more than the underlying characteristics of stakeholder needs.
On the other hand, customers, investors and other stakeholders focus on firms’ media
reputations to form beliefs of the organization’s capabilities and willingness to meet their
expectations. Therefore, I find that imitating a small, but reputable first mover is more
likely to gain rents than imitating a large corporation with a negative reputation.
Additionally, imitation bandwagons often lead to performance losses because business
decision-makers focus on large corporations and firms with bad reputations tend to be
early donors.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Implications for the literature on timing strategy
My study sheds light on the conditions and mechanisms under which the sources of
timing advantages are a perception of contextual appropriateness rather than firm-,
industry-, or market-specific measures of efficiency, innovation, or physical resource
concentration. This proposes a context where the material consequences of timing
choices are not explained by the traditional four types of rents advanced by the extant
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literature: monopolistic, efficiency, quasi-, and Schumpeterian (Ahuja & Yayavaram,
2011; Teece et al., 1997).54
Hence, I provide evidence that incorporating insights from institutional theory can
enrich and enhance the predictive power of the timing strategy literature as recent studies
have claimed and called for (cf., Fosfuri et al., 2013). Unlike the traditional approach in
strategy research that suggests that institutions shape corporate action (Marquis &
Battilana, 2009; Marquis et al., 2013; Zhang & Luo, 2013), my study supports the
argument that such action may be a source of new institutional referents (Santos &
Eisenhardt, 2009; Tracey et al., 2010). This has allowed me to make theoretically
informed predictions about the explanatory power of cognitive referents in the generation
and allocation of rents associated with the timing choices.
That the findings are robust to several country-, time-, and event-specific variables
provides a contribution to the scarce scholarship on timing advantages at the international
level. Neo-institutionalism (Powell, 1991) and new institutional economics (North, 1990;
Williamson, 1991) suggest that realization of competitive advantages depends on the
level of institutional development. My findings suggest that the type of performance
advantages that I observe may be affected by the quality of national institutions, but such
influence is secondary to the sociological determinants that my study unpacks. Thus, the
causal role of a public perception of contextual appropriateness is arguably active across

To be clear, I am not suggesting that, for instance, a donor’s material resources are unimportant to
generate and sustain competitive advantages, but rather that empirical settings such as the aftermath of
disasters enable the influence of constructivist processes in off-trend revenue in a unique fashion.
54

108

socioeconomic and demographic contexts. The hypothesis that the allocation of rents is
socially constructed regardless of how dependable, predictable, and stable country
institutions are cannot be rejected in the context of my sample.
In sum, my study responds to the call for systematic evaluations of the conditions and
mechanisms that make some timing choices likely to generate rents. Arguably, this
endeavor is a more fruitful path for the advancement of the literature on timing strategy,
which includes research on imitation and first-mover advantage, than the identification of
“an elusive timing-performance relationship” (Klingebiel & Joseph, 2015; Lieberman &
Montgomery, 2013).
Implications for the literature on non-market strategy
My study contributes to the literature on corporate social responsibility that has
lacked theory and evaluation of the role of timing on the material consequences of prosocial behavior (Mellahi et al., 2015). Traditionally, this literature has approached the
study of the association between financial performance and corporate social performance
as a comparative evaluation of pro-social versus non-pro-social firms when these choices
are made in stable conditions (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). Hence, how organizations
navigate environmental uncertainty and causal ambiguity in fast-paced environments has
remained an open empirical question.
By bringing attention to informational constraints and time pressure, I present an
alternative explanation to the paradox of why the possession of comparatively large
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physical and financial resources (Godfrey et al., 2009) or the donation of relatively large
gifts (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014) do not increase the probability of realizing performance
benefits. In fact, I show that a symbolic gift may be a contextually more appropriate
choice in the eyes of stakeholders than a substantive gift—a contradiction of previous
studies (cf., Marquis & Qian, 2013). An important consequence of this finding is that
stakeholders often reward or punish firms by using measurements that are detached from
the underlying characteristics of their needs.
Implications for managerial practice
In 2015, an average large corporation was 300% more likely to engage in disaster
giving than 10 years before. Because the money allocated to disaster aid often surpasses a
corporation’s total annual social budget (Ballesteros et al., 2017), and several studies
suggest that disaster giving is a high-stakes decision often associated with competitive
advantages (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Patten, 2008), the timing
of donating is an important managerial question.
My findings suggest that firms are making inefficient decisions regarding their
engagement in disaster giving. In my sample, I found that 43% of first corporate
responders obtained negative off-trend losses. Furthermore, almost 51% of the time,
firms engaging in this behavior obtained negative performance consequences that were
significantly larger than the size of their donations. Therefore, understanding the
conditions and mechanisms that affect the relationship between corporate disaster giving
and firm performance is of increasing strategic value for managers. My study offers an
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unambiguous and objective method to calculate the relative probability of accruing offtrend revenue when leading the business community, imitating, or deviating from the first
donation. Finally, it identifies the firm-, industry-, and country-specific factors that
managers need to consider when choosing to engage in disaster giving. Attention to these
pieces of information may increase the strategic value of such response.
Limitations and Future Work
My study points to fruitful avenues of future research combining the literatures on
institutional theory and timing strategy. For instance, the findings indicate that early
behavior creates a longstanding impression on decision-makers in a way that subsequent
responses are evaluated based on their relative rather than their absolute value. Early
movers thus influence the value that the market assigns to different attributes of the good,
an argument that has been proposed by studies on anchoring and preference formation
(Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1989; Hysenbelli, Rubaltelli, & Rumiati, 2013). The analyses
illuminate some of the psychological factors affecting stakeholder expectations and their
decisions to reward or punish organizational choices, which have been identified mostly
in laboratory settings (Hysenbelli et al., 2013). This suggests that my findings extend
beyond the immediate conditions associated with disaster responses. Accordingly, my
study may be a framework that facilitates theory building on the constructivism of
competitive advantages more generally.
My findings present a call for further evaluation of the material consequences of
strategic choices under volatile environmental conditions. The diminished capacity of the
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government to meet increasingly complex and fast-changing societal needs associated
with complex social issues has fueled systematic attacks to the traditional supply scheme
of public goods (Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Lepoutre et al., 2007). In consequence, business
organizations have seen a growing number of calls to intervene in areas that historically
have been a role of other entities (Ballesteros et al., 2017). Manufacturing companies are
running elementary schools in India, banks are setting up telemedicine facilities in
Nigeria, consumer-products firms have engaged in rebuilding rebuilt roads in the
aftermath of Japan’s 2011 disaster, and technology firms are investing in community
centers in Mexico. In many cases, this activity is a new phenomenon for both firms and
external stakeholders. Given this increasing societal role, I expect future research will
expand the examination of the association between timing choices and financial
performance under high uncertainty and causal ambiguity, and will develop contextspecific predictions. Such efforts will be critical for a more theoretically nuanced
understanding of the role that the microfoundations of institutionalization may play in the
generation and sustainability of competitive advantages.
Finally, future work may analyze the argument that the influence of cognitive
referents and social constructivism decline as stakeholders and firms accumulate relevant
information. This type of analysis may give important insights into the relationship
between experiential learning and the performance impacts of timing choices. In the
setting of disaster aid, imitation fosters a rapid and greater accumulation of valuable
social resources. As organizational learning and more calculated choices replace
cognitive referents, will the benefit to disaster-stricken societies grow or shrink?
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CONCLUSION
This study highlights the relevance of institutional factors affecting timing decisions
and their consequences at the international level. My findings suggest that the insight in
the extant literature that imitating high-performing first movers or moving first with a
substantive action is more likely to realize rents than imitating low-performing firms or
move late with a small action is not supported in settings like corporate responses to
disasters. As such, I offer evidence of the factors that managers should consider when
choosing to lead, imitate, or deviate from the first mover under conditions of high
informational and time constraints. Additionally, I show in the context of my sample that
firms and stakeholders follow different signals to manage uncertainty and ambiguity in a
fast-paced environment. I hope that this initial endeavor fosters research focusing on this
divergence in order to enlarge our understanding of the performance consequences of
timing choices.
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APPENDIX
Supplementary Analyses
I run panel-data estimations as robustness tests. These estimations include firm,
country, event, month, and year fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant
factors. I include year dummy variables to account for potential yearly trends in the
availability of disaster giving and risk. In addition to this, I use month dummies because
some types of disasters such as tornados show seasonal patterns in their frequency and
magnitude.
Regarding other time-variant factors at the firm level, I control for industry (four-digit
SIC code), and one-year lags of longevity (logged number of years), logged values of the
number of employees, revenue, market capitalization, advertising expenditure, and R&D
intensity (in USD). Research has suggested these variables correlate with philanthropic
behavior (e.g., Marquis et al. 2007, Muller and Kräussl 2011, Servaes and Tamayo 2013).
Additionally, I control for customer orientation because firms with an end-user focus
(i.e., business-to-individual industries) may have a different propensity to engage in the
provision of collective goods than firms with an industry focus (i.e., business-to-business
industries). I also conduct sub-sample tests dividing the data according to the industry
orientation. Concerning disaster-specifics, I control for the number of disasters by year,
as this number may impact the response of the corporate community to the focal event.
For instance, the 2010 earthquake in Chile, that occurred five weeks after the earthquake
that stroke Port-au-Prince and caused an estimated financial damage three times larger,
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might have diverted the attention of the international community from the relief efforts in
Haiti. The source was the CRED database. Additionally, I include a binary variable to
account for whether a major sports event (e.g., Summer Olympics, FIFA World Cup)
occurred in the analyzed year (1=a major sport event occurred) and a continuous variable
for a number of other newsworthy events by year. Scholars have shown that the
availability of other newsworthy material may crowd out international catastrophe aid
(Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Stromberg, 2007). For country-specific factors, I control
for the logged values of total country population and total area (km2) as country size may
be associated with the exposure to shocks, ability to cope with the impact of catastrophes,
and prominence at the international level—and consequently, proneness to receive
international aid.
The opportunity cost of waiting
To analyze if a reputable organization faces an opportunity cost for deferring their
donation (i.e., being a follower instead of a first mover), I apply coarsened exact
matching (CEM; Iacus, King, & Porro, 2008, 2011) using the binary variable affiliation
(i.e., the firm has a subsidiary in the affected country) as treatment. CEM is carried out
with no replacement using the following matching variables: primary industry, number of
employees, market capitalization, headquarters country of ultimate parent, total revenue,
and return on assets. Such variables are chosen in accordance with literature in
philanthropy and particularly on corporate disaster giving (cf., Crampton and Patten
2008, Marquis et al. 2007, Muller et al. 2014, Patten 2008, Tilcsik and Marquis 2013,
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Whiteman et al. 2005). Pre- and post-descriptive statistics are compared in the treatment,
and control groups for assessing quality and measures of imbalance are calculated as
suggested by Iacus et al., (2008; see the Appendix). To assess and mitigate the effect of
spatial autocorrelation that may hamper econometrically efficient standard errors, I use
the Freedman-Lane semi-partialing method (Dekker et al., 2007) implemented as a linear
probability model with fixed-effects for the treatment and control groups (Rogan &
Sorenson, 2013). I regressed the US dollar amount of giving using an OLS specification.
I find that a knowledgeable and experienced organization faces a significant
opportunity cost for every minute that it delays a donation—specifically; the firm loses
more than $5,000 per minute in off-trend revenue (Table 25). This means that when the
firm possesses a good reputation, leading pays off more than following or abstaining. The
main finding is robust to the inclusion of the different season-, event-, country-, and firmspecific, time-variant and -invariant controls.
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Table 25. Opportunity Cost of Waiting for a Reputable Organization
VARIABLES

Model 2
Off-Trend Revenue

Donation Timing

-.0000507**
(.0000156)
0.000000567***
(0.000000105)
-.0381162***
(.0022641)
0.000000097
(0.000000403)
.0000104 ***
(0.000000244)
-.0114321***
(.0004695)
.0003531**
(.0001017)
0.00000000772**
(0.00000000225)
-0.00000129
(0.000000864)
2.692903***
(.162687)
14,142,850.00
4,637
YES
YES
YES
YES

Total Employees Corporate
Return on Assets Corporate
Total Revenue Corporate
Market Capitalization Corporate
Primary Industry
People Killed
Total #People Affected
Estimated Damage
Constant
Observations
Number of Events
Country FE
Year FE
Month FE
Firm FE

Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).

Case: organization has positive net pre-event media coverage sentiment score.
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CHAPTER 3
(with Michael Useem and Tyler Wry)
INTRODUCTION
Globalization and the advance of neoliberal economic policies have made it more
difficult for nations to regulate their economies and provide for their citizens, while
bolstering the power and influence of corporations therein (Matten & Crane, 2005;
Palazzo & Scherer, 2008). One consequence of this is that firms are being relied upon to
adopt responsibilities that have traditionally fallen to governments, aid agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Industry self-regulation increasingly substitutes for
standards that governments are unable or unwilling to enforce (Ostrom, 2000; Potoski &
Prakash, 2005); companies provide public goods by building hospitals, schools, and
community projects (Palazzo & Scherer, 2008); and many firms contribute to
infrastructure reconstruction efforts after natural disasters (Wassenhove et al., 2008).
Scholars have begun to examine when and why firms engage in these unique forms of
social responsibility (CSR) (Crilly, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) and how they might
benefit from doing so (Henisz et al., 2013; Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). Yet, as with the
broader CSR literature, we know little about societal outcomes and opinions are divided
as to whether social welfare benefits should be expected.
Proponents view CSR as intrinsically good for society. This can be seen in studies
that recognize firms may be strategic with their CSR (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011), but
consider it positive they are expanding their social responsibility repertoires to include
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the creation of public goods (see Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). However, this work stops
short of assessing the extent to which these practices benefit society. Industry selfregulation studies have adopted a similar focus, examining how standards are created
(Bartley, 2007) and when they lead to better corporate environmental performance (King
& Lenox, 2000; Potoski & Prakash, 2005). Yet this work is limited to harm reduction,
versus welfare enhancement, and ecological outcomes are assumed rather than shown.
Taking another view, critics have argued that these forms of CSR do little to benefit
society because firms use them primarily to secure government favors, forestall activism,
and mollify local communities (Banerjee, 2008). This is supported by evidence that CSR
is often symbolic or political, and that firms make little effort to understand or effectively
respond to social and environmental problems (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Mellahi et al.,
2015). As a result, CSR initiatives may be suboptimal, or even counterproductive, from a
societal perspective (Cavallo & Daude, 2011). For instance, a study of resourceextraction firms in the developing world found that more than $500m of CSR spending
yielded almost no social welfare benefits (Frynas, 2005). Similar anecdotes have led
some to argue that, while companies have the potential to contribute to social welfare
based on their resources and influence, this work is best left to organizations such as
governments and aid agencies that specialize in these activities and can be held
accountable for their pursuit (Frynas, 2005; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).
In short, we know little about the societal effects of CSR initiatives—particularly
those related to the provision of public goods—and what we do know raises questions
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about the effectiveness of their contribution to social welfare. We also lack theory to
predict when and why a firm’s actions will create meaningful social welfare benefits, or
the conditions under which businesses might be better-able than other types of
organizations to deliver such benefits. To this end, we suggest it is useful to consider the
unique capabilities of corporations vis-à-vis other types of organizations, and the
situations where these capabilities are likely to be deployed in ways that yield positive
outcomes for society. We argue that disaster responses are one such area, and that the
speed of emergency relief and the level of a nation's recovery will be greater when
economically-reliant corporations account for a greater portion of aid.
Responding effectively to natural disasters is a grand and growing challenge
worldwide. The inflation-adjusted cost of a typical disaster has sextupled in the last 40
years, but the level of aid from traditional responders such as governments and aid
agencies has been stagnant (Becerra et al., 2014). Firms are increasingly called upon to
address this gap, and have emerged in the past 25 years as a large contributor to disaster
relief (White & Lang, 2012). While these contributions undoubtedly supplement the
efforts of traditional aid providers, we argue that corporate involvement may also create
unique benefits for a disaster-afflicted country.
To account for this, we develop a theoretical model based on insights from the
dynamic capabilities literature (Teece et al., 1997). Studies in this milieu examine how
firms sense threats in the external environment, seize response opportunities, and
reconfigure routines and resources to do so (Teece, 2007). Typically, this is used to

120

explain firm-level performance differences. However, there is also evidence that
dynamic capabilities differ systemically among organizations with different forms
(Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Recent research has discussed the dynamic capabilities that
allow firms to sense external stakeholder expectations and seize opportunities to “win
their hearts and minds” (Henisz, 2016).
Building on this, we argue that corporations that are economically reliant to market
systems (i.e., those firms that sell, buy, or rent raw materials, final products, or services,
or hire human capital to/from a given market)—as compared to other types of
organizations that give disaster aid—have dynamic capabilities that enable them to more
effectively sense areas of critical need following a disaster, make fast decisions, and
reconfigure resources for efficient responses. As such, we predict that aid will arrive
more quickly, and a nation will recover more fully, when economically-reliant firms
account for a larger share of disaster aid. We further argue that these outcomes will be
enhanced when disaster giving leverages firm-specific routines and resources.
We test our arguments with a proprietary dataset comprising all reported
contributions from firms, governments, and aid agencies to relief efforts following every
major natural disaster in the world from 2003 to 2013. To isolate the effect of corporate
aid on our outcomes of interest, we use the synthetic control method (SCM) (Abadie et
al., 2015). The method is similar to other matching techniques often used in
organizational research. Rather than matching treated entities with a single member of
the control group, though, SCM constructs comparison units based on a combination of
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multiple entities: a synthetic control. The approach can thus be applied in contexts where
it is hard to find suitable single comparisons, either because analysis focuses on
aggregate entities like nations, or because the pool of potential controls is small (Abadie
et al., 2010). This is useful for us because our analysis requires a comparison of nations
that have similar attributes and are afflicted by similar disasters, but receive different
levels of corporate aid.
Results support our hypotheses and suggest that disaster aid from economicallyreliant firms is not only socially beneficial, but also creates value beyond that provided
by other entities. As such, we demonstrate societal benefits of CSR and identify factors
that generate and enhance positive outcomes. This addresses a weak spot in the CSR
literature (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). The social impact of CSR is also a metric that is
increasingly demanded by stakeholders such as customers and governments (Eccles,
Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014); we provide a way to show this using unambiguous
measures. Our study also has policy implications. Disaster costs have grown at a pace
that far exceeds the real value of traditional relief funding. Closing the gap is not only a
matter of giving more, but giving more efficiently (United Nations, 2015; 2016). We
illuminate conditions and mechanisms under which the business community can
contribute to this goal in disaster responses.
THEORY
Disasters and the Rise of Corporate Responses
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Nations face significant challenges in the aftermath of disasters. Earthquakes, floods,
hurricanes and other calamities destroy infrastructure, cause human suffering, and are a
source of negative economic growth that can take years to recover from (von Peter et al.,
2012). A typical large disaster causes a 20% reduction in national GDP (Barro, 2007),
and the annual inflation-adjusted loss from even average disasters has grown from $54
billion in 1980 to over $314 billion in 2015 (United Nations, 2016). Disasters are also
underinsured, even in developed nations (Bevere, Orwig, & Sharan, 2015). As a result,
there is a growing gap between the scale of disasters and the capacity of traditional aid
providers, such as governments and multilateral agencies, to undertake effective
responses (United Nations, 2016).
As with other areas of CSR, the diminished capacity of traditional actors has led to
growing calls for firms to be involved in disaster relief and recovery (Matten & Crane,
2005; Twigg, 2001; United Nations, 2015). Reflecting this, there has been a significant
increase in corporate disaster giving over the past 15 years. More than 90 percent of the
world’s 2000 largest firms now participate in relief efforts each year, and their average
inflation-adjusted donation has grown by over 10 times to $1.6 million (Ballesteros,
2015).55 Corporate giving also comprises a growing share of all disaster aid, and in some
cases exceeds the contributions of traditional providers (Ballesteros, 2015; White &
Lang, 2012). For instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami in Chile,
55
The recent rise of corporate disaster giving is an expected consequence of firms’ strategic behavior.
During the last thirty years, the number of firms with multinational operations and the number of foreign
affiliates among the world’s largest companies grew three-fold and 10-fold, respectively. Given that
exposure to disasters is higher for the average MNE than for single-country firms, the internationalization
of economic activity has likely increased management attention to disaster risk.

123

55.4% of aid was from corporations; more than the combined amount provided by
foreign governments and multilateral aid agencies. Similarly, 68.3% of the aid that Japan
received after the 2011 tsunami was from firms, as was 51.7% of aid received by the
Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan (OCHA, 2016).
Although corporate giving undoubtedly helps to address disaster funding gaps, we
argue that such efforts are more than a supplement for traditional aid. We base this on the
fact that the effectiveness of a disaster response is related to not just the quantity of aid,
but also to the speed with which it arrives and the extent to which it addresses areas of
critical need (Cutter et al., 2009; Klinenberg, 2003; Wassenhove et al., 2008). Following
a disaster, resources can be directed to many different areas, with the implication that
allocations may create logistical clogs in the disaster zone, not match the emergency at
hand, or focus in areas that do not contribute to a nation’s long-run recovery. There is
also evidence that the damage and suffering caused by a disaster is inversely related to
the speed that aid reaches beneficiaries (DeLeo, 2013; Wassenhove et al., 2008). To wit,
disaster recovery is significantly affected by the fast delivery of essential resources, such
as food, water, and medicine, as well as the quick restoration of communication and
transportation infrastructure (Day, Junglas, & Silva, 2009; Day, Melnyk, Larson, Davis,
& Whybark, 2012). The slow response to Hurricane Katrina is a case in point: harm from
the storm’s physical destruction was greatly compounded by the inability of Federal and
local officials to respond quickly and adequately (Horowitz, 2008).

124

In what follows, we develop a theoretical framework which predicts that corporations
that have an active economic presence in a disaster-affected nation are uniquely wellsuited to undertake fast and effective responses, and that their involvement thus
contributes to more socially beneficial relief and recovery efforts.56
Dynamic Capabilities and the Comparative Advantage of Economically-Reliant
Firms in Disaster Response
Our approach for theorizing about the social value of corporate disaster giving is
based on the dynamic capabilities literature. This research studies how organizations
identify threats and opportunities in the external environment and reconfigure their
routines and resources to undertake strategic responses (Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997).
The core insight is that performance differences—especially in rapidly changing and
uncertain environments—arise from the varied dynamic capabilities of different
organizations (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Recent work has also used this approach to
explain variance in the strategic CSR of different companies (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).
While most studies have been at the firm-level, there is also evidence that dynamic
capabilities differ systematically among organizational forms, which are groups of
entities that share common distinguishing features (Hannan & Freeman, 1984;
Romanelli, 1991). This has been shown in cross-sectional research on firms with
different governance structures (Hedlund, 1994), and in studies that examine how
strategic behavior changes when a company switches forms (Lampel & Shamsie, 2003;
56

We define local presence based on a company having an affiliate or subsidiary that creates products
or performs services in a focal nation.

125

Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Studies have also observed systematic differences in the
governance structures, goals, and decision-making processes of businesses, charities, and
government agencies as distinct organization forms (Cobb, Wry, & Zhao, 2016; Lee,
Battilana, & Wang, 2014).
Building on this, we argue that corporations—as compared to other organizational
forms such as government agencies and multilateral aid providers—are likely to have
capabilities that enable fast and effective disaster responses. Following Teece (2007), we
decompose dynamic capabilities into sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring components,
and argue that firms with a presence in a disaster-afflicted nation are well suited to 1)
sense threats and diagnose areas of critical need following a disaster, 2) seize upon
opportunities to respond, and 3) quickly reconfigure routines and resources to do so
effectively. We suggest that, collectively, these factors will lead to a nation receiving aid
more quickly, and recovering more completely, when economically-reliant firms account
for a greater share of total disaster relief.
Sensing areas of need
As with rapidly changing competitive environments, the aftermath of a disaster is
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and urgency (Baker & Bloom, 2013; Day et
al., 2012). In such contexts, the first step for organizations in determining how to
respond is to sense and interpret the situation at hand (Lampel et al., 2009; Teece et al.,
1997). This entails scanning the environment and gathering data that can be used to
inform strategic decision-making. In this regard, effective sensing capabilities yield
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diverse, accurate, and nuanced information, and thus support a robust understanding of
threats and opportunities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015).
The most immediate way that a firm is likely to sense a disaster is through its effects
on local operations. The destruction of physical infrastructure directly affects the
production and distribution of goods, while the human toll of a disaster affects
employees and the functioning of local markets. Firms that have a economic reliance are
likely to be sensitive to such disruptions because they are experienced directly, and
interpret them as areas of need because they have obvious financial implications
(Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Indeed, studies have shown that
in the aftermath of a disaster, economically-reliant firms often rebuild transportation
infrastructure to restore distribution and supply channels, construct housing and health
facilities to bring normalcy to customers and employees, and make direct transfers to
disaster victims to restore purchasing power (Ballesteros, 2015). This aligns with
strategic CSR arguments that predict companies will act in the public good when doing
so serves their own interests (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). Broadly speaking, firms are
likely to sense disaster impacts that threaten their market performance and view these as
requiring immediate responses (Horwitz, 2009). Discussing this, a Coca-Cola manager
explained her firm’s response to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan by saying:
“We are part of a system. If the government cannot [respond effectively], we need to
rebuild. We need the market to recover.”57

57

Manager, International Public Affairs, Coca-Cola Company: interview with the first author.
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Further, to the extent that decisions about how to respond to market disruptions are
best made when informed by nuanced and diverse information (Teece et al., 1997),
companies are likely to benefit from relationships developed through their operations in
a country. There is evidence that firms utilize local grass-roots relationships, affiliate
networks, and partner organizations to help assess the damages caused by a disaster and
to determine where aid is most urgently needed and will have the greatest impact (Useem
et al., 2015). Having employees and other stakeholders present in the disaster zone may
also enable a firm to gather to contextualized information about disaster impacts, and
understand the needs and preferences of local communities (Horowitz, 2008). Thus, just
as having ‘boots on the ground’ aids a firm in making sense of complex and uncertain
competitive environments (Teece et al., 1997), local operations offer a close-up look at
the nature and scale of disaster impacts, and can thus help with sensing areas of critical
need.
By comparison, non-local governments and multilateral aid agencies usually do not
have significant established infrastructure or contact networks in a disaster zone (Cohen
& Werker, 2008). Thus, the information that guides response planning for these
organizations is more likely to be second-hand and from fewer sources. This may create
challenges for sensing disaster impacts as well as confusion about how and where to best
intervene. Indeed, a lack of local understanding has been cited as a key factor in the
insufficient and misguided response from FEMA and other Washington, D.C. based aid
providers following Hurricane Katrina (Horwitz, 2009). The same issue is made vivid in
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the account of a municipal official in Chile’s Maule region, which was devastated in
2010 by an earthquake and tsunami:
The government disappeared… and when they arrived, they did not know exactly
what to do, how to coordinate the aid, what functions to perform… we coped with it with
our own resources and with a lot of help from the private sector.” (Polanco, 2012).
There is also evidence that, whereas a firm’s fiduciary interests contribute to a focus
on economically relevant disaster impacts (Ballesteros, 2015), traditional aid providers
often confront multiple pressures and preferences that shape how they interpret
information coming from a disaster zone. For governments, decisions about how to
intervene following a disaster may be guided by political factors (Reeves, 2011). Indeed,
studies have shown that up to 50 percent of the variance in disaster relief allocations is
explained by electoral considerations (Garrett & Sobel, 2004). Foreign governments also
tend to be more attuned to disasters that affect political allies, culturally similar nations,
and oil-exporting countries (Fink & Redaelli, 2011). There is also evidence that the
amount of aid pledged by governments, NGOs, and multilateral agencies is influenced
by the level of media coverage that a disaster receives, irrespective of its actual impacts
(Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Franks, 2013). In sum, the capability of these
organizations to sense areas of critical need following a disaster is often constrained by
political considerations and special-interest pressures, rather than being guided by
assessments of need and impact alone (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Platt, 2012).
The above considerations support the argument that economically-reliant companies
are more likely than traditional aid providers to sense and accurately interpret
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information about disaster impacts that relate to a nation’s economic functioning. In turn,
this should motivate responses that focus on rebuilding key infrastructure and restoring
the market status quo. Importantly, there is evidence that such initiatives have a positive
effect on national growth and social welfare: in comparison, the less focused and
politically motivated initiatives undertaken by governments and aid agencies have been
shown to generate less social surplus (Cavallo & Daude, 2008; Khan & Kumar, 1997;
Robinson & Torvik, 2005). For instance, in a sample of 24 countires, Khan and Reinhart
(1990) found that public investments had an overall negative influence on economic
growth, whereas private investment had a significant positive effect.
Seizing opportunities to act
Once an organization has sensed disaster impacts and come to an understanding of
where to intervene, the next step is to seize the opportunity to act (Teece, 2007). As with
other strategic decisions, the speed with which action takes place has significant
implications for the effectiveness of disaster relief and recovery (Day et al., 2012;
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). In this regard, dynamic capabilities research shows that
local autonomy and decentralized decision-making enhance the speed and effectiveness
with which a firm can respond to threats and opportunities in the external environment
(Teece et al., 1997). Extending this to disaster relief, we argue that economically-reliant
companies will likely have a speed advantage over other types of aid providers.
When a firm is motivated to restore market functioning in a nation, it can delegate
decisions about aid allocation to managers whose local knowledge and situational
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proximity are conducive to the agility and improvisation required for quick and effective
action in complex environments (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). In comparison,
governments and multilateral aid agencies often have centralized, bureaucratic decisionmaking processes which can impede rapid action (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Hence,
when a disaster requires donors to swiftly ramp-up their engagement, firms likely face
fewer decision-making constraints than other aid providers (White & Lang, 2012). For
example, following the 2010 Chile disaster, multi-national mining firm, Anglo
American, relied on local managers to assess damages and lead its response. Just hours
after the earthquake, the company’s London-based headquarters was briefed on the
destruction and authorized managers to respond. The result was one of the first major
relief and recovery donations from any source (Useem et al., 2015).
Reconfiguring and the effective provision of aid
In addition to decision-making speed, economically-reliant companies are also likely
to have resources and routines that can be quickly reconfigured for disaster relief (Teece,
2007). With regard to resources, the cash position of most large firms allows them to
purchase response goods or transfer money to victims (Matten & Crane, 2005).
Productive assets within an affected country can also be repurposed to address disaster
needs, such as when Anglo American rapidly dispatched heavy equipment from its
mining operations to gather debris and remove rockslides after the Chile earthquake
(Useem et al., 2015). Similarly, following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, handset
manufacturer, Ericsson, moved quickly to provide mobile phones to help disaster
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responders. Large firms also have the ability to smoothly redeploy resources from across
their network of corporate affiliates (Teece, 2014). This contributes to a broader and
more diverse resource base that can be deployed at speed to support relief efforts. For
instance, Wal-Mart and other large retailers were able to mobilize inventory from across
their subsidiary networks to bolster the supply of medicines, food, and clean-up supplies
following Hurricane Katrina (Horwitz, 2009).
Routines and competencies that a company has developed for business purposes can
also be utilized to implement fast, effective relief efforts (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
Following the Indian Ocean tsunami, for example, industrial companies helped rebuild
schools by drawing on their experience with large-scale engineering projects. These
firms had no history building schools, but ample expertise with construction materials
and methods. Coordinating with makers of mobile buildings, they quickly built state-ofthe-art, earthquake-proof schoolhouse structures (Fernando, 2010). In another example,
the logistics company, TNT, assisted the United Nations in designing relief warehouses
in Italy by using its expertize to help optimize warehouse storage and to train personnel
in inventory management: the result was an estimated $450,000 reduction in annual
operating costs (Wassenhove et al., 2008).
In comparison, the centralization and bureaucracy that often slows decision-making
in governments and multilateral agencies can create barriers to efficient and effective aid
deployment. Unlike companies that already have resources in a nation, these
organizations typically need to marshal resources and put local infrastructure into place
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before a response can begin (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Lipscy & Takinami, 2013). In
addition to slowing the flow of aid, it is costly to create new structures and routines, and
there are often kinks to be worked out before operations become smooth (Raffaelli &
Glynn, 2014; Teece et al., 1997). The need to navigate layers of bureaucracy may also
contribute to bottlenecks that slow the dispersion of disaster relief (Fritz, 2004). Indeed,
nearly 40% of the aid pledged by foreign governments and aid agencies following the
2010 Haiti earthquake was still outstanding in 2013, whereas all corporate aid had been
distributed (Ballesteros, 2015; Becerra, Cavallo, & Noy, 2013).
Without discounting the importance of traditional aid providers for effective disaster
relief, our collected arguments suggest that firms have capabilities that are uniquely wellsuited to fast and effective responses. In turn, this should contribute to positive outcomes
for afflicted nations when corporations account for a larger share of disaster relief.
Formally, we predict:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The speed with which aid is provided to a disaster-affected nation
will be faster when economically-reliant corporations account for a greater share of total
disaster aid
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The long-term recovery of a disaster-affected nation will be
greater when economically-reliant corporations account for a greater share of total
disaster aid
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The value of firm-specific versus general resources
While we expect that corporations as an organizational form have a comparative
advantage in delivering fast and effective aid following a disaster, there is undoubtedly
variance in the degree to which responses fit with the need being addressed (Kogut &
Zander, 1992). For instance, even at a high level of analysis, there is likely to be a
difference in the speed and effectiveness of responses that draw on firm specific versus
general routines and resources. According to the dynamic capabilities literature, firms
work to develop areas of core expertise around co-specialized routines and resources,
which they then look to deploy in response to environmental shifts (Kogut & Zander,
1992; Teece, 2014). Mirroring the general finding that firms perform better when they
are able to leverage such competencies, research on strategic CSR has shown that
companies are more disciplined with their giving when it is consistent with business
objectives (Porter & Kramer, 2002; Saiia et al., 2003), and that CSR that is related to
core business competencies is more likely to produce financial benefits for the firm
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Extending this to societal outcomes, Kaul and Luo
(forthcoming) developed a theoretical proof that suggests related CSR contributes to
social welfare more efficiently than comparable government or charity initiatives.
Applied to disaster response, this points to a distinction between firms that respond
with general resources—such as donating money to relief efforts—versus those that
respond by reconfiguring areas of core expertise. Financial donations undoubtedly make
a valuable contribution to disaster relief, but they also insert a layer between the firm and
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aid implementation, while offering little additive value beyond the cash infusion. This
may contribute to a relatively slower and less effective response. In comparison,
leveraging areas of expertise has the potential to add unique value that contributes to the
effectiveness of a relief effort without imposing major transactional or operational costs.
Such efforts can also be undertaken quickly, as they draw on existing products or
services and generally don’t require intermediaries for implementation.
For instance, it stands to reason that the impact of disaster giving will be greater
when a firm contributes resources that are similar to those it has expertise producing for
private sale. For the firm, the marginal cost of providing such goods is relatively low, as
significantly new skills and routines are not required for their production. Quality and
speed of delivery should also be high, given the firm’s production competencies. In
comparison, it will likely be costly for other entities—corporate or otherwise— to
provide similar goods if they lack the relevant capabilities (Besley & Ghatak, 2007). The
implication is that related CSR should be more efficient, cost effective, and high quality
than other options.
Illustrating this, in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Coca-Cola
converted soft-drink production lines in Sri Lanka to bottle water, and used its own
trucks to distribute the water to victims. In so doing, Coke was able to quickly produce
and distribute an essential good in a cost efficient and effective manner (Fritz, 2004).
Supporting this argument with formal models, Kotchen (2006) compared the provision
of public goods that firms produced jointly with private goods, versus those that they
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produced separately. Results suggested there are greater social welfare impacts in the
first example because production integrates capabilities that are used to produce the
private good: this affects the equilibrium provision of the public good. This effect is
absent for unrelated giving, however, such as when a transport company donates food or
a fraction of sales to disaster relief.
Company-specific knowledge and routines may also be germane to disaster relief
efforts. The types of expertise required for many aspects of disaster response—for
instance, logistics, construction, and planning—have analogs in business (Wassenhove et
al., 2008). Firms incur little cost when they contribute such expertise, yet this can have a
meaningful effect on the speed with which aid reaches beneficiaries, as well as the
effectiveness of a disaster response (Horwitz, 2009). The actions of express delivery
firm, DHL, offer a case in point. DHL often assumes a lead role in coordinating the
reception and distribution of relief supplies after a disaster. By drawing on its
competencies in rapid dispatch and inventory control, DHL’s involvement in disaster
logistics regularly contributes to fewer donated goods going to waste and less airport
congestion in the disaster-affected nation (Wassenhove et al., 2008). Similar outcomes
were apparent when FedEx took a lead role coordinating the delivery of relief goods
following the 2008 floods in Mexico (Ballesteros, 2013). As such, we predict:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Aid from economically-reliant corporations will have a greater
effect on the speed with which aid is provided to a disaster-affected nation when this
giving leverages firm-specific routines and resources
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Hypothesis 4 (H4). Aid from economically-reliant corporations will have a greater
effect on a nation’s recovery from disaster when this giving leverages firm-specific
routines and resources
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We tested our hypotheses with a dataset that covers every major natural disaster in
the world from 2003 to 2013, as reported in the International Disaster Database (EMDAT) from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.58 We followed the
same strategy as Chapter 1 and 2 and restricted our analysis to sudden disasters, such as
earthquakes and hurricanes, which have a clear triggering event, immediate disruption,
and peak impacts within 30 days. We excluded slowly-emerging disasters, such as
famines, because impacts unfold over a long period and it is difficult to identify the
magnitude and timing of disaster responses. We also excluded human-caused disasters,
such as 9/11, as these are often accompanied by social and political factors that affect the
likelihood of receiving aid (Birkland, 1997; Klinenberg, 2003).
Overall, there were 3,523 disaster-nation pairs in our analysis period (i.e., instances
where a country was affected by a sudden natural disaster). Of these, we dropped 119
where the start- and end-dates of the disaster were imprecise, as well as 191 where peak
impacts occurred outside of 30 days. We gathered information on the economic and
human toll of each disaster using data provided by the company, Swiss Re, which tracks
58

To register an event in the International Disaster Database, at least one of the following criteria must
be fulfilled: 10 or more people killed, 100 or more people affected, a declaration of a state of emergency, or
a call for international assistance. Further information can be accessed at http://www.emdat.be/.
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insured and uninsured disaster losses (Sigma, 2014), and from international-aid data
provided by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Data
on these variables were missing or incomplete for 1,031 of the records in our dataset,
which were dropped from our analysis. This left us with 2,084 discrete disaster-nation
events that we used to test our predictions about the speed of aid provision (H1 and H3).
For our analysis of post-disaster recovery (H2 and H4), we considered that a nation may
be affected by multiple disasters in the same year. In such cases, we added the damages
for each disaster to create a collective annual disaster. This resulted in 464 country-year
disasters. Collectively, the disasters in our analysis affected over 836 million people in
129 countries and caused over $1.3 trillion in damage.
For disaster aid, we built a propriety dataset with information on every donation that
a nation received for 12 months following a disaster, and from what source (i.e.,
corporations, governments, and multilateral agencies). To do this, we began by searching
Factiva and Lexis Nexis for media reports with headlines that featured a combination of
the affected country, the type of disaster, and—where relevant—the name of the disaster
(e.g., Typhoon Haiyan).59 We then narrowed our sample to reports that contained
information on disaster giving by searching for a Boolean combination of the term
‘donate’ as well as various derivations and synonyms. In total, this yielded over
2,310,000 items which formed the core of our analysis. We then used an automated
coding process to search within each report for details about the type, financial value,
59

These databases cover newspapers, trade publications, magazines, newswires, press releases,
television and radio transcripts, digital video and audio clips, corporate websites and reports, institutional
websites and reports, and government websites and reports, among other sources.
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date, and source of each donation. This yielded information on over 73,000 donations
from more than 34,000 corporations. For each donation, we coded those that were
coming from corporations with local affiliates as reflected in the Lexis Nexis Corporate
Affiliations database. For each in-kind donation, we recorded the characteristics of the
product or service in question and converted this to a monetary figure based on current
prices in the affected nation, the monetary value reported by the donor, or the reported
value of similar donations from other organizations. Donations were converted into U.S.
dollars using the exchange rate on the date the gift was made. We elaborate on our search
strategy, coding procedures, and validity checks in the Annex.
Methods
Our hypotheses focus on how corporate disaster giving affects the speed of aid
provision and the level of disaster recovery in a nation following a sudden natural
disaster. Given the impossibility of a clean experimental design where disaster-affected
nations are randomly allocated into groups with different levels of corporate disaster
giving and donation relatedness, we aim for the second-best econometric tool for causal
inference: a quasi-experimental design. For our analysis, isolating causality requires an
approach that compares relief and recovery among nations that receive different levels of
corporate aid, but are otherwise similar regarding underlying attributes and disaster
impacts. The assumption of heterogeneity in corporate disaster giving, but homogeneity
in everything else, is difficult to satisfy and poses an estimation challenge for
conventional panel-data techniques. To wit, nations may have capacities that are
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independent of corporate giving, but difficult to empirically isolate, such as variance in
their ability to care for citizens and manage disaster responses. Failing to take these
factors into account may lead to biased, inefficient estimates, or spurious causation.
Tools such as country-specific fixed-effects and control variables can be used to help
address these issues, but this imposes the assumption that ex ante disaster trends
extrapolate to ex post conditions, which is often not the case, particularly over long time
periods (E. Cavallo et al., 2013). In comparison, traditional quasi-experimental designs,
such as differences-in-differences, allow for the inclusion of unobserved confounding
influences. These effects must be time-invariant, though, so that the temporal differences
method can address them. Large sample inferential techniques like coarsened-exact
matching are another way to deal with this issue. It is difficult to apply these techniques
in contexts such as ours, however, because suitable single comparisons often do not exist
for aggregate entities like nations (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). The challenge is amplified
when the number of potential control units or sample periods is small (E. Cavallo et al.,
2013).
Synthetic control method. Based on these considerations, we chose the synthetic
control method (SCM) for our analysis, which is a quasi-experimental technique that
overcomes some of the limitations of traditional matching approaches (Abadie et al.,
2010, 2015). As with other matching techniques, SCM matches a focal (treated) entity
with a control that is statistically similar for a set of relevant predictors, but different
regarding a focal independent variable (the treatment). Comparison units are selected to
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reproduce the counterfactual for the focal entity, and thus isolate how treatment affects
the outcome of interest. SCM is unique, though, in that controls are a combination of
multiple potential comparators, rather than single entities.
The approach works by using an algorithm that, first, evaluates the capacity of every
entity not affected by an intervention to emulate pre-treatment characteristics of the
treated entity. From this, weights are assigned to multiple control entities, which are then
combined to form a synthetic comparator that closely resembles the treated entity, except
for the presence of the intervention (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2015 for detailed
discussions). The approach is also capable of matching entities over a long pre-treatment
time-period. As Abadie et al. (2015: 498) note, this effectively controls for unobserved
variance, as “only units that are alike in observed and unobserved [factors]…should
produce similar trajectories on the outcome variable over extended periods of time.” As
applied to our analysis, this means that SCM matches each treated nation with a
combination of carefully selected countries in the control group: a synthetically created
nation. For instance, no one country approximates Chile in the years leading up to the
2010 earthquake and tsunami. However, features of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Paraguay, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States can be integrated in different
proportions to form a synthetic Chile that is a close match on features that predict the
speed of disaster relief as well as the nation’s historical levels of social welfare.60

60

Our online appendix shows how the SCM algorithm combines features of these nations to
approximate 2010 Chile. See https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/synthetic-controlmethod.pdf.
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The efficiency of SCM centers on the capacity of the algorithm to minimize, for each
pre-treatment period, the distance between treated entities and each of the control entities
on a case-by-case basis. Thus, significance levels are not computed as in traditional
panel-data techniques, and effect sizes are interpreted directly as the difference between
the values for treated versus control entities on the outcome of interest (Abadie et al.,
2015). The statistical likelihood that observed outcomes are the result of treatment versus
chance is calculated using placebo tests. The approach works by telling the SCM
algorithm that entities in the control group have received treatment (even though they
have not). These ‘placebo’ entities are then matched with synthetic counterparts, and
outcomes of interest are assessed. Repeating this analysis for all non-treated entities
creates a distribution of outcomes that are essentially observed by chance. This
distribution of false treatment effects is then used to compare with the actual treatment
effects and generate p-values (see Abadie et al., 2015).

Variables
Outcome variables. Our analysis features two outcome variables: the speed of aid
provision, and; a nation’s disaster recovery. As with previous studies of disaster
management, we used the portion of total disaster aid provided in the four weeks
following a disaster as a proxy for the speed of aid provision (Day et al., 2012;
O’Donnell, 2009). We analyze a nation’s recovery from disaster based on the annual
growth rate of its Human Development Index (HDI) score, which is a measure of
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aggregate social welfare (Anand & Sen, 1994). HDI is calculated annually by the United
Nations Development Program and tracks a nation’s level of health and longevity,
knowledge and education, and standard of living.
Treatment variables and levels. For hypotheses 1 and 2, our treatment variable is the
share of aid from economically-reliant firms. We used the Lexis Nexis Directory of
Corporate Affiliates to determine which firms were located, or had a subsidiary, in an
affected country and were thus ‘economically-reliant’. Our variable is the amount of aid
from these firms divided by the total amount of aid received by a nation in the year
following a disaster. To test our hypotheses, we analyzed three levels of treatment. The
distribution of corporate giving is highly skewed, which means that is not an efficient
strategy to select treatment levels based on the mean value and standard deviations.
Instead, we use the 75th (7.7% of aid is from economically-reliant firms), 95th (24.5%),
and 99th (44.4%) percentiles as treatment levels (see Cavallo et al., 2013 for a similar
approach).
For hypotheses 3 and 4 we developed a measure of related giving that reflects the
degree to which disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. To calculate
this, we began by using a firm’s four-digit SIC code to identify its key business
activities. We coded the dollar number of in-kind donations that aligned with these
activities as related [i.e., products, services, or activities that are relevant to the firm’s
market operation (e.g., Bayer providing medicines in response to Typhoon Haiyan)].
Details about how we coded related versus unrelated giving can be found in the Annex.
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Our specific variable is the value of related aid divided by the total value of disaster aid
from economically-reliant firms. Again, we used three treatment levels in our analysis.
As the distribution for relatedness is relatively normal, we used the mean (26.9% of
corporate aid is in the form of related giving) and +/- one standard deviation (11.5% and
42.4%) for treatment indicators.
Predictor variables. We created a synthetic counterpart for each treated nation using
the STATA algorithm developed by Abadie et al. (2010). For all matching, we included
a variable for the economic hardship caused by a disaster, as reflected in USD amount of
damage to property, crops, and livestock reported by Swiss Re and EM-DAT. Beyond
this, however, different predictors are relevant for the speed of aid provision versus a
nation’s recovery from disaster (Day et al., 2012; Ray, 1998; Wassenhove et al., 2008).
As such, we added different matching variables for these two analyses.
Speed of aid provision. Studies of disaster management and corporate disaster giving
have suggested that key predictors for aid speed include the size of a nation’s economy,
it’s openness to aid, and the prominence of a disaster (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007;
Stromberg, 2007). To this end, we used the following predictors in our matching: 1) size
of the economy, measured as the natural logarithm of a country’s pre-disaster GDP per
capita (PPP); 2) human hardship, which is the natural logarithm of either the number of
people killed or number of people affected, as reported by EM-DAT; 3) salience,
measured with the natural logarithm of (one plus) the count of news articles in Factiva
and Lexis Nexis that referred to the event in the 48 hours after its occurrence; 4)
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newsworthy events, defined as the average of the median number of minutes that a news
broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day over the forty days after the
disaster (see Eisensee & Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this indicator and a test
of its effectiveness); 5) number of disasters at the country and 6) at the international
level, which speaks to other events that may dilute the attention paid to a focal disaster
and; 7) openness to aid, which is a binary variable indicating the national government’s
consent to receive foreign aid, as coded from articles in Factiva and Lexis Nexis.
Disaster recovery. We chose predictors of disaster recovery based on their relevance
to HDI as reflected in a voluminous literature on economic development and the social
costs of disaster (Barro, 2007; E. Cavallo et al., 2013; Kousky, 2013). These are: 1)
schooling measured by secondary education attainment; 2) life expectancy at birth; 3)
inflation rate as reflected in the annual percentage change for consumer prices; 4) trade
openness proxied by real exports plus real imports as a percentage of real GDP; 5)
investment rate, which is the ratio of real domestic private and public investment to real
GDP. Data for these variables is from World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). For each treated nation, we constructed a synthetic control based on 15 years of
pre-disaster data. For calculating disaster recovery, we followed nations for 10 years and,
thus, in some cases use forecast values for 2016 to 2023 as reported in the WDI.61 Table
26 shows descriptive statistics while table 27 shows correlations.

61

Some country-specific data were missing from the WDI, in such case, we applied the multiple-input
bootstrapping algorithm for time-series-cross-sectional data as explained by Honaker et al. (2011).
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RESULTS
The Effect of Corporate Aid on Response Speed and Recovery from Disaster
Table 28 shows results for hypothesis 1, which predicted that the speed of aid
provision will be faster when economically-reliant corporations account for a greater
share of disaster aid. Models 1-3 reflect the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% levels of the
treatment variable, respectively. We observe similar average values for treatment and
control groups on each predictor variable, which shows that our matching was effective.
P-values were calculated using the placebo method discussed above.62 Results show that
there is no significant difference in the speed of aid provision at 7.7% share of corporate
giving in total aid. However, the size of this effect increases dramatically as corporations
comprise progressively larger shares of disaster giving. At the 24.5%, treated nations
received 121% more aid during the first month as compared to synthetic counterfactuals.
The effect is even greater when the share of corporate giving is above 44.4% of aid.

62

The online appendix https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/inference-with-placeboexercises.pdf provides details on the placebo tests that were used to support our analysis.
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Table 26. Descriptive Statistics on the Economic Value of Disaster Giving
VARIABLES

mean

sd

min

max

Donation Amount (US Million)

907.09

46.26

.014

189,857.45

13,730.17

14,179.09

388.20

62,571.35

0.31

0.35

0.00

0.94

Human Hardship (deaths)

392.61

6,904.36

1.00

222,570.00

Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years)

70.37

8.10

42.15

83.33

GDP (PPP per capita)
Human Development Index

Annual Number of Disasters (Nation)

7.45

7.90

0.00

33.00

Annual Number of Disasters (Global)

237.78

16.71

213.00

260.00
29.25

Newsworthy Events

8.90

2.57

2.83

Salience

18.83

17.32

0.18

50.00

Openness to Aid

35.37

18.16

0.12

137.97

Estimated Damage (US Million)

1,163.80

8,175.15

0.01

385,000.00

School Enrollment, Secondary, (% net)

70.19

21.12

6.92

99.84

Total Investment (ratio of total investment to GDP)

26.31

8.92

6.59

61.47
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Table 27. Correlations on the Economic Value of Disaster Giving
1

VARIABLES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Donation Amount (US Million)

1.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

GDP (PPP per capita)

0.09

1.00

Human Development Index

0.10

0.19

1.00

Human Hardship (deaths)

0.20

-0.05

-0.03

1.00

Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years)

0.05

0.79

0.24

-0.05

1.00

Annual Number of Disasters (Nation)

0.05

0.27

-0.17

0.05

-0.03

Annual Number of Disasters (Global)

0.01

-0.08

-0.20

-0.04

-0.09

0.02

1.00

Newsworthy Events

0.17

0.10

0.15

0.04

0.10

-0.01

-0.08

1.00

Salience

0.07

0.51

0.10

0.01

0.33

0.37

0.09

0.04

9

10

11

12

1.00

1.00

Openness to Aid

0.07

0.57

0.07

0.02

0.44

0.41

0.08

0.01

0.93

1.00

Estimated Damage (US Million)

0.58

0.14

0.14

0.11

0.13

0.03

-0.07

0.27

-0.11

0.12

School Enrollment, Secondary, (% net)

0.05

0.74

0.21

-0.06

0.85

-0.01

-0.06

0.11

-0.25

0.31

0.13

1.00

Total Investment (ratio of total investment to GDP)

0.01

-0.05

-0.05

0.06

0.11

-0.12

0.09

0.06

0.08

0.04

-0.03

0.07
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13

1.00

1.00

Here, treated nations received more than twice the aid of synthetic control nations by
the end of the fourth post-disaster week. Thus, while corporate giving has negligible
effect on the speed of aid provision for most disasters (because firms comprise a
relatively small share of aid in these instances), we observe that prominent levels of
giving have a strong and significant effect that is consistent with our prediction in H1.
Table 28 and Error! Reference source not found. show the average and the trajectory
of the accumulated donation each post-disaster week for treatment and synthetic control
groups.
Table 28. The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Speed of Aid

Share of Aid from
Economically-Reliant Firms

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

7.7%

24.5%

44.4%

Predictors

Treated

Control

Treated

Control

Treated

Control

Size of the Economy

10782.72

11074.42

11677.95

11680.89

22236.14

22311.46

Human Hardship

418.47

438.71

397.28

394.78

7515.66

6872.36

Salience

15.07

16.33

17.12

17.24

25.21

23.89

Disasters (Nation)

8.75

8.95

7.24

7.31

8.46

8.69

Disasters (Global)

241.11

237.44

240.37

239.98

239.61

241.28

Newsworthy Events

8.69

8.87

8.11

8.36

7.15

7.58

Openness to Aid

0.79

0.82

0.89

0.86

0.68

0.71

Estimated Damage

811.74

810.83

1025.42

1017.85

117176.74

99815.27

19.5

58.3

18.4

Outcome Variable
% of disaster aid 4 weeks
p-value

17.5

14.6

43.1

0.234

0.006

0.000

Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of
the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm
minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a
case by case basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of disaster giving coming from
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firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff
points). The total sample of country disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 2,084.

Figure 3. The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Speed of Aid

Note: The outcome variable is the accumulated amount of disaster aid. Treated are disaster countries with
a substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as
defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country disasters in the period
2003-2013 is 2,084.

Table 29 shows results for hypothesis 2, which predicted that the overall recovery of
a nation will be greater when economically-reliant corporations account for a larger share
of disaster aid. Again, models reflect different levels of the treatment variable, and report
average values for treatment and control groups on each predictor. The outcome variable
is the annual growth rate of HDI 10 post-disaster years. We observe a significant
difference between HDI growth rate for treatment and control groups when
economically-relaint firms account for more than 24.5% of disaster aid. The result is
stronger when firms contribute more than 44.4% of all aid. However, we do not observe a
significant effect on social welfare when the share of corporate disaster aid equals, or is
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lower than, 7.7%, suggesting that positive effects only become apparent when
corporations play an outsized role in a disaster response.
Table 29. The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Disaster Recovery
Share of Aid from
Economically-Reliant Firms
Predictors
School Enrollment

Model 4
7.7%
Treated
Control
70.24
70.39

Model 5
24.5%
Treated
Control
89.12
84.68

Model 6
44.4%
Treated
Control
82.75
83.33

Life Expectancy

70.11

71.25

80.44

79.98

76.95

75.48

Inflation rate

2.58

3.15

1.99

2.01

1.44

2.54

Trade openness

31.48

31.25

49.91

48.71

46.96

47.91

Total Investment

23.14

24.19

20.74

21.14

19.66

19.84

810.14

790.36

1008.74

1000.79

117176.74

98815.27

0.54

0.22

Estimated Damage
% of annual HDI growth
p-value

Outcome Variable (10th post-disaster year)
0.95
0.84
0.48
0.25
0.239
0.007

0.004

Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the size of the
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the algorithm minimizes the distance
between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis. Treated
are disaster countries with a substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in
the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of countryyear disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 464.

Figure 3 shows the trajectory of change in the annual growth rate between treated and
control nations. Given that the SCM algorithm generates counterfactual disaster countries
based on the pre-disaster history of the predictors of HDI, we expect no significant
differences before the disaster. Accordingly, we observe the differences in the HDI
growth rate only during the 10 post-disaster years. Results show that the level of recovery
after 10 years is notably higher for countries that receive over 24.5% of disaster aid from
economically-reliant firms. On average, the HDI growth rate for such nations is 92%
higher than for their synthetic controls: this gap grows to 145.5% at the 44.4% of share of
corporate giving. As such, our results suggest a slight decrease in the positive effect on
HDI at higher levels of corporate giving. Hence, we find support for hypothesis 2, but
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note that our results suggest that corporate involvement is not panacea for disaster
responses, and that a nation’s long-term recovery likely benefits from the participation of
other entities.

Figure 4 The Effect of Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms on Disaster Recovery

Note: Instead of showing absolute values, the figure shows the difference in HDI growth rate between
treatment nations and correspondent synthetic controls for 15 years before the disaster and 10 years after
the disaster. Period (0) is the disaster year. No sizeable effects before the disaster year suggest that the
synthetic control method has generated efficient control nations. Treated are disaster countries with a
substantial share of disaster giving coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as
defined by the 7.7%. 24.5% and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-year disasters in the
period 2003-2013 is 464

The Value of Firm-Specific versus General Resources
Regarding our last two hypotheses, we found that the positive effect of corporate aid
on the speed of aid provision and a nation’s recovery from disaster becomes greater when
the portion of this giving that is related to firms’ core business increases. To analyze this,
we examined the effects of relatedness (i.e., 11.5%, 26.9%, and 42.4%) at each treatment
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level of corporate giving (i.e., 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4%). Table 30 reports the results for
hypothesis 3, which focuses on the effects of related giving on the speed of aid. We
observe that increases in relatedness lead to significantly faster aid provision when the
share of giving from economically-reliant firms is at least 24.5% of total aid. For
instance, at 95th percentile of share of corporate giving and 7.7% of relatedness, treated
nations receive aid 170% faster than counterfactual nations; at 44.4% of share of
corporate giving and 42.4% relatedness, nations receive aid 260% faster than control
nations. In other words, the marginal effect on relief speed increases with the share of
related corporate giving. Figure 3 plots the trajectory of accumulated aid for each postdisaster week for the cases of a nation with at least 24.5% of aid coming from
economically-reliant firms and 11.4% of relatedness; and one receiving 44.4% and 42.4%
respectively. In sum, these effects suggest a strong case for hypothesis 3.
We followed the same procedure for hypothesis 4, which predicted that a nation’s
recovery from disaster will be stronger when a greater portion of corporate aid comes in
the form of related giving. Table 31 reports the treatment effect of relatedness on the
growth rate of HDI and shows that it has a consistently positive and significant influence.
Of note, we observe that the greatest average difference between treated and control
nations occurs when there are high levels of corporate aid (44.4% share in aid) and a
large portion of this aid comprises related giving (42.4%). Ten years after a disaster, the
average HDI annual growth rate for such nations is expected to be almost 190% greater
than for comparators. To show the magnitude of the role of relatedness in the effect of
corporate giving on HDI, we compare in Figure 6 the trajectory of the annual growth of
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HDI between two similar treated nations and their control nations. When relatedness is
not considered, the difference between treated and synthetic controls is 56 percentage
points lower. As such, we find strong support for hypothesis 4.
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Table 30. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms and Speed of Aid
Share of Aid
from
EconomicallyReliant Firms
Relatedness of
Corporate Aid
Predictors
Size of
the Economy
Human
Hardship
Salience
Disasters
(Nation)
Disasters
(Global)
Newsworthy
Events
Openness to
Aid
Estimated
Damage

7.7%

Model 7
11.5%

24.5%

Model 8
26.9%

Model 9
42.4%

Model 10
11.5%

44.4%

Model 11
26.9%

Model 12
42.4%

Model 13
11.5%

Model 14
26.9%
T

Model 15
42.4%

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

785.6

700.5

17890.
4
380.7

16998.
2
380.2

2478.5

50711.
8
348.5

49788.
2
347.3

7412.1

7314.1

888.3

17448.
8
236.2

0.0

847.6

17864.
3
236.8

0.0

1031.7

15511.
7
987.4

2748.4

1025.4

15845.
4
994.3

C

T

C

22.2
9.1

29648
.2
8211.
7
35.1
9.8

29008
.4
8305.
5
30.5
9.7

0.0

0.0

6125.3

6785.2

11.7
8.3

11.9
8.3

15.0
8.8

15.4
7.6

18.3
8.8

18.4
7.7

16.8
7.8

16.7
7.8

24.6
7.3

25.1
7.2

25.9
7.5

24.8
7.4

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

21.7
9.0

289.1

289.9

240.4

229.7

240.8

222.0

310.1

309.7

248.4

247.7

239.4

239.6

0.0

0.0

211.3

215.4

240.9

241.3

8.2

8.2

8.2

8.0

8.5

7.2

8.3

8.5

7.4

7.3

8.0

8.6

0.0

0.0

6.1

6.8

7.1

7.1

0.7

0.7

0.7

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.9

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.6

557.6

553.8

810.8

799.1

811.0

756.4

739.2

736.6

976.5

981.5

1008.7

1000.8

0.0

0.0

11594.5

11587.5

16997
4.6

16785
7.4

16.7

46.8

23.8

NA

NA

48.7

17.6

63.2

17.0

Outcome Variable
% of disaster
aid, first four
weeks
p-value

11.6

10.6

0.470

15.4

13.3

0.225

18.8

15.5

0.209

30.7

11.4

0.030

38.4

0.004

0.001

NA

0.002

0.000

Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a
reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by
case basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active
in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 2,084
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Table 31. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from Economically-Reliant Firms and Recovery
Share of Aid
from

7.70%

24.50%

44.40%

EconomicallyReliant Firms
Relatedness
of Corporate
Aid
Predictors
School
Enrollment
Life
Expectancy
Inflation rate
Trade
openness
Total Investment

Estimated
Damage

Model 16
11.50%

Model 17
26.90%

Model 18
42.40%

Model 19
11.50%

Model 20
26.90%

Model 21
42.40%

Model 22
11.50%

Model 23
26.90%

Model 24
42.40%

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

T

C

63.11

64.85

69.72

70.02

71.98

71.71

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

89.12

84.68

0.00

0.00

65.14

66.05

91.55

90.14

67.15

67.89

68.57

67.39

72.51

73.51

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

80.44

79.98

0.00

0.00

68.71

69.14

81.07

82.17

5.69

6.11

4.56

4.78

3.39

3.52

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.99

2.01

0.00

0.00

2.93

2.68

0.69

1.25

21.36

22.18

28.67

28.11

34.78

32.14

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

49.91

48.71

0.00

0.00

27.91

26.87

57.21

57.36

15.4

15.68

19.75

19.84

26.34

27.89

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

20.74

21.14

0.00

0.00

19.66

18.76

21.6

20.7

557.64

553.81

810.76

799.13

811.01

756.36

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1008.74

1000.79

0.00

0.00

11594.47

11587.47

169974.58

97994.17

0.48

0.25

NA

NA

0.52

.24

0.55

0.19

Outcome Variable
% of HDI
annual
growth, end
of 10th year
p-value

1.47

1.48

0.374

0.96

0.97

0.317

0.89

0.72

0.224

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

0.007

NA

0.005

0.002

Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the disaster response for the analyzed period only as a
reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case
basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active in the
affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points). The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-2013 is 464

156

24.5%
44.4%

Share of giving from economically-reliant firms

7.7%

Figure 5. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from
Economically-Reliant Firms and Speed of Aid

Note: The outcome variable is the accumulated amount of disaster aid for the first four post-disaster weeks.
Treated are disaster countries with at least 42.4% of in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core
operation coming from firms economically active in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%,
and 44.4% cutoff points). The sample for the period 2003-2013 is 2,084 disasters.
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24.5%
44.4%

Share of giving from economically-reliant firms

7.7%

Figure 6. The Effect of Relatedness in the Relationship between Disaster Giving from
Economically-Reliant Firms and Recovery

Note: The outcome variable is the annual growth rate of HDI. Treated are disaster countries with at least
42.4% of in-kind giving that is related to the donor’s core operation coming from firms economically active
in the affected country (as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points). Each figure shows the
difference between the annual growth rates of HDI for treated and control nations 15 years before the
disaster and 10 years after the disaster. The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 2003-2013
is 464
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Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses
We ran a variety of supplementary models and robustness checks to deepen our
analysis and bolster our findings. All results are available to view in our online appendix
at https://disastergiving.wordpress.com/.
Alternate method
Although SCM allows us to cleanly identify the effect of corporate aid on the speed
of aid provision and the level of recovery following a disaster, we conducted additional
analyses using traditional regression techniques. While there are limits to this type of
approach in contexts like ours—namely that they do an inefficient job of accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity—consistent results would add support to our findings, while
offering insight into the influence of our treatment variables across a broader range of
values.
To this end, we ran OLS regressions: country-level fixed-effects were used to control
for time-invariant unobserved factors, and a variety of country-, disaster-, and timespecific variables were used to control for time-variant effects. A description of these
variables, as well as their sources and definitions, is provided in our online appendix. To
enhance the econometric efficiency of these estimates, we also applied coarsened-exact
matching (CEM) (Iacus et al., 2008, 2011). The rationale for using CEM is that it
provides a way to deal with unobserved variance in country-specific capacities to
manage disasters and enhance HDI over time. To conduct the matching, and balance
baseline nation-specific factors between treatment and the control groups, we used the
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same predictors as in our SCM analysis. As discussed, however, the ability of CEM to
produce efficient estimates drops considerably when the number of available comparison
entities or periods is low, in addition to its comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis the SCM
to account for the aggregate nature of nations.
Results of this analysis were consistent with our reported models. We found that a
one standard deviation increase in the share of giving from economically-reliant firms
resulted in a 230% increase in the portion of aid that arrived during the first four weeks
after a disaster, as well as a 37.2% increase in HDI growth rate. The magnitude of these
impacts increases 36% and 29.2%, respectively, for every standard deviation increase in
the degree of relatedness of giving.
Alternate dependent variable
In our main analysis, we modelled a nation’s recovery from disaster using its HDI
annual growth rate, as this provides a measure of aggregate social welfare. Our
arguments suggest, however, that the disaster response efforts of economically-reliant
firms are likely to center around restoring market functions and economic infrastructure.
If this is correct, we would expect to see increases in economic as well as social
indicators when corporations account for a greater portion of disaster aid. To test this, we
replicated our analysis using a nation’s annual growth rate of GDP in place of the
correspondent rate for HDI. This exercise replicated the significance and direction of our
main findings. Aid from economically-reliant firms strongly affects a nation’s economic
recovery from disaster. When economically-reliant firms account for at least 44.4% of
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total aid, GDP growth for treated nations is twice that of control nations. This adds
further support to our theoretical arguments. It also aligns with literature on the economic
costs of disasters (Kousky, 2013) as well as work that show private investment has a
larger effect than public investment on economic development (Khan & Kumar, 1997).
The influence of economically-reliant vs. other firms
Another key feature of our argument is that it predicts economically-reliant firms will
have dynamic capabilities that enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster
response. Thus, while disaster aid may also come from firms that do not have a presence
in an afflicted nation, we excluded these from our main analysis. If aid from outside firms
has a similar effect to what we observed for economically-reliant companies, this would
cast doubt on the validity of our theory. While the ideal way to check for this would be to
replicate our analysis of giving from economically-reliant firms with an analysis of
distant firms, there are not enough cases to support a meaningful comparative analysis:
very few nations receive 24.5% (let alone 44.4%) of aid from distant firms. As the next
best option, we selected a binary treatment level of 49.9% or more of aid from
economically-reliant firms. We see non-significant effects when economically active
firms comprise the minority of corporate giving. This supports our argument that the
dynamic capabilities relevant for effective disaster responses are related to having a local
presence in the affected nation.
The effect of institutional development
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One may argue that the underlying quality of national institutions may drive the
efficiency of corporate disaster giving. Countries with more developed institutions may
be readier to absorb, manage, and account for aid flows. Less corruption and higher
accountability may also increase the willingness of firms to donate. Further, government
effectiveness should be associated with a stronger capacity to match relief aid with victim
needs. Although our SCM algorithms matched nations on several institutional variables,
we took an additional step to evaluate the potential influence of local institutions on the
speed and effectiveness of aid from economically-reliant companies. Specifically, we
stratified the application of the synthetic case algorithm by government effectiveness—
which is a measure from the WDI that reflects perceptions about the quality of public
services, the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies—using the percentiles 50th, 75th, and 90th as cutoff values.
We did not use lower percentiles because the number of available disaster countries with
which to generate synthetic controls was insufficient. We found consistency in the effect
of corporate disaster giving on disaster recovery across distinct levels of institutional
development (see https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/).
Is corporate disaster giving a win-win proposition?
The findings offer evidence that countries, on average, are better off when
economically-reliant firms account for comparatively large shares of disaster aid. In turn,
the analyses in chapter 2 on the performance consequences of corporate disaster giving
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resulted in the finding that corporate donors with positive pre-disaster media reputation
are likely to obtain revenue not explained by normal market operation. Taken together,
these results suggest that the conditions under which corporate disaster giving is a
solution where firms and external stakeholders benefit are economic reliance with the
disaster-stricken country and a positive pre-disaster media reputation by the donor.
To offer initial evaluation of this possibility, I use the SCM to run comparative
evaluations of changes in reputation and financial performance associated with disaster
giving in countries that have benefited by the corporate intervention. First, I compare the
trajectory of media reputation of corporate donors with positive pre-disaster media
reputation in each of three groups of countries according to the share of disaster aid
coming from economically-reliant firms. Group A are disaster-stricken countries that
received at least 7.7% of international aid from economically-reliant firms; group B, at
least 24.5%; and group C, at least 44.4%. In all cases, synthetic counterfactuals come
from the pool of statistically similar non-donor companies.
Figure 7 reports average results one year before and after the donation. In the three
cases, corporate donors have significant improvements in media reputation when
compared with control non-donors. The largest difference between treatment and control
groups is observed in countries where the share of aid coming from economically-reliant
firms is the lower (7.7%). This suggests that when the intervention of firms in disaster aid
is relatively low, those firms that donate receive larger visibility than when the
intervention of firms is higher. The placebo tests show that the difference in reputational
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gains between firms in country groups A and C are particularly prominent in early postdonation months. Additionally, reputation gains are bigger in group C countries, those
with at least 44.4% share of corporate giving in total aid, that in group B countries, those
with at least 24.5% share of corporate giving, but these differences are not significant in
several months.
Figure 7. The effect of corporate disaster giving on post-disaster media reputation of firms
with positive pre-disaster reputation
Net Media Reputation (Indexed)
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Note: Disaster countries are included in groups A, B, and C based on the share of
corporate giving from economically-reliant firms on disaster aid, as defined by the 7.7%,
24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points, respectively. The figure shows average differences in each
month between treated and control firms. Month 0 marks the month of the donation. Treated
are firms that donated, have economic reliance with the affected country, and have positive
pre-disaster media reputation. Control are non-donor firms that are otherwise similar.

To provide an analysis of more proximate implications of disaster giving, I use the
measure of off-trend revenue developed in chapter 2. I compare the likelihood of
obtaining revenue that is not explained by market operation for donors in country groups
A, B, and C versus counterfactual non-donors. As in the previous test, I center on firms
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with positive pre-disaster media reputation that have economic reliance with the disasterstricken country.
The results in Table 32 show the average differences in the likelihood of gaining offtrend revenue between treatment and control groups are maximized in countries that
received at least 44.4% of international aid from economically-reliant firms. Because
these are the countries that receive the largest positive differences in the speed of relief
and magnitude of recovery when compared with counterfactual countries, these results
propose that when reputable economically-reliant firms mount a large collective effort on
disaster relief and recovery, corporate disaster giving may be a private behavior that
results in performance benefits and economic value for the affected country.
An argument that solves the contradiction of these findings and the results on the
effects on reputational spillovers is that reputational capital has an instrumental value for
future performance (Roberts & Dowling, 2000).
Table 32. The effect of corporate disaster giving on the likelihood of obtaining off-trend
revenue in countries with different share of corporate giving on disaster aid
Share of corporate disaster giving from economically reliant firms on total international aid
7.7%
24.5%
44.4%
Firm-Specific Variables
Total Revenue (USDmm ln)

9.74

9.78

10.01

Market Capitalization (USDmm ln)

9.57

9.64

9.78

Return on Assets %

5.92

4.36

3.99

Primary Industry (ln)

8.40

8.37

8.30

Number of Employees (ln)

10.55

10.65

12.11

Total Assets (USDmm ln)

14.89

15.14

17.47

R&D Expenses (USDmm ln)

9.74

10.41

13.18

Human Hardship (ln)

12.63

11.85

7.99

Economic Cost (USDmm ln)

6.37

7.44

10.25

Context-Specific Variables
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Share of corporate disaster giving from economically reliant firms on total international aid
7.7%
24.5%
44.4%
Media Coverage (ln)

9.68

10.37

12.01

Number of Disasters (Nation, ln)

2.19

2.01

2.03

Number of Disasters (Global, ln)

5.47

5.53

5.54

Newsworthy Events

8.88

8.14

7.95

Openness to Aid

0.84

0.75

0.61

11.84

17.72

38.95

Outcome Variable
Off-trend revenue

Disaster countries are included in groups A, B, and C based on the share of corporate giving from
economically-reliant firms on disaster aid, as defined by the 7.7%, 24.5%, and 44.4% cutoff points,
respectively. The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases only as a
reference—the synthetic control study algorithm minimizes the distance between potential control firms
and the treated firm on a case by case basis. Treated are firms that donated, have economic reliance with
the affected country, and have positive pre-disaster media reputation. Control are non-donor firms that are
otherwise similar.

DISCUSSION
Globalization and the advance of neoliberal policies have made it more difficult for
nations to ensure the welfare of their citizens, while simultaneously giving more power to
the corporations therein (Frynas, 2005; Matten & Crane, 2005). Thus, companies are
being called upon to adopt responsibilities that have traditionally fallen to governments,
multilateral agencies, and NGOs. Scholars have made several inroads regarding
describing these practices (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), and have
begun to make predictions about when firms will adopt them, and with what
consequences (Henisz et al., 2014; Prakash & Potoski, 2007). Yet, as with the broader
CSR literature, societal outcomes have been largely overlooked (Frynas, 2005; Margolis
et al., 2007). We also lack theory to predict when and why a firm’s actions will create
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meaningful social welfare benefits, or the conditions under which businesses might be
better-able than other types of organizations to deliver such benefits.
We examined these issues in the context of sudden natural disasters; an area where
there are growing calls for corporations to help address the insufficient response capacity
of traditional aid providers (United Nations, 2016). To make predictions about the effects
of corporate aid, we developed a theoretical framework based on the dynamic capabilities
literature (Teece, 2007). We argued that nations will benefit when economically-reliant
firms account for a larger share of disaster aid because these firms are better equipped
than governments and aid agencies to sense areas of need following a disaster, seize
opportunities to respond, and reconfigure routines and resources to do so. To wit,
companies are likely to focus on rebuilding economic infrastructure and restoring market
functions as soon as possible after a disaster, leading to faster aid provision and a stronger
long-term recovery. We argued these effects would be amplified when responses
leveraged firm-specific routines and resources. We tested our predictions using a
proprietary dataset comprising information on every major natural disaster from 2003 to
2013, as well as each aid donation and its source. Synthetic control analysis, as well as
several robustness checks, provided support for our predictions. Corporate disaster aid
appears to be not only socially beneficial, but also more efficient and effective than aid
from traditional providers.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Implications for corporate social responsibility research
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Our study is relevant to debates about the social desirability and effectiveness of
CSR. It is popular among management scholars to focus on the organizational
implications of CSR, while inferring societal benefits. Some scholars considered it
intrinsically good—and certainly better than the alternative—that companies are
developing self-regulation standards (Prakash & Potoski, 2007), engaging in disaster
responses (Madsen & Rogers, 2014), and contributing to the provision of public goods
(Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). This interpretation is open to critique, however, because
societal outcomes are assumed rather than shown. Indeed, critics have argued there are
inherent problems with these initiatives, largely because of their strategic nature (Marquis
& Qian, 2013; Surroca et al., 2013). Per this view, firms use CSR primarily for symbolic
and political purposes, rather than as a tool to deliver meaningful social benefits. This has
led some to argue that efforts to enhance social welfare are best left to governments and
aid agencies, and should not be ceded to corporations (Banerjee, 2008; Frynas, 2005).
Our study is among the first to provide quasi-experimental evidence for the social
value of CSR (Lyneis & Sterman, 2015; Wry, 2009). Our approach assumes that
corporate disaster aid is primarily strategic and self-interested (Henisz et al., 2014).
Rather than symbolic responses and sub-optimal aid allocation, however, results suggest
that firms are taking practical action to restore economic and market functioning
(Ballesteros, 2015; Horowitz, 2008). Thus, when firms make a large collective
contribution to relief efforts, the net effect is that aid arrives more quickly and a nation
recovers more fully following a disaster. In turn, responding companies may benefit from
buffering their own economic shocks while also currying favor among local stakeholders
168

(Henisz et al., 2014; Madsen & Rogers, 2014). In this way, our findings raise interesting
questions about the degree to which companies might benefit from CSR, not only as a
firm-specific resource, but also through the creation of public or club goods (Ballesteros,
2015).
Our approach also contributes to the CSR literature by showing that dynamic
capabilities can be usefully applied to theorize about the relationship between corporate
action and societal outcomes. Unlike studies that have used this framework to explain
why CSR differs among firms (Ramachandran, 2011; Scherer et al., 2016), we followed
research that has shown capabilities vary systemically among organizational forms
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Rindova et al., 2007). This allowed us
to make theoretically informed predictions about the value of aid from corporations
versus other types of organizations. Indeed, our argument and findings casts doubt on the
notion that social welfare initiatives are always best left to public organizations
(Banerjee, 2008; Sundram & Inkpen, 2004). To be clear, we are not suggesting these
organizations are unimportant, but rather that economically-reliant firms have motives
and capabilities that enable them to contribute to disaster relief in uniquely valuable
ways.
However, by focusing on aggregate initiatives and outcomes, our approach points to a
potential tension in the relationship between CSR that benefits society versus individual
firms. We argue that society benefits when firms direct their capabilities toward a
common goal. Yet there is evidence that firms are incented to mount distinctive
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responses to capture private rents (Ramachandran, 2011; Teece, 2007). It will be
important for future studies to identify factors that predict coordination and cooperation
in CSR initiatives, as opposed to idiosyncratic efforts or free-riding (Ostrom, 2000). In
this way, our approach also highlights the importance of focusing on the collective level
of analysis to understand the conditions under which CSR is most likely to yield societal
benefits (Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Wry, Lounsbury, &
Glynn, 2011; York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2016; Zhao & Wry, 2016).
Also, while our predictions are context specific, the process of sensing, seizing, and
reconfiguring is relevant to a broad range of CSR initiatives. This framework is also
amenable to predicting both positive and negative outcomes, and should thus be useful
for theorizing about the conditions under which corporate initiatives are likely to
contribute to desirable social outcomes. Indeed, while the dynamic capabilities of
economically-reliant companies appear to be conducive to fast and effective disaster
responses, firms may not be as well suited to deal with other social issues. Of course, the
efficacy of CSR may also differ among firms. We anticipate that future studies will apply
dynamic capabilities at the firm level to make predictions about the variable effectiveness
of CSR initiatives undertaken by different companies. Our analysis of related versus
unrelated aid is a first step in this direction, and provides evidence in support of the
argument that corporations create greater societal benefits when CSR leverages firmspecific competences (Kaul & Luo, 2017; Mcwilliams & Siegel, 2000).
Implications for managerial practice
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Companies face growing calls not only to adopt social responsibilities, but also to
demonstrate that their efforts in this regard are effective (Eccles et al., 2014). Indeed, the
benefits that a firm receives from CSR are blunted when stakeholders criticize its
initiatives as being instrumental and symbolic (Frynas, 2005). As such, it is in a firm’s
self-interest to have objective data that show how its efforts affect outcomes of interest.
Scholars have begun to develop tools for assessing the societal outcomes of public sector
initiatives (e.g., Ebrahim 2003) but, as Frynas (2005: 276) notes, “linking CSR to
development [goals] requires a new repertory of tools…by which such private
interventions can be justified, planned, executed and evaluated.” Our study offers a first
step in this direction by advancing an approach that uses official data to empirically
assess the social outcomes of corporate action. While this requires outcome data that is
reliable and relevant to the aims of a focal initiative—and thus has some notable
limitations—it nonetheless has the potential to help managers and other stakeholders
more critically evaluate the social value of CSR. Such understanding may help firms
maximize their social return on investment, while enhancing the strategic benefits of CSR
initiatives.
Our findings also have implications for corporate disaster responses. To this end, we
show that disasters are an area where economically-reliant firms have a comparative
advantage over other organizations in contributing to social welfare. Moreover, these
efforts appear to be enhanced when responses are fast and leverage firm-specific routines
and resources. For managers, this suggests that there is value in delegating response
decisions to local affiliates. It also highlights the value of engaging in responses that
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leverage a firm’s core expertise, as opposed to providing more general forms of aid (Kaul
& Luo, 2017).
Implications for disaster relief and recovery
While there is anecdotal evidence that disaster responses benefit from corporate
involvement (e.g., Horowitz, 2008; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013; Useem et al., 2015), our
study is the first to empirically model this relationship. Our findings point to an important
role for economically-reliant firms in disaster relief, but also key limitations. To the
extent that corporate aid is motivated by a desire to restore market functions, our analysis
suggests that a nation’s ability to recover from disasters may be related to the level of
development and openness in its economy. Put another way, the small economic footprint
of foreign and domestic companies in some nations likely makes corporate giving more a
function of social preferences, and—given our argument about the conditions for a
comparative advantage of the firm—less impactful for social welfare. Our approach also
suggests that firms are more likely than traditional aid providers to engage in responses
that are ancillary to their financial interests. There is a broad range of damages wrought
by a disaster, and not all of these are equally relevant for a nation’s economic
functioning. This suggests that 1) the practical contribution that companies make to
effective disaster relief varies widely among nations, and 2) corporate involvement is not
panacea for all facets of disaster response. Thus, while firms can play a valuable role in
disaster relief, this does not obviate the need for traditional aid providers.
Limitations and Future Work
172

In this study, we have started to elucidate the characteristics of corporate donors and
their giving that may have implications for social welfare outcomes. Disaster relief is
only one context where internal and external stakeholders ask firms to play a larger role,
though, and caution should be taken when generalizing our findings. We anticipate that
future studies will examine the influence of CSR for different social issues, and will
develop context-specific predictions and findings. Such efforts will be important for
generating a more robust and theoretically nuanced understanding of the relationship
between corporate action and social welfare.
Also, while our study strongly suggests that corporate aid is beneficial for disaster
relief, important unresolved issues remain. For instance, our results suggest that
beneficiaries are likely to receive in-kind goods more quickly than other types of
donations, and that these are helpful for a nation’s disaster recovery. Yet disastermanagement practitioners often ask for liquid resources because in-kind donations cannot
be repurposed as needs evolve, and can burden or clog aid-delivery infrastructure (Fritz,
2004). Future studies should deepen our analysis and work to untangle these conflicting
predictions. It may be useful here to examine the variable influence of different types of
related resources. Some firms may have routines and resources that greatly benefit relief
efforts, whereas it may be more beneficial for others to provide general resources.
Further, to the extent that firms in some industries are better equipped to contribute to
disaster responses, this type of analysis may also give insight into the relationship
between a nation’s industrial demography and its recovery from disaster. A clear
limitation that affects these ideas is that we do not observe the three dynamic capabilities
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that, we argue, generate the comparative advantage of economically-reliant firms to
deploy disaster aid. Future studies that rely on qualitative research designs may shed light
on such mechanisms.
Finally, while our analysis focused on isolating the value of aid from economicallyreliant firms, effective disaster relief requires coordination and cooperation amongst all
responders (Cohen & Werker, 2008; Fritz, 2004). As such, the value of corporate aid may
be shaped by interactions with other stakeholders, the extent to which aid decisions
consider these other providers, and the degree to which donations are complementary
versus redundant. These issues were beyond the scope of the dissertation, but provide
fruitful terrain for future research.
CONCLUSION
Addressing the hardship caused by sudden natural disasters is a grand challenge with
implications for human misery and the economic functioning of both nations and
corporations. As companies are increasingly being called upon to participate in response
efforts, it is important to understand their ability to contribute to positive societal
outcomes. Our findings suggest that firms with operations in an affected country have
unique capabilities that allow them to sense areas of critical need, seize response
opportunities, and reconfigure routines and resources to respond more quickly and
effectively than traditional aid providers. As such, we not only demonstrate that strategic
CSR can deliver meaningful societal benefits in some contexts, but that nations benefit
greatly from corporate involvement when disaster strikes.
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APPENDIX
Supplementary analyses and robustness checks
OLS Regression. We regressed the speed of aid and the HDI using the following OLS
specifications:
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼1(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠, 𝑐𝑑𝑔) + 𝛼2𝑎 (𝑐𝑑𝑔 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) +
𝛼2𝑐 (𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼′(𝜃𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼1(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠, 𝑐𝑑𝑔) + 𝛼2𝑎 (𝑐𝑑𝑔 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) +
𝛼2𝑐 (𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛼′(𝜃𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝑖

where the vector 𝜃𝑖 contains country-, time-, and event-specific variables with
fixed-effects with clustered-by event errors. The results are shown in Table 33
Additional Controls and Coarsened-exact Matching in OLS models
The estimation vectors contain disaster, country, month, year, and firm-by-country
fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant factors and path-dependent CSRrelated investment in the market. To account for potential yearly trends in the availability
of disaster risk and aid (e.g., urbanization has increased exposure to certain types of
disasters), we included year dummy variables. Additionally, we used month dummies
because disasters like hurricanes show seasonal patterns in their frequency and
magnitude.
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Table 33. The Effect of Disaster Giving from Economically-Reliant MNEs on Disaster
Relief and Recovery
VARIABLES

Dependent variable:
Accumulated Donation First Month

Dependent variable:
HDI Growth Rate

0.244***
(0.054)
0.126***
(0.005)
0.001
(0.001)

19.493***
(1.609)
0.557***
(0.137)
0.001
(0.132)

0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.011***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.035***
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.001
(0.003)
0.036
(0.056)
-0.000
(0.000)
3,044.217***
(1,125.475)
-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
-0.063***
(0.009)

0.078***
(0.020)
-0.011
(0.041)
-0.066
(0.041)
0.043***
(0.006)
0.419***
(0.056)
1.025***
(0.386)
-0.407***
(0.121)
-0.013
(0.170)
3.609***
(1.173)
3.373***
(1.154)
6.095***
(1.172)

Donation from economically-reliant firms (USD)
Relatedness x Donation
Relatedness
CONTROLS
School enrollment, secondary, (% net)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Inflation Rate
Trade Openness
Openness to Aid
Size of the Economy
Area (Size)
Population
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Mass Movement Dry
Mass Movement Wet
Human Hardship (deaths)
People Affected
Estimated Damage (US Million)
Annual Number of disasters (Nation)
Annual Number of disasters (Global)
Newsworthy events
Constant

-32.824
(42.089)
-0.223
(0.580)
297,763.560
(792,109.162)
-0.049*
(0.028)
0.022**
(0.009)
0.096*
(0.051)
-31.404***
(4.062)

Observations
1,495,193
113,641
R-squared
Number of events
2,084
464
Note: Clustered-by-event bootstrapped errors in parentheses. Fixed-effects model with month-, year-, country-, and
event-effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Additional Control Variables
At the country level, total land area (km2) and total population may not only skew
disaster risk, but also the size of market systems and the likelihood of donation. Hence,
using data from the World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2014), I controlled
for the logs of these variables. Regarding event-specific controls, I used dummies for
disaster type as some specific types may fuel public response and aid more effectively
than others (Birkland, 1997). The impact of the disaster was also controlled using the
relative magnitude of killed, number of affected, and associated economic damage (i.e.,
killed/total population, affected/total population, and economic damage/GDP PPP,
respectively).63 Finally, to account for donor fatigue, 64 the geographical distribution of
shocks, and the learning effects of disasters, I included controls for the number of
disasters by country and worldwide in a period of one year before the focal disaster
date—both logged. Additionally, I accounted for the possibility that other major social,
political, or economic events may have crowded out organizations’ attention and
financial capacity to provide collective goods (Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Franks,
2013). Newsworthy events is the average of “the median number of minutes a news

63

I obtained these data the EM-DAT, The World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (2014). Note
that endogeneity may be an issue when regressing measures of disaster hardship. Arguably, hardship is
endogenous to the characteristics of the philanthropic response. The following subsections explain the
methods to account for this risk.
64
Club members may face the situation of allocating scarce resources to multiple collective goods in
the same fiscal exercise; early disasters may crowd out the response to subsequent shocks.
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broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day” over the forty days after the
disaster.65
Coarsened-exact matching
We used no-replacement coarsened exact matched procedure in which we targeted a
treatment-to-control ratio of 1:10, but tested up to 1:2 for robustness. CEM is carried out
with no replacement using variables chosen in accordance with the set of predictors of
speed of aid and HDI.
a) Speed of aid: 1) size of the economy, measured as the natural logarithm of a
country’s pre-disaster GDP per capita (PPP); 2) human hardship, which is the natural
logarithm of either the number of people killed or number of people affected as reported
by EM-DAT; 3) salience, measured with the natural logarithm of (one plus) the count of
news articles in Factiva and Lexis Nexis that referred to the event in the 48 hours after its
occurrence; 4) newsworthy events, defined as the average of the median number of
minutes that a news broadcast devotes to the top three news segments in a day over the
forty days after the disaster (see Eisensee & Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this
indicator and a test of its effectiveness); 5) number of disasters at the country and at the
international level, which speaks to other events that may dilute the attention paid to a
focal disaster and; 6) openness to aid, which is a binary variable indicating the national

65

See Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) for an explanation of this indicator and a test of its effectiveness.
The variable is calculated by Professor David Strömberg and is available at http://people.su.se/~dstro/.
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government’s consent to receive foreign aid as coded from articles in Factiva and Lexis
Nexis.
b) HDI: 1) schooling measured by secondary education attainment; 2) life
expectancy at birth; 3) inflation rate as reflected in the annual percentage change for
consumer prices; 4) trade openness proxied by real exports plus real imports as a
percentage of real GDP; 5) investment rate, which is the ratio of real domestic private
and public investment to real GDP. Data for these variables is from World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI).
Pre- and post-descriptive statistics for assessing quality and measures of imbalance
were calculated as suggested by Iacus et al., (2008). We used the Freedman-Lane semipartialing method implemented as a linear probability model with fixed-effects for the
treatment and control groups (Rogan & Sorenson, 2013) to control spatial
autocorrelation in standard errors, (Dekker et al., 2007). See the Appendix for a
description of the CEM procedure.
The sum of absolute differences across the multivariate histogram has the following
form:
𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐)

1
𝑛|𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 − 𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 |
2𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘

where 𝑡𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the relative frequency of the categorical variables for the firms in the
treatment group and 𝑐𝑙𝑖..𝑙𝑘 is the correspondent number for the firms in the control group.
A magnitude of 𝐿(𝑡, 𝑐)=0 means perfect balance while a magnitude of 1 represents
perfect separation. The procedure to obtain the relative frequencies of the categorical
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variables is based on Iacus et al., (2008). Once a number of categories for each
continuous variable, a cross-tabulation of the discretized variables is generated for the
treatment and the control groups. Then, the k-dimensional relative frequency is
calculated.
Table 34. Alternate Output Variable: Annual Growth Rate of GDP
Model 1
7.70% (75th
percentile)

Model 2
24.50% (95th
percentile)

Predictor Variables

T

C

T

C

T

C

School enrollment, secondary, (% net)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Inflation rate
Trade openness
Total investment (ratio of total investment to
GDP)
Estimated Damage (US Million)

70.24
70.11
2.58
31.48

70.19
72.33
2.79
31.78

89.12
80.44
1.99
49.91

90.12
79.33
2.04
47.69

82.75
76.95
1.44
46.96

79.69
77.23
2.04
47.96

23.14

26.18

20.74

22.17

19.66

18.78

1001.89

117176.74

89992.78

3.89

3.68

1.22

% of annual GDP growth (10th postdisaster year)
p-value

810.14
811.17
1008.74
Outcome Variable
5.97

5.01

7.49

0.677

Model 3
44.40% (99th
percentile)

0.000

0.000

Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes
the distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case
basis. Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of giving economically-reliant firms (as
defined by the 75th, 95th, and 99th quantiles). The total sample of country-year disasters in the period 20032013 is 464.

Table 35. Comparing aid from Local versus Distant MNEs
The Effect of Intervention from Distant MNEs
Model 27
Predictor Variables

T

C

School enrollment, secondary (%
net)
Life expectancy at birth, (years)

68.44

71.56

56.43

Inflation rate
Trade openness
Total investment (ratio of total
investment to GDP)
Estimated Damage (US Million)

Model 28
Predictor Variables

T

C

Size of the Economy

648.51

701.29

57.97

Human Hardship (deaths)

1250.34

994.36

7.36

6.34

Salience

10.69

10.85

26.14
17.89

27.63
17.88

Disasters (Nation)
Disasters (Global)

8.93
290.15

8.24
290.14

45738.15

44993.56

8.17

8.23

0.74
386.91

0.76
399.41

Newsworthy Events
Openness to Aid
Estimated Damage (US Million)
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% of annual HDI growth
(10th post-disaster year)
p-value

Outcome Variables
1.89
1.93
% of accumulated aid at
the end of 4th week
0.387
p-value

5.43

6.01

0.527

Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the
distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis.
Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of giving from distant firms (i.e., at least 51%).

Table 36. The Role of Institutional Development
Model 1
Model 2
7.70%
24.50%
(75th percentile)
(95th percentile)
Outcome Variable
% of annual HDI growth
0.95
0.84
0.48
0.25
(10th post-disaster year)
Government Effectiveness
1.15
1.13
0.56
0.32
50th
0.94
0.99
0.34
0.19
75th
0.81
0.77
0.67
0.38
90th

Model 3
44.40%
(99th percentile)
0.54

0.22

0.74
0.57
0.38

0.31
0.24
0.16

Note: The table shows the mean values of the covariates used for matching cases and the magnitude of the
disaster response for the analyzed period only as a reference—the synthetic control algorithm minimizes the
distance between potential control disaster countries and the treated disaster country on a case by case basis.
Treated are disaster countries with a substantial share of giving from economically-reliant firms (as defined
by the 75th, 95th, and 99th percentiles). The analyses are stratified by the magnitude of the government
effectiveness index calculated by the World Bank.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation applies an integrative theoretical framework that builds on insights
from the strategy, economics, and institutional literatures to understand the drivers and
consequences of a form of non-market strategy: the corporate provision of public goods
in the aftermath of natural disasters. In three papers, I examine this type of organizational
decision-making by focusing on the firm’s economic reliance in market systems. I build
on the theory of clubs to analyze how this relationship alters the frequency and magnitude
of the organization’s choice to supply collective goods that benefit local communities. I
draw on the literature on sensemaking to evaluate how substantial environmental
uncertainty, causal ambiguity, and time pressure influence whether economically-reliant
enterprises and their stakeholders choose to imitate reputable first-mover behavior in the
face of socially constructed preferences. Finally, I study how economic reliance is the
source of dynamic capabilities and the comparative advantage of the firm versus foreign
national and multilateral public agencies to speed relief and the degree of national
recovery from natural disasters. I use a longitudinal database covering over 93,000
donations from almost 39,000 firms from 83 countries to 4,637 disasters that affected 176
countries, and novel econometric methods to increase the identification of causal effects.
CONTRIBUTIONS
I hope that my dissertation’s integrative theoretical framework helps guide similar
studies exploring the determinants and consequences of organizational decision-making,
particularly those associated with the corporate provision of collective goods. A
particularly promising research strategy is accounting for the role of economic reliance
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and its effects on the likelihood and magnitude of corporate behavior, the ability of a
corporation to identify what stakeholders consider when facing uncertainty and ambiguity
and, then, choosing efficiently when to move first or follow, and on the competitive
advantage of certain firms to generate economic surplus for external stakeholders. The
results suggest that a theoretical argumentation based on economic reliance provides a
clear identification of the set of business decision-makers that are prone to behave prosocially. Broader public-goods systems better characterize the frequency and magnitude
of pro-social behavior among firms with no clear economic reliance. Such firms may
donate, but the likelihood of not observing a donation is comparatively large.
Hence, my dissertation uncovers a form of strategic consideration whose effect
remains understudied (cf., Aguinis and Glavas, 2012; McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright,
2006; Mellahi et al., 2015). My analyses show that traditional strategic considerations
arguments such as reputational capital with internal (Flammer & Luo, 2015) and external
stakeholders (Muller & Kräussl, 2011) or physical presence (Muller & Whiteman, 2008)
alone do not capture the effect of economic reliance. Additionally, in my sample, such
has greater explanatory power than social preferences theories altruism (Batson &
Powell, 2003), fairness (Kahneman et al., 1986), and warm glow (Andreoni, 1990).
Across the three chapters, the data confirm that studying national markets as club
systems where entities share the costs and benefits of collective goods is a useful
methodology to predict corporate behavior. This approach informs the institutional
literature on how local institutional forces affect organizational behavior. My findings
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suggest that the effect of institutional development on non-market strategy is more
complex than the extant literature has suggested (Dorobantu et al., 2017). On the one
hand, firms react positively to a government’s willingness to follow policies and
regulations that guarantee the efficient use of resources and facilitate the maximization of
its private benefits. This conforms with work showing that institutional development
enhances corporate pro-social behavior (Marquis & Qian, 2013; Young et al., 2008). At
the same time, when firms perceive that the government is incapable of supplying
collective goods, they increase their average giving. Taken together, my dissertation
provides a more nuanced understanding of the role of institutional forces in disciplining
firms into a certain non-market strategy than previous studies (Mellahi et al., 2015).
The findings in Chapter 1 contribute to the literature on industry self-regulation
(Barnett & King, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). This literature situates the motives of the
provision of collective goods in a collectivity circumscribed by the industry (Baron,
2009). My study focuses on the notion of a business community defined by geographical
markets, a collectivity of industries. From this perspective, my study extends the
literature on industry self-regulation to explain variance in the studied behavior across
nations (i.e., groups of industries). My study thus helps understand how the predictions
of the literature on self-regulation regarding the capacity of firms to overcome collective
action problems show statistical regularities across nations (Baron, 2001; Ostrom, 2003;
Prakash & Potoski, 2007).
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Chapter 2 suggests that one source of debate in the literature on timing strategy (e.g,
first-mover advantage) is the little attention to the determinants of stakeholder
expectations (Fosfuri et al., 2013). In this regard, I suggest a structural mechanism behind
the social construction of performance advantages. When corporate behavior is a
relatively novel phenomenon, stakeholders cope with uncertainty and ambiguity by
focusing on prominent, easy-to-collect signals. Cognitive referents replace formal
institutions and objective mechanisms based on probability estimates. Stakeholders often
follow different cognitive referents than firms when evaluating the contextual
appropriateness of timing choices.
By showing that the performance consequences of donations to disasters depend
heavily on the timing of donation, I contribute to contribute to the literature on nonmarket strategy where timing is a dimension that has not been explored systematically
(Mellahi et al., 2015). Traditionally, scholars approach the analysis of the relationship
between financial performance and corporate social performance as a comparative
evaluation of pro-social versus non-pro-social firms when these choices are made in
stable conditions (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). Therefore, how performance benefits arise
under environmental uncertainty and causal ambiguity in fast-paced environments is
largely an open empirical question.
Combined lessons from Chapter 1 and 2 formalize a contribution to stakeholder
theory by suggesting that economic reliance increases the ability of firms to predict
stakeholder expectations. My study informs about the factors that make geographically
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located customers, competitors, and governments strategic stakeholders for the
organization (Freeman, 2010). My study suggests that the market standing of the firm and
the degree of market competition are two necessary elements to understand when and
how power dependence, need for legitimacy, and urgency vary across firm-stakeholder
relationships (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Finally, my dissertation suggests that drawing upon the scholarship on dynamic
capabilities (Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997) may help address a longstanding debate in
the literature on non-market strategy scholars. We know very little about the economic
consequences of pro-social behavior and opinions are divided as to whether performance
benefits for the firm and economic surplus for stakeholders should be expected
(Dorobantu et al., 2017). At the heart of this debate is the fact that there is little theory to
predict when and why a firm’s actions will create sizeable economic surplus, or the
conditions under which businesses might be better-able than other types of entities to
deliver such benefits (Kaul & Luo, 2017).
I propose that these inquiries can be addressed by connecting the findings in Chapter
3 with the causal intuition in Chapter 1. Economic reliance facilitates the firm to identify
local needs in times of distress. This drives managers’ attention on economically costly
disasters that can disrupt the financial performance of the corporation—those extreme
events that hit countries where the firm has economic interdependencies and where there
is a significant gap in the traditional sources of aid (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). By
confirming that economically-reliant firms are in an advantageous position to help drive
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timely delivery of disaster aid, thereby lessening the adverse effects of natural disasters
on social welfare, my dissertation sheds light on the mechanisms that explain firms’
comparative advantage to supply collective goods after disruptions vis-à-vis other donors
(Godfrey, 2005; Hart, 1995; Porter & Kramer, 2002).
Consequently, considering the unique capabilities of economically-reliant firms and
the situations where these are likely to be deployed in ways that yield positive outcomes
for society is a promissory avenue of research. The core insight in the application of
dynamic capabilities is that performance differences—especially in rapidly changing and
uncertain environments—arise from varied dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin,
2000). While most studies compare firms, there is also evidence that dynamic
capabilities differ systematically among organizational forms (Hannan & Freeman, 1984;
Romanelli, 1991).
To summarize, my dissertation is one step in the direction to understand the
antecedents and effects of corporate disaster giving with unambiguous and objective
measures that enhance replication. Given the coverage of the dataset, my study better
informs on the firm-, industry-, and country-specific factors that moderate and mediate
the determinants and consequences of the organizational choice than previous studies.
Traditionally, pro-social behavior has been evaluated at the country level and, although
there have been influential studies on corporate disaster giving using a multi-country
setting, these limit to one event affecting several countries (Whiteman et al., 2005) or a
few single-country events (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014). Moreover, my study covers
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organizations that commonly are not included in the extant literature such as firms from
emerging countries, particularly when they give abroad. Finally, my dataset mitigates the
risks of measurement error and omitted-variable bias that have been a concern regarding
the findings of observational studies in developing countries (Mellahi et al., 2015).
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
My dissertation centers on the argument that firms in an industry consider themselves
as part of a supportive club in a country. Thus, when an exogenous event harms the value
of their club good, they may have an incentive to rebuild it by giving. The assumption is
that the investment equilibrium reached before the event is disturbed by the disaster, and
thus after the event, it again becomes logical to invest in the club good.
Empirically and theoretically, the study of the drivers and consequences of disaster
giving within industries make sense given the characteristics of the phenomenon, e.g.,
firms from the same industry tend to donate the same amount, but the observation of
similar donation amounts do not occur across firms from different industries. However,
further study of the unpacked conditions and mechanisms that affect the frequency and
magnitude of donation and its consequences at different levels of analysis is needed. For
instance, one may argue that exclusivity misstates the nature of the effected club. Large
disasters destroy assets across a wide range of industries. If the club good is the
functioning of the local economy, then actors from many industries own stakes, and the
effected club is much broader than a single industry. It follows that the external
stakeholders that evaluate the contextual appropriateness of the business response and
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reward and punish firms may also be customers of different industries. They thus
evaluate such responses across industries and not within the industry.
The findings on the economic value of corporate disaster giving call for further
investigation to understand the optimal value of the provision of collective goods from
the social standpoint. My dissertation focuses on cases where there is a disaster funding
gap, and corporate aid comes as an unmitigated social good. However, a plausible
argument is that the marginal productivity of corporate giving will decrease as its
magnitude increases because such productivity is partly a product of complementarities
with public investment (Cavallo & Daude, 2011; Khan & Kumar, 1997). Private giving,
for instance, may well stimulate public intervention in areas or on a scale that firms are
not willing or able to fully achieve themselves.
Moreover, corporate giving requires an institutional framework that is difficult to
substitute through private mechanisms or externalize via markets. That is, a lack of public
goods may make the costs of supplying disaster relief and recovery unbearable for an
average firm. Additionally, it is likely that some of the strategic factors that motivate
corporate giving may be only salient when there is also an opportunity for enhancing
business-government relations. Managers may expect to bolster corporate legitimacy in
the local market by giving to disasters (Marquis & Qian, 2013), but that depends on a
parallel interest by traditional donors.
Another open question that may be of interest for institutional theorists concerns the
association among efficiency in corporate giving, economic growth, and institutional
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development. Recalling that low-income nations also tend to have relatively low
institutional capacities (The World Bank, 2014), an interesting paradox arises. Corporate
disaster giving constitutes a scarcer resource in low-income countries; hence its marginal
value should be higher than in high-income countries. At the same time, lower levels of
local institutional capacities may result in a lower marginal productivity of business
giving. For instance, high levels of corruption increase the inefficiency of recovery
funding since governments are less likely to enforce building codes and infrastructure
quality (Kahn, 2005), and more likely to engage in rent seeking (Cavallo & Daude,
2011). Hence, from the perspective of global welfare, is it efficient to allocate private
giving to lower-income countries that may have a higher marginal utility for its victims
but lower utility for productivity? Further empirical work may help clarify this paradox.
Taken the lessons from the three chapters together, my dissertation shows that the low
economic footprint of corporations in some countries makes corporate giving more a
function of social preferences, such as altruism, and given our argument on the conditions
for a comparative advantage of the firm, a less impactful resource on social welfare
(Ballesteros et al., 2017). Hence, the fact that traditional international aid concentrates on
countries such as Nepal and Burma and corporate aid on countries such as Chile and
Japan is an efficient allocation of global resources. The rise of corporate disaster giving is
a Pareto-improvement mechanism in disaster countries lacking enough international aid
for disaster funding (Hochman & Rodgers, 1969). Moreover, if the corporate donor
obtains private benefits from such giving and the private gains are not misdirected from
business purposes (e.g., philanthropy is not subject to moral hazard, Jensen & Meckling,
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1976; Salomon, 2013), the effect is to enhance shareholder value (Porter & Kramer,
2002) and no other sector of society is worse off, corporate disaster giving can thus be
seen as a Pareto optimal choice—a subject worthy of further exploration.
The findings suggest that the study of organizational decision-making in the context
of disasters is a good cornerstone for theory development in the strategy and organization
literatures, where systemic or correlated risk remains understudied (Oetzel & Oh, 2014;
Salomon, 2013). Particularly attractive for institutional and organizational theorists is
that natural disasters commonly involve “an excessiveness” where the salience of
specific social arrangements and stakeholder relationships increases (Klinenberg, 2003).
This phenomenon facilitates the observation of societal and institutional dynamics that
are commonly obscured and small in scale (Durkheim & Mauss, 1963; Klinenberg,
2003; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013).
Nevertheless, applying the integrative framework to other settings may provide a
comparative evaluation of the predictive power of the three theoretical cornerstones in
more stable market conditions. For instance, in the absence of systematic disruptions, do
we need dynamic capabilities to differentiate the comparative advantage of the
corporation to provide collective goods or would a differentiation between the general
characteristics of the firm and other societal entities suffice? What happens when we
compare the ability of the firm to accrue performance benefits in stable market
conditions? Do we find that firms are more effective to predict and satisfy stakeholder
expectations with their pro-social behavior? My findings suggest that the divergence in
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cognitive referents between firms and stakeholders is robust to lower degrees of
uncertainty and ambiguity.
Additional limitations and boundary conditions of my dissertation are associated with
the focus on publicly-traded and relatively large firms. Although this type of
organizations accounts for nearly 90 percent of the recorded corporate donations in the
observed period (and, thus, selection bias is mitigated), smaller and/or private firms may
follow unique mechanisms and conditions when behaving pro-socially. Future work
based on case studies may better complete our understanding of private provision of
collective goods by unpacking such factors. This effort also would provide a finer
grained understanding of the relationship between economic reliance and the geographic
distribution of club systems particularly in countries with large territories.
In this regard, a future avenue of research entails the collection of data at the local
and regional level to better unpack the causal effect of economic reliance on corporate
pro-social behavior. For instance, incorporating zip code data in the analyses would help
us understand in a more accurate fashion the spatial distribution of disaster damage,
market activity, and corporate giving. Scholars conducting single-country studies have
made progress in the conceptualization of (geographically circumscribed) business
communities (Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). My study suggests a method to replicate such
endeavor in a longitudinal and international setting.
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Beyond its theoretical value, this dissertation has implications for management
practice. In 2015, an average large corporation was 300% more likely to engage in
disaster giving than 25 years before. Because the money allocated to disaster aid often
surpasses a corporation’s total annual social budget (Ballesteros et al., 2017), and several
studies suggest that disaster giving is a high-stakes decision often associated with
competitive advantages (Madsen & Rodgers, 2014; Muller & Kräussl, 2011; Patten,
2008), the timing of donating is an important managerial question. In this way, my
dissertation—centers on the fundamental transformation that the business world is now
undergoing in attention given to the growing number of large (correlated or systematic)
risks and, particularly natural disasters, and how it is affecting firms’ non-market strategy
and their relationships with their stakeholders (George et al., 2016).
Overall, my findings suggest that firms are more likely than not to make inefficient
decisions regarding their engagement in disaster giving. About 51% of firms engaging in
this behavior obtained negative performance consequences that were significantly larger
than the size of their donations. As such, I provide evidence of the factors that managers
should consider when choosing to engage in corporate pro-social behavior under
conditions under conditions of high informational and time constraints.
The economic hardship associated with natural disasters is expected to continue to
grow because of expanding human settlement in regions exposed to extreme natural risks
(Cutter et al., 2009; Dong & Tomlin, 2012; Kunreuther & Useem, 2009; von Peter et al.,
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2012). Traditional sources of humanitarian aid and standard insurance practices have not
proven sufficient to cover fat-tail disaster losses, particularly in large markets (Kellett &
Caravani, 2013; Noy, 2012; Weitzman, 2011). The value of corporate disaster giving for
socioeconomic development is thus likely to grow over time. In this context, the cardinal
practical question will be how such form of pro-social behavior can be stimulated and
disciplined organically, and this dissertation may inform such endeavor.
The rise of corporate disaster giving may be a Pareto-improvement mechanism in
disaster countries lacking enough international aid for disaster funding (Hochman &
Rodgers, 1969). Moreover, if the corporate donor obtains private benefits from such
giving and these benefits are not misdirected from business purposes (e.g., giving is not
subject to moral hazard, Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Salomon, 2013), the effect is to
enhance shareholder value (Porter & Kramer, 2002) and no other sector of society is
worse off, corporate disaster giving can thus be seen as a Pareto optimal choice—a
subject worthy of further exploration.
My dissertation presents an exploratory effort of this exploration. The findings help
unpack the conditions under which corporate disaster giving may provide benefits for the
donor firm and the affected country. When disaster-stricken countries receive significant
proportions of international aid from firms that have economic reliance and a positive
pre-disaster reputation, firms realize post-donation revenue that is not explained by
market operation and countries receive relief comparatively fast and recover in great
magnitude.

194

Aside corporate disaster giving, firms are facing calls to not only engage in
traditional forms of non-market strategy, but also to adopt responsibilities that have
historically fallen to aid agencies, governments, and non-governmental organizations
(George et al., 2016). Firms are increasingly developing self-regulatory standards to
substitute for regulations that governments are unable or unwilling to enforce (Ostrom,
2000; Potoski & Prakash, 2005), building hospitals, schools, and community projects
(Matten & Crane, 2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 2008). Others are leading important social
innovations such as telemedicine and distance learning (Ballesteros, 2013).
In this dissertation, I propose theories and methods suitable for replication in other
non-market settings. I hope that my work helps scholars to deepen the understanding of
the conditions and mechanisms under which the corporate provision of collective goods
provides benefits for the firm and society at large.
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ANNEX
A DATABASE OF DISASTER DONATIONS
Data Collection and Coding Procedures
My dataset comprises data on every sudden natural disaster recorded in the EM-DAT
database. As detailed below, I used a combination of manual and automatic procedures to
find data on disaster donations, and code their value and sources. We searched for news
items related to each disaster in the Factiva and Lexis Nexis databases. The search
window is one year after the official time of occurrence of the disaster according to EMDAT. For example, the 2010 earthquake in Chile had the range 02/27/2010-02/27/2011.
To identify relevant articles, we searched for combinations of ‘affected country name’,
‘type of disaster’, and (where applicable) ‘disaster name’.
We searched within each article for information on the type of disaster, and corporate
aid donations.
a.
follows:

The disasters that passed the criterion of a sudden shock were identified as

i.
Mass movement: “landslide” OR “avalanche” OR “rockfall” OR
“subsidence”
ii.
Earthquake: “seismic” OR “quake” OR “earthquake” OR
“tsunami”
iii.
Flood: “flood”
iv.
Storm: “storm” OR “typhoon” OR “cyclone
v.
” OR “hurricane” OR “tornado”
vi.
Volcano: “volcano” OR “volcanic” OR “eruption”
b.
Corporate giving was identified by searching for the following terms:
“donation” OR “donate” OR “donated” OR “donating” OR “pledge” OR “pledged”
OR “pledging” OR “give” OR “gave” OR “given” OR “giving.” An example of the
Boolean search is:
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[03/11/2011-03/11/2012]; (“Japan” OR “Japanese” OR “Japan’s” OR
“Japans”66) AND (“tsunami” OR “earthquake” OR “quake” OR “disaster”) AND
(“donation” OR “donate” OR “pledge” OR “pledging” OR “give” OR “gave” OR
“given” OR “giving”).

Coding each corporate aid donation
To make over 2,310,000 electronic reports computationally tractable, we applied
differential language analysis using JavaScript Object Notation (i.e., JSON and AJAX) to
parse the data. For each article, we coded the following fields:
•

Entity making the donation

•

Actual donation.
o In case of in-kind donations, the characteristics of the product or service
were recorded (e.g., 1000 bottles of water, a team of nine technicians) and
monetized using either current prices applicable in the affected country
(e.g., the average price of one litter of bottled water, the daily man-power
wage for a specific professional or technician) or an equivalent pecuniary
value based on other firms’ reporting of their donation to the same
disaster.
o In case of donations reported in a currency different than the dollar, we
converted using the currency exchange rate of the day of the donation.

•

To increase the relevance of the output (for example, some news reports were a
series of articles with no relevance to the study but whose combination would

66

There were spelling mistakes in some articles.
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make the report to be included in the outcome), the search was qualified with the
following filtering process:
o The name of the country had to be within 50 words of the type of the
disaster or the word “disaster.”
o Entities and the act of donating were parsed: The entities per article were
extracted and grouped in three categories: organization (e.g., Tepco),
location (e.g., Canada), and individual (e.g., Barack Obama).
o The verb identifying the act of donating had to be within 30 words of an
entity
Coding for giving from economically-reliant corporations and related aid
We used an automated coding process to search within each report for details about
the type, financial value, date, and source of each donation. Researchers coded donations
that were coming from corporations with local affiliates as reflected in the Lexis Nexis
Corporate Affiliations database. For each in-kind donation, we recorded the
characteristics of the product or service in question and converted this to a monetary
figure based on current prices in the affected nation, the monetary value reported by the
donor, or the reported value of similar donations from other organizations. Donations
were converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the date the gift was made.
For Chapter 3, we coded a measure of related giving that reflects the degree to which
disaster aid leverages firm-specific routines or resources. To calculate this, we began by
using a firm’s four-digit SIC code to identify its key business activities. We coded the
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dollar amount of in-kind donations that aligned with these activities as related [i.e.,
products, services, or activities that are relevant for the firm’s market operation (e.g.,
Bayer providing medicines in response to Typhoon Haiyan)].
Once these two coding procedures have been completed, we randomly selected a
sample of 5% of coded donations. Researchers not involved in the previous procedures
checked for measurement error. This resulted in fewer than 5% of the selected sample
that marked as inaccurate. About 60% of these errors were mainly associated with
monetizing the in-kind value of donations, with less than 8% of the donations were
incorrectly marked as related giving. The rest of sample of discrepancies were mainly
associated with missing data on the nature of donor’s business.
Assessing Data Quality
The following procedures were implemented to rule out measurement error:
1.

Five percent of the events (156) were randomly selected and giving was

manually searched using Google, Lexis Nexis, and Factiva. From this procedure,
5.128 percent of the selected events (8) had data inaccuracies, e.g., donation amount,
date of donation.
2.

We had access to exclusive information of donation for the 2010 tsunami

and earthquake in Chile via the Chilean government. By comparing our database with
the list of donors provided by the Chilean government, we found that our dataset
comprised 68 percent of the official source. Our tracking did not include donating
frequency of small- and medium-sized Chilean, non-multinational enterprises. In
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terms of magnitude, our dataset accounted for 92 percent of the total corporate aid for
the event.
3.

When available, the accuracy of the data was corroborated using external

sources:
a.

The Financial Tracking System (FTS) of the United Nations Office

for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is a global database
that records self-reported international humanitarian aid for different
humanitarian crises.67 The FTS has information on corporate donation for
about 3 percent of the tracked events; and government and NGO donation for
about 10 percent of the tracked events. In all cases, for corporate giving, the
built dataset was larger than the FTS dataset.
b.

Disaster corporate aid trackers of the Corporate Citizenship Center

(CCC) at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation.68 This source provided
information on corporate donation for 0.610 percent of the tracked events. In
all cases, our database was larger than the CCC dataset.
DATA FOR THE MEASURE OF ECONOMIC RELIANCE
The distinct levels of company hierarchy are the following with information from
Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations database:

67
For information about the method of collection of FTS data and their verification, visit the following
site: http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=AboutFTS-Data.
68
These data are available at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/corporate-citizenshipcenter/disaster-corporate-aid-trackers.
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Table 37. Company hierarchy according to the Corporate Affiliations database

Ultimate
Parent

The very top company listed in a company hierarchy and the ultimate
controlling company within a corporate structure.

Parent

The top tier within an organization but may not be the “ultimate parent.”
It should have other companies reporting to it, and would itself report to
another legal entity. In many cases the terms, “parent” and “ultimate
parent” are used synonymously. Corporate Affiliations commonly refers
to the “ultimate parent” as the “parent.”

Subsidiary

Separate corporate legal entity owned by the company at 50.1% or more.

Joint
Venture

A business in which two or more companies share responsibility and
ownership.

Affiliate

A separate legal entity in which there is an ownership interest by the
parent company of less than 50%.

Division

An internal unit of a company, not incorporated or a separate legal entity.
Usually tends to have many employees.

Branch

An internal unit of a company, not incorporated or a separate legal entity.
Usually tends to have a small number of employees.

Unit

Same definition as division.

Factory

Same definition as division.

Plant

Same definition as division.

Group

Corporate classification grouping “like“ industries or businesses

Holding

A business whose voting stock is owned to influence its board, policies,
and management.

Non–
Operating
Entities
(Shells)

Legal non-operating entities (displayed at the bottom of its immediate
parent’s hierarchy)

201

Treatment of Missing Data
Given the relatively small subset of firms engaging in disaster giving by event,
addressing this issue with traditional strategies like listwise deletion or mean substitution
would have fostered the risk of obtaining biased estimates, increasing Type II errors, and
underestimating correlations and coefficient weights (Stock & Watson, 2003). Therefore,
I used two different methods to address missing data. The primary analyses were
conducted with the first method and the second method was used for robustness checks.
First, I used a multiple-input bootstrapping algorithm for time-series-cross-sectional
data as explained by Honaker et al. (2011). This form of multiple imputation accounts for
smooth time trends, changes across cross-sectional variables, and time and space
correlations and it susceptible to integrate scant knowledge to specific cells when
available. A review of how this method can produce more accurate imputation
particularly for data used in the social sciences than traditional procedures can be found
in Honaker and King (2010).
Second, I used imputation with maximum likelihood. This strategy centers on the
observed relationships among the covariates and considers a degree of random error that
takes into account uncertainty of imputation (Blackwell, Honaker, & King, 2015). For
increasing accuracy of the MLE calculation, I grouped the data by industry.
Additionally, to cope with missing values on the event-specific variables, I applied
multiple imputation based on a bootstrapping-based algorithm as recommended by
Honaker, King, and Blackwell (2011). To account for nonlinear effects in the case of

202

disasters, I used dummies to inform if killed, total affected, and estimated damage were
in the percentile regions 0th-25th, 25th-50th, 50th-75th, or 75th-95th , with the omitted
categories are above 95th.
CAUSAL INFERENCE
The analyses for the different chapters sought to exploit the considerable benefits that
the characteristics of the phenomenon present for obstacles for the identification of causal
effects. The variation in the studied behavior across firms, geographies, and time
facilitate statistical regularity in a degree not observed in the extant literature. Overall, the
setting offers several advantages for causal inference that are particularly beneficial for
the study of the consequences of corporate behavior.
First, it is not subject to the endogeneity traditionally affecting the study of the
implications of corporate pro-social behavior. The exogenous nature of the disaster
mitigates the risk of reverse causality when assessing the link between the organizational
choice and its material consequences. Second, the characterization of the size and
frequency of the organizational choice overcomes subjective concerns that have affected
the empirical literature. The key constructs associated with financial performance (i.e.,
annual revenue) and economic value (i.e., aid collected within the first post-disaster
month and the annual growth rate of the Human Development Index) are unambiguous
and objective. This enhances internal validity and facilitates replication. Finally,
contextual factors that often are assumed such as environmental uncertainty, causal
ambiguity, and time pressure can be measured. The size of the dataset increases statistical
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power when analyzing country-time factors such as institutional development. By
stratifying the dataset, I have been able to better capture the effects of these factors on the
studied relationships.
Despite these econometric advantages, the study of the broad relationships present
different challenges for the identification of causal effects. Decision-making is likely
endogenous to some of the explored covariates. The risk of documenting a spurious
relationship is particularly high since the discussed organization-specific variables (e.g.,
financial performance) and pro-social behavior are likely moving in the same direction as
idiosyncratic unobserved factors (e.g., managerial capabilities and risk aversion).
Alternatively, the direction of the causal relationship may not be clear. Therefore, I
applied followed a variety of strategies to increase causal inference.
Regarding the study of economic reliance as a driver of corporate disaster giving, one
concern in my study is that the decision to enter a market is endogenous to the likelihood
of engaging in disaster giving. That is, given the geographical (and, thus, political, and
socioeconomic) heterogeneity in the context of disaster risk, firms with a similar
propensity to donate self-select into specific market systems. The econometric problem
here is that donating and economic reliance are both moving in the same direction as an
unobserved factor (e.g., adversity to systemic risk), which prevents an observation of the
causal effect of economic reliance on the frequency and size of giving.
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To mitigate the occurrence of this issue, I applied coarsened exact matching (CEM) 69
(Iacus et al., 2008, 2011) to balance the baseline propensity to engage in pro-social
behavior between the treatment (i.e., firms with at least one affiliate in the affected
country) and the control groups (i.e., firms with no presence in the market). To conduct
the match, I draw on the literature in non-market strategy and, specifically, corporate
disaster giving. I compared pre- and post-descriptive statistics in the treatment and
control groups for assessing quality. Additionally, I calculated measures of imbalance as
suggested by Iacus et al., ( 2008). The main results hold in the matched sample, which I
include in the Appendix in addition to the matching summary.
Additionally, a plausible argument is that the effect of economic reliance on the
provision of collective goods is heterogeneous across events. For some shocks, economic
reliance may have relatively little effect because of the magnitude of news coverage
(Stromberg, 2007). For instance, events such as Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. and the
2010 earthquake in Haiti were certain to receive philanthropic giving irrespective of the
economic connection of the organization. Therefore, it is likely that the studied
association is stronger for events whose probability of being in the news is relatively low.
Thus, I followed Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) and conducted robustness analyses
limiting the sample to disasters with a probability of being in the news of 50 percent and
lower. I also run analyses including countries that never received donations from firms,
which does not affect the estimates.

69

See (King et al., 2011) for a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of matching methods.
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The study of the consequences of corporate disaster giving presents even greater
challenges for causal inference. For instance, regarding the effects on firm performance,
the study focuses on how the perception of the contextual appropriateness of corporate
disaster giving, driven by media reputation and corporate financial standing, affects
donations decisions and performance benefits. Testing these associations is a complex
task because reputation, financial standing, and donation choices are likely endogenous to
firm performance. Isolating causality requires an approach that compares performance
variables among firms that donated with different timing and magnitude, and have
distinct levels of media reputation and financial standing, but are otherwise similar
regarding underlying attributes. The assumption of heterogeneity in these characteristics
but homogeneity in everything else is difficult to satisfy and poses an estimation
challenge for conventional panel-data techniques. The risk of documenting a spurious
relationship is particularly high since financial performance and pro-social behavior are
likely moving in the same direction as unobserved factors such as managerial capabilities
and risk aversion. Similarly, nations may have capacities that are independent of
corporate giving, but difficult to empirically isolate, such as variance in their ability to
care for citizens and manage disaster responses. Not taking these factors into account
may lead to biased, inefficient estimates
Conventional panel-data tools such as fixed-effects and control variables impose the
assumption that ex ante firm- and context-specific trends extend to post disaster
conditions, which is often not the case. Difference-in-differences and traditional quasiexperimental designs eliminate unobserved heterogeneity but require effects to be time206

invariant (Abadie et al., 2010; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). Furthermore,
large-sample matching methods do not work very well when the number of
counterfactual units or sample periods is small, as is the case in my study. In turn,
matching methods such as coarsened-exact matching exhibit a limited ability to find a
suitable control because of the small number of similar cases.
Synthetic control method. Given these considerations, I applied the synthetic control
method (SCM) in my second and third chapter as the second-best econometric option for
causal inference to a field experiment. This method allows me to reproduce a quasiexperimental design. The key difference between the SCM and traditional matching
techniques is that control entities are made up of combinations of different potential
counterfactuals. This method uses an algorithm to evaluate the efficiency of every firm
not affected by the treatment variable in reproducing the pre-treatment characteristics of
firms affected by the treatment. These characteristics are selected from variables (i.e.,
predictors) thought to drive the outcome variable (i.e., the dependent variable in
traditional regression), in my case annual revenue, speed of aid, or the rate of growth the
Human Development Index. Once found, these units are averaged into a single case,
corresponding to a synthetically created firm (see Abadie et al., 2010, 2015 for detailed
discussions). For instance, no one firm approximates the underlying characteristics of
Anglo American in the years leading up to the 2010 earthquake and tsunami. However,
features of Rio Tinto, Antofagasta, Tek, Bifox, and Codelco are combined in different
proportions to form a synthetic ‘Anglo American’ that closely matches features
predictive of corporate disaster giving. Thus, SCM controls time-variant and invariant
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unobserved heterogeneity and allows us to understand what would have happened to the
donation magnitude of a given firm to a disaster-country pair in the absence of the
treatment.70 Likewise, no one country approximates Chile in the years leading up to the
2010 earthquake and tsunami. However, features of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Paraguay, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States can be integrated in different proportions
to form a synthetic Chile that is a close match on features that predict the speed of
disaster relief as well as the nation’s historical levels of social welfare.
The statistical efficiency of SCM relies on minimizing the difference between the
predictors of every treated firm and its synthetic control in each of the analyzed predonation periods. Because standard errors in traditional panel-data methods measure
uncertainty in aggregate data, statistical inference with SCM is run differently. I calculate
the likelihood that the observed revenue or measures of disaster recovery are the effect of
corporate disaster giving versus chance by conducting falsification exercises like
permutation exercises, which are called placebo tests. In practical terms, I artificially
reassign the intervention to entities in the control pool and run SCM by using a firm that
did not channel its donation through an NPO as a treated entity. I then match this placebo
firm with a synthetic counterfactual and assess the results. I repeat this procedure with
every entity in the control group, which generates a distribution of effects that are indeed
observed by chance. I finally compare this distribution of false treatment effects with the
actual distribution and generate p-values. The benefit of the SCM is that is always
70

Our online appendix shows how the SCM algorithm combines features of these firms to approximate
Anglo-American responding to the 2010 disaster in Chile. See
https://disastergiving.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/synthetic-control-method.pdf.
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feasible to calculate the exact distribution of the estimated effect regardless of the number
of donor firms, disaster-country pairs, and observation periods.
FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SYNTHETIC CASE METHOD
The traditional case-study method used in the extant literature has two critical
empirical challenges. First, comparison cases are often chosen based on subjective
criteria of affinity. Second, they typically use data on a sample of disaggregated units,
but employing inferential techniques that observe uncertainty at the aggregate value in
the population.
Uncertainty about the efficiency of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual
result is not mitigated with the availability of aggregated data because such uncertainty is
not captured by the standard errors of the traditional inferential methods commonly
employed (Abadie et al., 2010). Applying the synthetic logarithm to every potential
disaster country in the control group allows us to better assess if the studied effect found
in the synthetic control for the disaster country with the minimum share of business
giving is significantly large vis-à-vis the effect estimated found in a randomly chosen
country with no intervention. This inferential method is efficient because it is always
feasible to calculate the exact distribution of the estimated effect of corporate disaster
giving regardless of the number of disaster countries. Thus, the inference identifies
whether the estimated effect of the business intervention is significantly large vis-à-vis
the distribution of effects for the disaster countries not exposed to a ratio of corporate
disaster giving to disaster relief of at least five percent.
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I use Chapter 3 to formalize describe the SCM. To test the hypotheses, we analyzed
three levels of treatment. The distribution of corporate giving is highly skewed,71 which
means that using the mean value of 5.25% combined with standard deviations is not an
efficiency strategy. Instead, we used the 75th (7.7% of aid is from economically-reliant
firms), 95th (24.5%), and 99th (44.4%) percentiles as treatment cutoffs. For relatedness,
we used three treatment levels in our analysis. As the distribution for relatedness is
relatively normal, we used the mean (26.9%) and +/- one standard deviation (11.5% and
42.4%) as treatment indicators.
We compared disasters that prompted a share of economically reliant corporate
giving of at least the share of giving from economically-reliant firms defined by each
quantile (i.e., intervention) to a weighted combination of a control events with a lower
proportion of business response (i.e., the synthetic control). Without loss of generality,
our sample of J+1 events contains one event with such a degree of corporate disaster
N
giving and J events in the potential control group. Let Yit be the dollar amount of total

disaster aid or HDI that would be observed for disaster country i at time t in the absence
of the intervention, for disaster countries i=2,…,J+1, and periods t=1,…,T. Let YitI be
the dollar amount of total disaster aid or HDI that would be observed for disaster country
i at time t if that country received the intervention, which provides a proxy of the
efficiency to supply essential collective goods (Day et al., 2012).

71

See the online appendix at https://corpsanddisasters.wordpress.com/.
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Given the unpredictability of the analyzed shocks, the disaster giving has no effect on
the outcome before the intervention and anticipation effects are ruled out. That is, for
i  1,..., N  and t  1,..., T0  , YitI  YitN . Implicit in the notation is the assumption of no

interference between units (i.e., the intervention does not affect outcomes of the
I
N
untreated disaster countries; cf., Rosenbaum, 2007). Let it  Yit  Yit be the effect of the

intervention for disaster country i at time t, and let Dit be an indicator that takes value
one if disaster country i is exposed to the intervention at time t. Hence, the observed
outcome is
Yit  YitN  it Dit

(5)

Because only the first disaster country is exposed to the intervention and only after
period T0 , where (1  T0  T ) , then
1 if i  1 and t  T0
Dit  
0 otherwise

The target parameters are (1 , T01 ,..., 1 , T ) , which are the lead-specific causal effect
of corporate disaster giving on total disaster aid and social welfare. Thus, for t  T0 ,
1t  Y1tI  Y1tN  Y1t  Y1tN

(6)

Since Y1tI is observed, I approximate Y1tN to estimate 1t . t=1,…,T. Let vm be a certain
weight that captures the relative importance of the n-th variable and helps minimize the

211

differences between the pre-disaster characteristics of the treated disaster country and the
synthetic country control, W. Hence, the synthetic control estimator that captures the
effect of the share of economically connected corporate disaster giving in the treated
𝐽+1
𝐼
disaster country is given by 𝑌1𝑡
− ∑𝑗=2
𝑤 𝑗 𝑌𝑗𝑡 .

I estimate the studied effect as follows:
YitN  t  t Zi  t i   it

(7)

where  t is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across disaster
countries, Z i is a (r 1) vector of the predictors described above,  t is a (1 r ) vector of
unknown parameters, t is a (1 F ) vector of unobserved common factors,  i is an
( F 1) vector of unknown factor loadings, and the error terms  it are unobserved country-

specific shocks affecting disaster aid or social welfare with zero mean for all i and t.
Notice that we do not conduct a prediction of ex ante disaster giving in our matchedcase-study analysis. Arguably, disaster donations are observed only after the occurrence
of the shock. Additionally, recall our strategy of focusing on sudden disasters. Also
notice that, as suggested, our estimation method allows the effect of unobservable
heterogeneity to vary over time.
Case example. Constructing a Synthetic Chile 2010
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The following is the result of the SCM algorithm assigning weights to different
disaster-afflicted nations whose combination statistically resemble the pre-disaster
trajectory of the HDI growth rate.
Table 38. Synthetic control of Chile 2010
Control

Weight

Afghanistan

0

Albania

0

Algeria

0

American Samoa

0

Antigua and Barbuda

0

Argentina

0.460

Armenia

0

Australia

0

Austria

0

Bahamas

0

Bangladesh

0

Barbados

0

Belgium

0

Belize

0

Bolivia

0

Bosnia-Hercegovina

0

Brazil

0.109

Bulgaria

0

Burkina Faso

0

Cambodia

0

Canada

0

China

0

Colombia

0.172

Comoros

0

Congo

0

Costa Rica

0

Croatia

0

Cuba

0

Cyprus

0

Czech Rep

0

Denmark

0

Dominica

0

Dominican Rep

0

Ecuador

0
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El Salvador

0

Ethiopia

0

Fiji

0

France

0

Georgia

0

Germany

0

Greece

0

Guadeloupe

0

Guam

0

Guatemala

0

Haiti

0

Honduras

0

Hong Kong (China)

0

Hungary

0

India

0

Indonesia

0

Iran Islam Rep

0

Iraq

0

Ireland

0

Italy

0

Jamaica

0

Japan

0

Kazakhstan

0

Kenya

0

Kyrgyzstan

0

Lao P Dem Rep

0

Latvia

0

Lithuania

0

Macedonia FRY

0

Madagascar

0

Martinique

0

Mexico

0.148

Moldova Rep

0

Mongolia

0

Morocco

0

Mozambique

0

Myanmar

0

Namibia

0

Nepal

0

Netherlands

0

New Zealand

0

Nigeria

0

North Korea

0

214

Norway

0

Oman

0

Pakistan

0

Panama

0

Papua New Guinea

0

Paraguay

0.083

Peru

0

Philippines

0

Poland

0

Portugal

0

Puerto Rico

0

Romania

0

Russia

0

Rwanda

0

Samoa

0

Saudi Arabia

0

Senegal

0

Serbia

0

Seychelles

0

Slovakia

0

Slovenia

0

South Africa

0

South Korea

0

Spain

0.017

Sri Lanka

0

St Lucia

0

St Vincent and The Grenadines

0

Sudan

0

Sweden

0

Switzerland

0

Taiwan

0

Tajikistan

0

Thailand

0

Tonga

0

Trinidad and Tobago

0

Turkey

0

Turks and Caicos Is

0

Uganda

0

Ukraine

0

United Kingdom

0

United States

0.001

Uruguay

0

Venezuela

0
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Viet Nam

0

Yemen

0

Zimbabwe

0

Placebo exercises
To check on the validity of our findings, we extended the procedure suggested in
Abadie et al., (2010, 2015) and ran placebo tests as a falsification exercise. The approach
works by reassigning the treatment of interest to untreated entities. Each placebo entity is
then matched with a synthetic control, and values for predictor and outcome variable are
calculated. If the results of this analysis mirror what is observed for actually treated
entities, this would cast doubt on the argument that treatment is indeed producing the
outcome of interest. For instance, if we want to observe the placebo effect of corporate
giving on recovery of the 2008 earthquake in China (given that this nation received fell
in the 95% percentile of share of giving from economically-reliant firms), we choose
another similar disaster nation that received less than 24.5% of giving from corporations.
We expect, if our argumentation is correct, that we will not observe a meaningful
difference in post-disaster recovery (as proxied by the trajectory of the HDI growth rate)
between the false China 2008 and all those nations included in the synthetic control.
We first need to make sure that the SCM has done a good job in finding a synthetic
control. We expect that the differences in the predictor values are not statistically
significant.
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Predictor Balance:
Table 39. Accumulated placebo exercises for Chile 2010
Synthetic
Treated Control
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
71.8
68.5
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
22.5
22.2
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
19.9
22.2
School enrollment, secondary, (% net)
55.5
5.9
Inflation
5.1
5.9
Total investment (ratio of total investment to
GDP)
38.7
30.9

As shown in the following figure, this assertion holds.
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Figure 8. A Placebo Effect of Giving in the Post-Earthquake China’s Recovery
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Or the following is one of the falsification exercises for the United States’ recovery from
2004 Katrina.
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Figure 9. The Effect of Disaster Giving on the Hit of Hurricane Katrina on the U.S. GDP
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Conversely, the following is the difference in the GDP annual growth rate between the
actual Chile that suffered an earthquake and tsunami in 2010, but received over 44% of
giving from economically-reliant firms, and a synthetic control.
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Figure 10. The Effect of Disaster Giving on the Hit of the 2010 Disaster on Chile’s GDP
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Estimating placebo effects for every control nation allowed us to create outcome
distributions for both the speed of aid, and disaster recovery. If results from our analysis
of actually treated nations were to fall inside of these placebo-effect distributions, it
would cast doubt on the validity of our findings. Ultimately, this process enables to use pvalues to conduct a statistical comparison of the placebo-distribution and the estimated
effects in treated nations.
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